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ABSTRACT
Boolean games are a succinct representation of strategic games wherein
a player seeks to satisfy a formula of propositional logic by selecting a
truth assignment to a set of propositional variables under his control.
The difficulty arises because a player does not necessarily control every
variable on which his formula depends, hence the satisfaction of his
formula will depend on the assignments chosen by other players, and
his own choice of assignment will affect the satisfaction of other players’
formulae.
The framework has proven popular within the multiagent community
and the literature is replete with papers either studying the properties
of such games, or using them to model the interaction of self-interested
agents. However, almost invariably, the work to date has been restricted
to the case of pure strategies. Such a focus is highly restrictive as the
notion of randomised play is fundamental to the theory of strategic
games – even very simple games can fail to have pure-strategy equilibria,
but every finite game has at least one equilibrium in mixed strategies.
To address this, the present work focuses on the complexity of algo-
rithmic problems dealing with mixed strategies in Boolean games. The
main result is that the problem of determining whether a two-player
game has an equilibrium satisfying a given payoff constraint is NEXP-
complete. Based on this result, we then demonstrate that a number
of other decision problems, such as the uniqueness of an equilibrium
or the satisfaction of a given formula in equilibrium, are either NEXP
or coNEXP-complete. The proof techniques developed in the course
of this are then used to show that the problem of deciding whether
a given profile is in equilibrium is coNP#P-hard, and the problem of
deciding whether a Boolean game has a rational-valued equilibrium is
NEXP-hard, and whether a two-player Boolean game has an irrational-
valued equilibrium is NEXP-complete. Finally, we show that determin-
ing whether the value of a two-player zero-sum game exceeds a given
threshold is EXP-complete.
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Part I
GAMES , BOOLEAN AND OTHERWISE

1
INTRODUCTION
It was done intentionally of course. The testers who tested this game
went nuts. At first it was easier, but when the testers said “this is too
difficult”, I made it even more difficult.
— Itagaki Tomonobu
The connection between games and logic is a natural one, and not
merely because the game-theoretic concept of a “game” is broad enough
to encompass just about every human endeavour; reason leads to argu-
ment, and an argument begs strategy to be won. It should come as no
surprise that it was the highly litigious society of Athens that gave birth
to the European logical tradition, nor that some of the most memorable
arguments of Plato have a distinctly game-theoretic undertone.
With the increasing mathematisation of both disciplines in the nine-
teenth and twentieth century this connection too matured from the
intuitive to the formal. Logics old and new find semantics in the in-
teraction of strategic agents; epistemic properties of games are ready
targets of logicians on the prowl; logic and games is the subject of
various journals, conferences, lecture courses.
Among the fruits of this interaction is the framework of Boolean
games (Harrenstein, van der Hoek, Meyer, et al. [2]), in which players
assign truth values to propositional variables with the aim of satisfying
a target formula. Boolean games function as succinct representations
of strategic games, as the size of the truth function defined by a logical
formula is potentially exponential in that of the formula. Such suc-
cinct representations are widely studied as the textbook normal form
of strategic games scales too poorly to be used for anything but peda-
gogical purposes.
Logic is hard, however, and playing a game of itself is by no means
trivial. Questions of complexity, thus, marched alongside Boolean games
from the beginning, and at present much of the landscape is understood
– in the case of pure strategies. The complexity of decision problems
dealing with mixed strategies and mixed equilibria had been almost
entirely neglected. This is the focus of the current work.
1.0.1 Contribution
We demonstrate that the the following problems are NEXP or coNEXP-
complete for two-player Boolean games:
• ∃GuaranteeNash: deciding whether a Boolean game has an
equilibrium satisfying a payoff constraint.
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• ∀GuaranteeNash: deciding whether all equilibria of a Boolean
game satisfy a payoff constraint.
• ∃NashSat: deciding whether a Boolean game has an equilibrium
that satisfies a given formula.
• ∀NashSat: deciding whether all equilibria of a Boolean game
satisfy a given formula.
• UniqueNash: deciding whether the equilibrium of a Boolean
game is unique.
• IrrationalNash: deciding whether a Boolean game has an equi-
librium where at least one strategy weight is irrational.
We also show that the following problem is NEXP-hard for Boolean
games with at least three players:
• RationalNash: deciding whether a Boolean game has an equi-
librium where all strategy weights are rational.
Finally, we show that IsNash, the problem of determining whether a
given profile is an equilibrium, is coNP#P-hard and DValue, deciding
whether the value of a two-player zero-sum Boolean game is above a
given threshold, is EXP-complete.
1.1 the structure of the work
In Chapter 2 we introduce the framework we are working in and present
some key results and definitions from the theory of strategic games that
future arguments will take for granted. We then discuss how Boolean
games and the results of this thesis relate to the wider literature.
The technical content begins in Chapter 3. This is our quarry, and the
lemmata we prove here will serve as building blocks for the main results.
These involve developing a system of shorthand to discuss numbers and
arithmetic in propositional logic, as well as introducing two-player zero-
sum gadget games of a fixed value that will allow us to simulate finer-
grained preferences than what the win-lose nature of Boolean games
allows.
We set the cornerstone in Chapter 4 by showing that the problem
∃GuaranteeNash is NEXP-complete for two-player Boolean games.
This is the main technical result of the thesis, and it demonstrates how
the vocabulary introduced in Chapter 3 can be used to simulate the
computation of a Turing machine via a profile in mixed strategies. It is
worth studying closely, as subsequent results will be variations on the
same theme.
In Chapter 5 we exploit the result and techniques of the preced-
ing chapter to broaden the edifice and demonstrate that UniqueNash,
∃NashSat, ∀NashSat ∀GuaranteeNash and IrrationalNash are
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either NEXP or coNEXP-complete. We also demonstrate that Ratio-
nalNash is NEXP-hard for three-player Boolean games, and IsNash
is coNP#P-hard if the number of players is unbounded.
The capstone, Chapter 6, shows that DValue is EXP-complete for
two-player zero-sum Boolean games. This result demonstrates how the
machinery developed thus far can be used to translate proofs from a
wider class of succinct game representations to the case of Boolean
games.
We top out in Chapter 7, presenting a summary of the results and a
discussion of problems left unsolved.
No construction site is without its scrapheap, and the adventurous
dumpster-diver can turn to Appendix A for proofs deemed unworthy
to grace the pages of this thesis and Appendix B for lines of thought
that did not lead to anything substantive.
Certain sections in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are marked as scho-
lia.These are sections of reduced formality, intended to serve as justifi-
cations, explanations and asides. The results of these scholia either do
not contribute to the technical content of the work, or are standard
results that are assumed knowledge in the algorithmic game theory
literature. Readers well acquainted with the field can either skip or
skim the scholia with no detriment to the understanding of the main
theorems.

2
PREL IMINARIES
No one can make aught thereof,
And wisdom must be wedded to his soul,
Who from these pieces can invent a game.
— Shahnameh, C. 1725
2.1 framework
2.1.1 Games and representations
Boolean games can be, and have been, motivated in many different
ways; perhaps the wide appeal of the concept is due precisely to the fact
that scholars from the logic, multiagent, and game theory communities
can all claim it as their own. The motivation we adopt in this work,
then, is necessarily sectarian. We have little to say about what these
games tell us about the algebra of logic, or their fecundity in modelling
a multiagent environment. Instead, we place the stress firmly on their
place in the wider algorithmic study of an object known as a finite
strategic game.
The finite strategic game can be thought of as a game in the abstract,
with all the fat stripped away: what is the smallest set of pieces needed
to construct a game? Clearly, if a game is to be played, there need be
players. Next, these players need to be endowed with some capacity of
choice: some actions or strategies that they may choose to employ, else
we could make do without players altogether. And finally, the game
needs to have an outcome, which the players may interpret as their
heart desires. It is these three elements, without any embellishments of
time, state space, or information, that motivate our first definition.
Definition 2.1.1. Consider a finite set of n players, N = { 1, . . . , n }. Our convention for
pronouns will
treat odd players
as male and even
players as female.
For each i ∈ N , Player i is equipped with a finite set of pure strate-
gies, Si. An n-tuple of pure strategies, one for each player, is called
a pure-strategy profile. The space of pure-strategy profiles is denoted
S = S1 × · · · × Sn. Player i’s utility function maps pure-strategy pro-
files to the reals, ui : S → R. A finite strategic game is the triple
(N, {S1, . . . , Sn }, {u1, . . . , un }).
There are two natural families of subclasses of such games. First, we
could restrict the number of players; the class of games where n is equal
to k gives us the k-player games. Two-player games, in particular, will
be of interest to us in this thesis. On the other hand we could restrict the
codomain of the utility functions, particularly since, given the biases
of our field, we shall always have issues of computability in mind. It
7
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is then natural to consider the class of rational-valued games, in which
every ui has its range restricted to Q. In the more radical case where
we restrict the range to { 0, 1 }, we term the result win-lose games.
A more complicated subclass, based on semantic rather than syn-
tactic considerations, is that of zero-sum games. A game is said to be
zero-sum just if there exists a c such that for every s ∈ S, the following
equation is satisfied:1
n∑
i=1
ui(s) = c. 
We would like to stress that what we have just defined is an abstract
mathematical object and few people, if any at all, visualise games in
the manner described. One would be tempted to sketch a state space,
or a payoff matrix, or perhaps even concretely imagine a situation of
actual beings interacting in a competitive setting. We study shadows
on the wall to reconstruct the object from which they arise.
If we do not shy from pedantry (caveat lector: we won’t), we may
claim that even had one the desire to, to reason about a game in the
abstract is simply not possible – after all, a set has no order, yet we
write S1 = { s1, . . . , sm }.
We wish to make this notion of representing an abstract mathemati-
cal object with a concrete data structure precise, due to the algorithmic
nature of our enquiry; it is well and proper for a human being to con-
ceive of a problem in whatever way convenient, provided they return
to the definition once they \begin the proof environment, but a ma-
chine must be informed precisely how the sequence of symbols on its
tape relates to the object in question. This brings us to the notion of a
representation:
Definition 2.1.2. Let G be a class of finite strategic games. A represen-If R is a
representation of G
and f(R) = G, we
will overload
terminology by
referring to R as
the representation
of G.
tation of G is a pair (R, f), where R is a class of finite data structures,
and f is a computable procedure that, given R ∈ R, lists the players,
pure strategies and graphs of the utility functions of some G ∈ G.
A representation is said to be adequate with respect to G if for every
G ∈ G there exists some R ∈ R such that f , run on R, lists the
components of G. 
It is clear that no representation can be adequate with respect to
the class of all finite strategic games as the reals are non-denumerable.
1 Strictly speaking, we have defined a constant-sum game. In a zero-sum game c
ought to be zero. There is, however, no harm in such abuse of terminology, for
reasons we will see in Section 2.1.1.2. The main benefit of this choice is a certain
resonance with the wider literature; standard theorems state results for zero-sum
games which in fact apply equally to constant-sum games, so this spares us the
need for trivial corollaries; the conflation of zero/constant-sum nomenclature is by
no means uncommon among authors, putting us in good company; and outside
the technical literature of game theory the term “zero-sum” has come to signify a
situation of complete competition, which of course applies equally to the constant-
sum case. Moreover, a personal affection of the author for the euphonic character of
the word “zero” may have swayed the decision.
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Figure 2.1: A two-player game in normal form.
Looking at a rational-valued game, however, a canonical choice seems
evident: this is a finite object, so why not just write it down in its
entirety? This leads us to the normal form:
Definition 2.1.3. The normal form is a representation of finite strate-
gic games obtained by listing the components of a game, including
the graphs of the utility functions, explicitly. In the case of two-player
games this is frequently presented graphically in the form of a labelled
table, as in Figure 2.1. 
Fact 2.1.4. The normal form is adequate with respect to rational-
valued games.
Example 2.1.5. Prisoner’s Dilemma is a game where two prisoners
have to decide whether to inform on their partner in crime or to remain
silent (S1 = {Talk1,Silent1 }). If both prisoners are silent then the We use
superscripts to
record player
ownership where
necessary.
state will lack the evidence to prosecute, but the police will still be
able to pin a minor offence on them, interning them for a short while
(u1(Silent1, Silent2) = −1). If one informs and one stays silent, the
informer will be set free (u1(Talk1,Silent2) = 0) and the other given
the maximum sentence (u2(Talk1,Silent2) = −5). If both talk, they
will be given slightly shorter sentences in light of their cooperation
(u1(Talk1,Talk2) = −4).
Battle of the Sexes is a game where Player One and Two are trying
to decide on a venue for a date. Player One prefers ballet and Player
Two prefers boxing. In case of successful coordination, the player at
their venue of choice gets a utility of 3 and the other player a utility
of 2. The utility for standing outside the venue in the rain, waiting for
someone who never comes, is 0.
Matching Pennies is a game where Player One and Two simultane-
ously display a coin either heads or tails up. If both coins have the
same orientation, Player Two pockets a utility of 1 while Player One
walks away with 0. If the orientations are different, Player One gets 1
and Player Two 0.
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The normal forms of these games are displayed in the left column of
Figure 2.2. 
The tabular presentation of the normal form allows us to better vi-
sualise the strategic considerations the players are embroiled in. Every
square represents a strategy profile, or an outcome of a game. Player
One would naturally wish to find himself in a square where his utility
is highest. However, he can only control the row of the table; it is up
to Player Two to determine which column they play in. It is only when
Player One finds himself in a position where he is in profile s and there
is another s′ in the same column for which ui(s′) > ui(s) that he can
change his choice of strategy to improve his payoff – he has a profitable
deviation.
The profiles where no profitable deviations for either player exist,
then, are in some sense stable: we do not claim that a play of any game
will naturally end up in such a profile, but if the players find themselves
in such a position, and are aware of it, they will have no incentive to
leave. This brings us to a fundamental solution concept in game theory,
the Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.1.6. A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is a pure-strategyAs Nash equilibria
are the only kind
of equilibria that
will be of interest
to us, we will refer
to them simply as
equilibria.
profile, s, from which no player has a profitable deviation.
That is, if we use s−i(sj) to represent the strategy profile obtained by
replacing Player i’s strategy in s with sj ∈ Si, then s is an equilibrium
precisely when the following is satisfied:
∀i ∈ N, ∀sj ∈ Si : ui(s) ≥ ui(s−i(sj)). 
Example 2.1.7. Prisoner’s Dilemma has one pure-strategy equilib-
rium: if Player Two is silent, Player One would rather talk as that
would net him a utility of 0 as opposed to −1. If Player Two talks,
then talking will get Player One a utility of −4, whilst being silent −5.
Thus no matter what Player Two chooses, Player One would choose to
talk – this is an example of what is called a dominant strategy. As the
game is completely symmetric, the same argument applies to Player
Two and in equilibrium both players dob each other in.
Battle of the Sexes has two pure-strategy equilibria: both players
go to the boxing match or both players go to the ballet performance.
In any profile where the players disagree on the venue, both have the
incentive to change their strategy and increase their payoff from 0 to
either 2 or 3. The players may disagree on the relative merits of the two
equilibria, but they would certainly rather be at either of them than
alone on Friday night.
Matching Pennies has no equilibria in pure strategies. Should Player
One choose tails, Player Two will choose tails. Should Player Two
choose tails, Player One will choose heads. There is no pure-strategy
profile in which neither player can improve their payoff by deviating.
The equilibria, and the profitable deviations, are displayed in the
right column of Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2: Three games in normal form, the players’ deviations and resulting
pure-strategy equilibria.
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The case of Matching Pennies bears further consideration, as it demon-
strates that even very simple games can fail to have a pure-strategy
equilibrium; if we cannot account for this fact, then the limits of the
mathematical treatment of games would appear to be grave indeed. Let
us then consider where the problem lies. Player One does not want to
play heads, as Player Two will respond with heads and win the game.
Neither does he want to play tails, as Player Two can counter with tails
as well.
Of course, this description of the situation is not faithful to our defi-
nition of a game – Player Two does not get a chance to observe Player
One before responding, the coins are displayed simultaneously. In this
sense, in a single match of Matching Pennies it does not really matter
what strategy Player One chooses. Nevertheless, if Player One displays
a certain predilection for heads, then over a sequence of ten matches
(some nights are more boring than others) Player Two may discover
this bias, and start responding with heads. Player One, of course, is not
stupid. There may be no sure way to win the game, but there is a clear
means to avoid losing: display heads or tails in an unpredictable pattern
through the matches (James Bond fans may recall Bond’s rock-paper-
scissors match with Tanaka). This gives us a frequentist interpretation
of randomised play, or what we call a mixed strategy:
Definition 2.1.8. A mixed strategy for Player i is a probability distri-
bution over Si. An n-tuple of mixed strategies, one for each player, is
called a mixed-strategy profile. If we let P(X) denote the space of prob-
ability distributions over X, then the space of mixed-strategy profiles
is P(S) and the space of mixed strategies for Player i is P(Si).
We extend a utility function from the space of pure-strategy profiles
to mixed-strategy profiles on the basis of expected utility. That is, the
function ui : S → R is extended to Ui : P(S) → R in the followingWe will conflate ui
with Ui where no
confusion will arise
manner:
Ui(σ) =
∑
s∈S
ui(s)P (s | σ).
We can thus define a mixed-strategy equilibrium analogously to the
pure strategy case: it is a strategy profile σ satisfying the following
condition:
∀i ∈ N, ∀σj ∈ P(Si) : Ui(σ) ≥ Ui(σ−i(σj)). 
Example 2.1.9. Matching Pennies has a unique mixed-strategy equi-
librium where both players display heads with probability 1/2. The util-
ity Player One derives from this equilibrium is 1/2: there is a 1/4 chance
of (Heads1,Tails2) being realised, and a 1/4 chance of (Tails1,Heads2).
This gives a 1/4 + 1/4 probability of getting a utility of 1, and the other
two profiles yield a utility of 0. If Player One were to deviate to playing
Heads1, then there would be a 1/2 chance that Player Two would play
Tails2, giving Player One a 1/2 probability of getting a utility of 1, and
a 1/2 chance of Heads2, and hence a utility of 0. The same holds for a
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deviation to Tails1, mutatis mutandis, so Player One has no incentive
to deviate. As the game is symmetric, neither does Player Two.
Battle of the Sexes has an additional equilibrium to the two we have
already seen in which Player One plays Boxing1 with probability 2/5
and Ballet1 with probability 3/5, and Player Two plays Ballet2 with
probability 2/5, Boxing2 with 3/5. The payoff to Player One is 2/5 · 3/5 ·
2 + 3/5 · 2/5 · 3 = 6/5. This is also the payoff he would get for playing
Ballet1 (2/5 · 3) or Boxing1 (3/5 · 2).
Prisoner’s Dilemma has no additional equilibria. This is a conse-
quence of the presence of strictly dominant strategies – under any cir-
cumstance, Player One has a strict preference for squealing, and hence
there can be no equilibrium in which he randomises over talking and
staying silent. 
The reader will note two things. First, unlike with pure-strategy equi-
libria, we made no attempt to motivate how players reach these states.
We have already mentioned that equilibria are best thought of as states
in which the game stays, rather than states which the game reaches.
This will be useful to keep in mind when we construct the complex
equilibria needed to prove our results – it does not matter how players
arrive at such profiles, only that once they do, they will not deviate.
Second, in the example above we have only considered the case of
players deviating to pure strategies, whereas the definition of equilib-
rium requires there to be no profitable deviation in the entire contin-
uous space P(Si). There is no generality lost in doing so, as we shall
quickly verify.
Fact 2.1.10. A strategy profile is in equilibrium if and only if no player
can strictly increase his payoff by deviating to a pure strategy. This also
implies that a necessary condition for equilibrium is that a player need
be indifferent between deviating to any pure strategy in the support of
his mixed strategy.
Proof. Finding a profitable deviation for Player i is the problem of
maximising the function Ui(σ−i(σj)) with respect to the variable σj ,
over the simplex P(Si). Following Definition 2.1.8:
Ui(σ−i(σj)) =
∑
s∈S
σ−i(σj)(s)ui(s).
This is a linear function, and will therefore find its extrema at the
boundary points of the domain – the pure strategies. q.e.d.
Mixed-strategy equilibria are the subject of the most famous theorem
of game theory.
Theorem 2.1.11 (Nash [4]). Every finite strategic game has an equi-
librium in mixed strategies.
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It is, however, worth noting that game theory predates the concept
of equilibrium. Indeed, “what is a stable outcome of the game?” is a
much less natural question to ask than “what is the best way to play?”.2
There is, of course, no reason to suppose that in an arbitrary game an
“optimal” way to play should exist. A game may consist of many players
pursuing different goals, and were Player One to have an optimal choice
of strategy, that would imply that the game is in some sense trivial:
the other players do not matter at all – Player One’s strategy does not
depend on theirs.
The case of two-player zero-sum games, however, is special in that
the notion of optimal play is well defined. In such a case it makes sense
to ask how much utility this optimal strategy would secure for Player
One, which brings us to the next theorem:
Theorem 2.1.12 (von Neumann [5]). Player One obtains the same
utility in every equilibrium of a finite two-player zero-sum game. This
is called the value of the game, and Player One obtains it by playing a
maxmin strategy. That is, the optimum strategy for Player One is the
following:
arg max
σ1∈P(Si)
min
s2∈S2
U1(σ1, s2).
It should be noted that the theorems of Nash and von Neumann apply
to games rather than representations – a finite strategic game will have
an equilibrium whether it is presented in normal form or otherwise. So
far the normal form is the only representation we have dealt with, as it
is perhaps the most natural way to view a finite strategic game,3 but
this generality is of importance to us as it will save us the trouble of
restating variants of Nash’s theorem for every representation we shall
come across (and we will examine a fair number in Section 2.2). There
are two other representations we wish to introduce before the end of
this section, one for its significance for the algorithmic study of games,
and the other being the star of the show itself.
We have described the normal form of a two-player game as a payoff
table. Perhaps a more common term in the literature is a payoff matrix.
We avoided this usage as there does in fact exist a game representation
that is based on matrices in the strict mathematical sense of the word.
Definition 2.1.13. A bimatrix game is a representation of a two-player
game consisting of two matrices, A and B. The matrices are m × k,
2 The motivating question of von Neumann [5] was: “Wie muß einer dieser Spieler,
Sm, spielen, um dabei ein möglichst günstiges Resultat zu erzielen?”.
3 That said, it is worth noting that in both his 1928 paper and 1947 book, von Neu-
mann begins by defining a much more complicated game form, incorporating alter-
nating turns and chance moves, before demonstrating how such a game reduces to
a much simplified “Normalform” – namely, rather than letting players make a move
at each stage of the game, simply have them choose a single response function, a
“Spielmethode”, upfront. That is why we call the members of Si strategies rather
than moves or actions.
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where |S1| = k and |S2| = m. The (i, j) entry of A, ai,j , is u1(s1i , s2j ),
and the (i, j)-entry of B, bi,j , is u2(s1i , s2j ).
If the game is zero-sum, then only one matrix is required. This is
sometimes called a matrix game. 
Fact 2.1.14. Bimatrix games are adequate with respect to rational-
valued two-player games.
One may well ask what the point of this definition is – all we did was
split the table of the normal form in two. However, this representation
provides us with a very convenient way of evaluating utilities. Given
mixed strategies σ1 ∈ P(S1) and σ2 ∈ P(S2), interpreted as vectors
of probabilities, the utility Player One obtains from σ = (σ1, σ2) is
(σ1)TAσ2, whereas Player Two gets (σ1)TBσ2.
Equilibrium, then, is equivalent to two conditions:
∀τ ∈ P(S1) : (σ1)TAσ2 ≥ τTAσ2,
∀τ ∈ P(S2) : (σ1)TBσ2 ≥ (σ1)TBτ.
It is precisely this characterisation of equilibria as solutions to linear
systems that enabled much fruitful research into the algorithmic prop-
erties of two-player games. This is relevant for us in that it tells us that
two-player games have rational-valued equilibria, as we shall discuss in
Section 3.3.
Our main focus, however, is on a game representation that looks very
different from the normal form, in which the preferences of the players
are expressed via propositional logic.
Definition 2.1.15. A Boolean game is a representation of a win-lose
game consisting of n disjoint sets of propositional variables, Φ1, . . . ,Φn,
and n formulae of propositional logic, γ1, . . . , γn, defined over Φ =⊎
i∈N Φi.
We refer to γi as Player i’s goal formula and, as the name suggests,
the goal of Player i is to satisfy γi. To do this Player i is given control
over the variables in Φi. The game is played by having all players,
independently and simultaneously, choose a truth assignment to the
variables under their control, and then evaluating their goal formula
on the resulting truth assignment.
That is to say, a pure strategy for Player i is a truth assignment
νi : Φi → { true, false }. The set of pure strategies available to him is
thus 2Φi . The truth assignments to Φ1, . . . ,Φn are combined into a joint
assignment, ν, to Φ in the natural way, and Player i’s utility function
tracks the satisfaction of γi:
ui(ν) =
 1 : ν  γi,0 : ν 2 γi. 
Fact 2.1.16. Boolean games are adequate with respect to the class of
win-lose games where the cardinality of every player’s strategy set is a
power of two.
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Proof. A direct consequence of the expressive completeness of proposi-
tional logic: every truth function on a finite domain can be represented
by a propositional formula. q.e.d.
Example 2.1.17. Of the three example games we have considered,
only Matching Pennies satisfies the conditions of Fact 2.1.16, and in-
deed this game has a Boolean representation:
Φ1 = { p },
Φ2 = { q },
γ1 = ¬(p↔ q),
γ2 = p↔ q.
Battle of the Sexes relies on a tripartite distinction between outcomes,
so we cannot faithfully reproduce it in Boolean form. We could, however,
represent a simplified “pure coordination” variant, where the players
are indifferent to the venue insofar as they are at the same place:
Φ1 = { p },
Φ2 = { q },
γ1, γ2 = p↔ q.
Such a game will preserve the equilibrium structure of Battle of the
Sexes, but will lose the fact that players are not indifferent between
them.
Prisoner’s Dilemma does not have a Boolean form, and there is no
reasonable way to supply it with one. The tripartite distinction between
outcomes is vital. Player One has to strictly prefer (Talk1, Silent2) to
(Silent1,Silent2), or else he would see no reason to talk if paired with a
cooperative codetainee, Player Two has to strictly prefer (Talk1,Talk2)
to (Talk1,Silent2), else she would be content to suffer in silence. 
Despite several attempts to wed the two disciplines, it is fair to say
that logic and probability do not coexist peacefully in most people’s
minds. As such it is natural to ask whether mixed strategies are as
vital to the theory of Boolean games as strategic games in general.
The short answer is yes; Boolean games are an adequate representation
of a sufficiently large class of strategic games, and hence inherit all
their properties, such as the necessity of mixed strategy play for the
existence of equilibria, values of zero-sum games, and so on. In the
above example, both constructed games have the expected equilibria
in mixed strategies.
If such an answer is unsatisfactory, it helps to remember that at their
core, mixed strategies are a mechanism for coping with uncertainty.
What is sometimes regarded as the first formal theorem in game the-
ory (Zermelo [7]) demonstrates that without chance and uncertainty,
a game is determined by pure strategy play. So let us consider uncer-
tainty.
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Example 2.1.18. Consider a family of two-player zero-sum Boolean
games G(ϕ) parametrised by a formula ϕ. To play G(ϕ) Player Two
chooses a truth assignment to ϕ ν2, and Player One states whether
ν2  ϕ. That is to say, the game is as follows:
Φ1 = { p },
Φ2 = all the variables of ϕ,
γ1 = (p→ ϕ) ∧ (¬p→ ¬ϕ),
γ2 = ¬γ1.
Consider first the case without uncertainty: ϕ is a tautology or a con-
tradiction. In this case Player One can confidently proceed with a pure
strategy: setting p to true or false as the case may be. He can do so
safely because he knows for a fact that no matter what truth assignment
Player Two chooses, it will not affect the truth value of ϕ.
Now suppose that ϕ is neither. Suddenly, committing to either true or
false becomes a terrible idea, as Player Two could counter by picking
a contrary assignment. The pure equilibria disappear: if Player One
states that ϕ is true or false, Player Two can deviate by making it false
or true, and any assignment by Player Two to ϕ cannot help but either
satisfy the formula or fail to, hence Player One can deviate by setting
p to the appropriate value.
Player One simply does not know what the value of ϕ will be, and
he has no reason to prefer one to the other. He may as well set p to
true with probability 1/2.4 As it turns out, this is in fact his maxmin
strategy. 
A key feature of this representation, in contrast to the normal form,
is that Boolean games are succinct: there exist strategic games whose
normal form is exponentially larger than their smallest5 Boolean rep-
resentation. It is, however, difficult to say more than this. The size
of the normal form, the canonical representation of a strategic game, Of course for
win-lose games,
|uj(s)| = 1.
is O(nmaxi |Si|n ·maxj,s |uj(s)|). The size of a Boolean game is deter-
mined by the variable sets and formula lengths, which is O(nmaxi |Φi|+
nmaxj |γj |). How does one compare this? The dependency on the num-
ber of players is no longer exponential, to be sure, but without knowing
the magnitude of the other factors this does not tell us anything about
the total size. We could, of course, put very crude bounds on these;
in the best case, every formula is of constant size and we only need
log2 |Si| variables to represent |Si| strategies. Our game is of size:
O(n log2 |Si|+ nc) = O(n log2 |Si|).
Clearly, an improvement on the O(n|Si|n) of the normal form.
4 A less handwavy justification could invoke the principle of maximum entropy.
5 The Boolean representation is inherently non-unique, as every formula is logically
equivalent to infinitely many others.
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Φ1 = { p1, p2 },
Φ2 = { q1, q2, q3 },
γ1 = (p1 ∧ q1) ∨ (q2 ∧ q3),
γ2 = ¬(q1 ∧ q2 ∧ q3) ∧ (p1 ∨ p2).
Figure 2.3: An image of a pipe, and a representation of a game.
For the other extreme, faced with a game with no logical structure
whatsoever we might have to resort to the expedient of writing out the
payoff matrix explicitly and giving each player a gigantic DNF formula
picking out the non-zero entries. In this case the size our game would
be:
O(n log2 |Si|+ n|Si|n log2 S) = O(n|Si|n log2 S).
Which would take us a logarithmic factor above the explicit represen-
tation.
This wide range need not surprise us; there is no universal compres-
sion function so any representation adequate with respect to a suffi-
ciently comprehensive class of games cannot make them all smaller.
The question is, which case is typical? Do there exist interesting games
with concise Boolean representations, or may we just as well use the
normal form each time γi Ó= Û? This question could be seen as mo-
tivation for the results presented in this thesis: were Boolean games
incapable of providing concise representations of complicated games,
then we would expect their algorithmic complexity to be a lot lower –
after all, we could always expand the game into its normal form and run
the standard algorithm on that. The fact that we demonstrate an ex-
ponential jump in complexity for problems pertaining to the Boolean
representation would suggest that a great many algorithmically rich
games can indeed be concisely represented as a Boolean game.
2.1.1.1 Scholium: Ceci n’est pas un jeu
The famous pipe. How people reproached me for it! And yet, could
you stuff my pipe? No, it’s just a representation, is it not? So if I had
written on my picture “This is a pipe”, I’d have been lying!
— René Magritte
The framework we have adapted is quite similar to that of Schoenebeck
and Vadhan [9] and Àlvarez, Gabarró, and Serna [10], and not unlike
that of Papadimitriou [11]. However, it does differ substantially from
the way game are usually presented in the literature of both economics
and computer science. Most authors do not distinguish between a game
and its representation. What we have, after Osborne and Rubinstein
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[12], termed a strategic game, is commonly known as a normal-form
game, and the two terms are treated as synonyms. The various repre-
sentations we introduce in this thesis are generally defined simply as
games in their own right – although rarely do authors verify that these
new games inherit the classical results of game theory, upon which
much of their analysis is based.
After comparing Definition 2.1.1 and Definition 2.1.3, however, the
reader may well be tempted to take their side: the two state the exact
same thing except we call one a “game” and the other a “representation”.
One could make the argument that the distinction we are trying to
enforce is no more than petty sophistry. We hope to dissuade the reader
of any such notion.
Even though various representations of games tend to be identified
with the games themselves, the fact that some intuitive affinity be-
tween them is lurking beneath the veil is ineluctable. However, given
the choice of definitions this intuition is ultimately problematic. Eco-
nomics students, after being introduced to extensive games with im-
perfect information, are often asked to demonstrate that these are the
same as normal-form games. This task is complicated by the fact that
the claim, and others like it, are patently false – a table of values is
obviously not the same thing as a labelled tree, there is no meaningful
way to evaluate equality between a matrix and a Boolean circuit, and
Nash’s theorem certainly has nothing to say about the behaviour of a
Turing machine.
Of course, everyone knows this. What is really going on is that an
unspoken “it is intuitively obvious how to translate game X into game
Y that preserves property Z” is inserted before any such statement, and
indeed it is. But if we were to formalise this intuition we would end up
with a plethora of notions of similarity between every pair of games in
the literature, and we feel that the approach adopted in this thesis is
cleaner: it is the responsibility of the representation itself to tell us how
it relates to the concept of a game, the other representations need not
know of its existence. Then, if we want to compare two representations,
we can apply the computable procedure to obtain the game itself. This
reduces the problem of comparing arbitrary algorithmic data structures
to comparing finite sets and functions.
The distinction between a game and its representation is especially
convenient given the algorithmic nature of this enquiry. Consider the
problem of deciding whether a game has a pure-strategy equilibrium.
Clearly, the answer to this question should not depend on the game
representation used any more than the odour of a rose upon its name.
Equally clearly, the complexity of the problem could differ substan-
tially. Our convention allows us to use locutions like “∃PNE is in P
for games in normal form, but Σp2-complete for Boolean games”, rather
than defining ∃PNENorm and ∃PNEBool as separate problems.
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More importantly, it allows us to compare the complexity of repre-
sentations with respect to the entire class of such algorithmic problems,
as we demonstrate below:
Definition 2.1.19. A game representation (R, f) is polynomial-time
embeddable into (T , g) just if there exists a polynomial-time h : R → T
such that for every R ∈ R, f(R) = g(h(R)). 
We have used “=” in the definition above. This brings us to the next
question: what does it mean for two games to be the same? Standard
notions in the literature include strict equality – are the strategy sets
and utility functions identical? Strong isomorphism – can we rename
the strategies and players to obtain equality? And the Harsanyi-Selten
isomorphism – does there exist an isomorphism modulo an affine trans-
formation of utilities?
The notion we will use lies somewhere in between equality and iso-
morphism: we allow the renaming of strategies, but not of players.6 The
symbol we use for this notion is =, and when f(R) = g(T ) we say thatThis will not cause
confusion as we
will never have
need to distinguish
= from strict
equality.
the representations R and T represent the same game.
There is a natural class of algorithmic problems that do not distin-
guish between two representations that represent the same game.
Definition 2.1.20. Let A be an algorithmic problem about strategic
games. A is said to be representation-invariant if the answer to the
problem does not depend on the game representation used.
More concretely, given representations (R, f) and (T , g), if A is a
decision problem then for all R ∈ R, T ∈ T , if f(R) = g(T ) then
R ∈ A if and only if T ∈ A. If A is a function problem then in the
same conditions A(R) = A(T ). 
Fact 2.1.21. If (R, f) is polynomial-time embeddable into (T , g), then
for any representation-invariant algorithmic problem A, the (R, f) in-
herits the upper bounds on the complexity of A for (T , g), and (T , g)
inherits the lower bounds on the complexity of A for (R, f), in terms
of ≤Pm-degrees.
Proof. For the upper bound on (R, f), note that R ∈ A if and only
if h(R) ∈ A. For the lower bound on (T , g), if A belongs to a ≤Pm-
degree D, and one can determine whether some R ∈ R belongs to A
by applying h to it and running the (T , g) algorithm on h(R), then the
(T , g) case cannot be easier than D, otherwise the (R, f) case would
belong to a lower degree. q.e.d.
Note that if there exists a polynomial-time embedding both ways, i.e.
that (R, f) and (T , g) are biembeddable, then from the vantage point of
6 The names of strategies are immaterial to us, so we choose not to distinguish between
them. The numbering of the players, whilst unimportant to the mathematical side
of the enquiry, we have opted to retain as they can highlight certain links between
logical and game theoretic notions, such as negation and role switching.
2.1 framework 21
mainstream algorithmic game theory there is little sense to distinguish
between the two representations, as every representation-invariant com-
plexity result will be the same. Thus when the word “equivalent” is
used in the literature, it often means “polynomial-time biembeddable”
within our framework.
2.1.1.2 Scholium: Cardinal utility
In Definition 2.1.1, by defining ui as mapping to R we have made the
assumption that a player is able to associate a real number with every
outcome of the game, thereby expressing how satisfied he is with that
outcome. In other words we have made the assumption of cardinal
utility, and this choice begs an apology.
The history of this concept straddles the breadth of the history of eco-
nomics, from the philosophical arguments of classical political economy,
through various mathematical treatments in neoclassical economics, to
the exciting new insights shed on the matter by the burgeoning field
of neuroeconomics; we shall make no attempt to cover it here. To the
interested reader we recommend the first chapter of von Neumann and
Morgenstern [6] as a starting point, although we should note that the
authors of that œuvre themselves plead that an adequate treatment of
the subject is not the purpose of their book.
However, we would be doing the reader a disservice were we not to
expose them to the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theorem, espe-
cially as a familiarity with its consequences will aid the understanding
of certain proofs in the sequel.
It is clear that cardinal preferences are a stronger assumption than
ordinal: given a utility function ui for Player i, we can construct a
preference relation for the player, ²i, defined over all possible outcomes The strict and
symmetric
counterparts, ¼i
and ∼i, are
defined in the
natural way.
of the game (the space of mixed-strategy profiles, P(S)), simply by
setting σ ²i τ for all those σ, τ for which Ui(σ) ≥ Ui(τ ). The point
of the theorem is that under certain assumptions, it is possible to do
the reverse.
Suppose, then, that we start with a player equipped only with a
preference relation, ²i⊆ P(S)×P(S). Fortune favours the bold, so we
assume our player is decisive enough to assert σ ²i τ or τ ²i σ for any
pair of profiles: his preferences are complete. The very term of ordinal
preferences suggests an order, and order implies transitivity, so we re-
quire that if the player asserts σ ²i τ and τ ²i υ, he also affirms that
σ ²i υ. Continuity is not typically a virtue to which computer scien-
tists attach a lot of value, but in deference to our economics colleagues
we may yield the issue, and suppose that it is possible to find some
mix of a good outcome and a bad outcome that is equally appealing to
an intermediate outcome: given σ ²i τ ²i υ, we can find a p ∈ [0, 1]
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for which pσ + (1 − p)υ ∼i τ .7 Finally, as mixed-strategy profiles are
in essence lotteries, and will ultimately resolve into one and only one
outcome, it seems reasonable to assume that the presence of outcomes
that are not realised in the lottery should not affect the lottery’s value:
the outcomes are independent. Thus if σ is preferred to τ , then for any
υ, and any p ∈ [0, 1], the player asserts pσ+ (1− p)υ ²i pτ + (1− p)υ.
We seek not to convince the reader that these assumptions are reason-
able, but rather to make clear what the assumptions are. Completeness
may well be unreasonable when the players are not rational entities,
but psychologically driven creatures: I am not indifferent between pork
and chicken, but I spend a long time staring at the shelves in Tesco
trying to make up my mind. Transitivity could fail where the play-
ers do not represent unitary beings but societies of agents utilising a
voting mechanism; enter Condorcet. Continuity, among other things,
implies a certain attitude to risk: most people would prefer £1,000,000
to £999,999 to a kick in the teeth, but few would be willing to trade
£999,999 for a p chance of getting £1,000,000, no matter how close to 1
p may be. Independence, as the name suggests, is about independence.
Suppose you would prefer sunbathing in the Bahamas to skiing in the
Alps. Your travel agent offers you a lottery: you inform him of your
preference, drive to the airport and with probability p your plane will
take you to your destination of choice, and with (1−p) to an Antarctic
adventure. If you stick to your guns, you run the risk of finding yourself
armed with snorkel and swimming togs, surrounded by penguins.
Nevertheless, in a circumstance where the four assumptions are ap-
propriate we can rely on the following theorem:
Theorem 2.1.22 (von Neumann and Morgenstern [6], appendix). Con-
sider a relation ² defined over P(S), satisfying four conditions:
1. For all σ, τ ∈ P(S), σ ² τ or τ ² σ (completeness).
2. For all σ, τ ,υ ∈ P(S), σ ² τ and τ ² υ imply σ ² υ (transi-
tivity).
3. For all σ, τ ,υ ∈ P(S), if σ ² τ ² υ, then there exists a p ∈ [0, 1]
for which pσ + (1− p)υ ∼ τ (continuity).
4. For all σ, τ ,υ ∈ P(S), if σ ² τ , then for any p ∈ [0, 1], pσ +
(1− p)υ ² pτ + (1− p)υ (independence).
There exists a u : S → R that induces ². Moreover, u is unique up to
an affine transformation.
Given this uniqueness result it is tempting to declare that games that
differ only by an affine shift of the utility functions are fundamentally
7 Addition and scaling of mixed-strategy profiles is understood to be componentwise;
clearly, a convex combination of probability distributions is in itself a probability
distribution.
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“the same”, but that would be an unpolitical declaration to make in
light of our long argument on the importance of being precise about
the meaning of “sameness” in the previous section. We can however
state the following, which is sufficient for our purposes:
Fact 2.1.23. Consider games G = (N, {Si }i∈N , {ui }i∈N ) and G′ =
(N ′, {S′i }i∈N ′ , {u′i }i∈N ′) for which there exist ai, bi ∈ R, ai Ó= 0, satis-
fying the following:
N = N ′,
∀i.Si = S′i,
∀i.ui = aiu′i + bi.
Then σ is an equilibrium of G if and only if it is also an equilibrium of
G′.
Proof. Observe that given the definition of ²i, σ is an equilibrium of
G if and only if: This is, in fact,
how equilibrium is
commonly defined.∀i ∈ N.∀σj ∈ P(Si).σ ²i σ−i(σj).
By Theorem 2.1.22, we know that ui and u′i give rise to the same
²i. q.e.d.
2.1.2 Extensive games
If the first chapter of a textbook introduces a game in normal form, it
is a safe bet that the next will deal with the extensive form. The second
most famous game representation is not directly related to the techni-
cal content of this thesis, and as such this section can be safely skipped
without hindering understanding. However, a familiarity with the con-
cept is vital to navigate the literature surrounding Boolean games. As
we shall see in Section 2.2.2, the original formulation of a Boolean
game was actually as an extensive game, and not in the manner of Def-
inition 2.1.15; moreover the extensive game is often studied with other
succinct representations, as we see in Section 2.2.1.1.
Even more so than before, we would like to stress that the presenta-
tion that follows is by no means standard – the overwhelming majority
of authors do not distinguish between an extensive game and the exten-
sive form representation.8 We insist on the distinction because while
the extensive game is quite separate from a strategic game – it is an
alternative model of strategic behaviour incorporating notions of time
and information – the extensive form, a representation, can be used
to represent both extensive and strategic games. This will allow us to
8 The only exception that comes to mind is Àlvarez, Gabarró, and Serna [13]. Our
definition of the extensive game is modelled on theirs; what we define as the extensive
form, or game tree, is perhaps a more common definition of an extensive game in
the literature.
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avoid statements of the form “extensive game A is equivalent to strate-
gic game B” in favour of “the extensive form T represents the strategic
game B as well as the extensive game A”.
Definition 2.1.24. A finite extensive game consists of the following
components:
• A set N of n players, each equipped with a finite, disjoint set of
actions, Ai. We denote the combined set of actions A = ⊎i∈N Ai.
• A finite set H of histories, H ⊆ A∗, that is closed under prefixes.
Z ⊆ H is the set of terminal histories, i.e. h ∈ Z only if ha /∈ H
for any a ∈ A.
• An ownership function mapping non-terminal histories to players,
Ω : (H \ Z) → N . Whenever Ω(h) = i we require that ha ∈ H
only if a ∈ Ai. I.e., only Player i may make a move from h.
• A partition ofH\Z into some number of information sets denoted
I1, . . . , Im. Every history in an information set is owned by the
same player, i.e. there exists an i such that h ∈ Ij only if Ω(h) = i,
and the same set of actions is available at every history in a
given information set: for all h, h′ ∈ Ij , ha ∈ H if and only if
h′a ∈ H. If every Ij is a singleton we say the game is one of
perfect information.
• Finally, every player has a utility function mapping terminal his-
tories to the reals, ui : Z → R.
A strategy for Player i is a function mapping histories owned by Player
i to Player i’s actions, s : {h | h ∈ H and Ω(h) = i } → Ai, satisfying
two conditions:
1. s(h) = a only if ha ∈ H. That is, extending a history by Player
i’s choice yields another history.
2. For h, h′ ∈ Ij , s(h) = s(h′). If two histories are in the same
information set, then Player i must choose the same action at
either of them.
The reader will note that a pure strategy profile will uniquely identify
some h ∈ Z. 
Definition 2.1.25. The extensive form, or game tree, of an extensive
game is the tree induced by H. That is, the smallest tree T containing a
branch for every h ∈ H. Every node of T is thus an action, and we can
label every internal node a with Ω(a). Every leaf branch h is labelled
with ui(h) for every player i. Finally, we add indistinguishability arcs
between strategies in the same information set, labelled by the player
who cannot distinguish between those strategies. 
We make the following observation:
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Figure 2.4: The top two games induce the same strategic game, the bottom
two do not.
Fact 2.1.26. Every player in a finite extensive game has a finite num-
ber of strategies.
This of course means that should we choose to throw away all the
elements specific to an extensive game, such as information sets and
order of play, what we are left with is a strategic game.
Definition 2.1.27. Let G = (N,H,Ω, {u1, . . . , un }) be an extensive
game with strategy sets S1, . . . , Sn we say that G induces a strategic
game G′ = (N, {S1, . . . , Sn }, {u′1, . . . , u′n }) just if u′i(s) = ui(h), where
h is the outcome of G identified by s. 
Fact 2.1.28. Every strategic game is induced by some extensive game.
It might be tempting to thus identify an extensive game with the
strategic game it induces, but such a course of action has complications
– different extensive games may induce the same strategic game, and
morally similar extensive games may end up looking rather different if
their strategic counterparts are considered; consider Figure 2.4. These
examples may seem trivial, but the fact is that the question of what it
means for extensive games to be equivalent is a lot more complicated
than for strategic games, and this has been often asked in the literature
(Thompson, van Benthem, Goranko [14]–[16]).
This issue aside, what Definition 2.1.27 means is that the extensive
form, apart from being a representation of an extensive game G, can
also serve as a representation of a strategic game – the one induced byG.
Such a representation has the advantage of being succinct – a game tree
with k nodes and branching factor two induces a strategic game with
S of size O(2k) – and as such within the literature the extensive form
is at times treated purely as a concise means of representing a game.
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However, there is reason to suspect just how effective the extensive form
is in that rôle as it is all too easy to construct game trees inducing a
vast amount of strategies, the vast majority of which are redundant.
Consider a game that begins with Player One choosing to play in the
left or right subtree, each containing m binary choices for Player One,
and Player One chooses to play left. A strategy for Player One is a
choice at every node, so even though the game will never progress into
the right subtree, he still has to specify a decision at all m points.
As a result, every “actual” strategy in the left subtree ends up being
represented as 2m strategies in the induced strategic game.
We shall add to these doubts regarding the succinctness of the ex-
tensive form as a representation of strategic game in the literature
review, particularly in Section 2.2.2 where we demonstrate that there
exist games which admit a Boolean representation that is exponentially
more succinct than the game tree, but that any game that admits a
Boolean representation admits one that is at most polynomial in the
size of the game tree.
2.1.3 Algorithmic problems
In Figure 2.5 we present the problems studied in Chapter 4 and Chap-
ter 5. Other standard problems in algorithmic game theory are given
in Figure 2.6. With the exception of DValue, these are not treated in
this work.
RationalNash and IrrationalNash invoke a concept we have yet
to define, so we give it here:
Definition 2.1.29. An equilibrium σ is rational if every strategy
weight used is rational. It is irrational if at least one strategy weight is
not. 
Computability issues arise for these problems whenever the number
of players is three or greater, as there exist rational-valued three-player
games where no rational equilibria exist. This, of course, does not im-
ply that they are uncomputable, but any algorithm dealing with them
would need to deal with or represent irrational numbers in some man-
ner, and that is an issue many authors try to avoid. For this reason a
weaker notion of equilibrium is prominent in the literature:
Definition 2.1.30. Given an Ô > 0, an Ô-equilibrium is a strategy
profile σ satisfying the following condition:
∀i ∈ N, ∀σj ∈ P(Si) : Ui(σ) + Ô ≥ Ui(σ−i(σj)).
That is, a player can get at most Ô utility by deviating. 
It is important to note that an Ô-equilibrium is not an approximation
of an equilibrium – it is true that every point sufficiently close to an
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∃GuaranteeNash
Input: A representation of a game G and a vector of payoffs v.
Output: YES if there exists an equilibrium σ of G such that
ui(σ) ≥ v[i] for all i, NO otherwise.
∀GuaranteeNash
Input: A representation of a game G and a vector of payoffs v.
Output: YES if for all equilibria σ of G, ui(σ) ≥ v[i] for all i, NO
otherwise.
UniqueNash
Input: A representation of a game G.
Output: YES if G has a unique equilibrium, NO otherwise.
∃NashSat†
Input: A Boolean game G and a propositional formula ϕ.
Output: YES if there exists an equilibrium σ of G in which ϕ
holds with probability 1, NO otherwise.
∀NashSat†
Input: A Boolean game G and a propositional formula ϕ.
Output: YES if in all equilibria σ of G, ϕ holds with probability
1, NO otherwise.
IsNash
Input: A representation of a game G and (the non-zero entries
of) a strategy profile σ.
Output: YES if σ is an equilibrium of G, NO otherwise.
RationalNash
Input: A representation of a game G.
Output: YES if G has a rational equilibrium, NO otherwise.
IrrationalNash
Input: A representation of a game G.
Output: YES if G has an irrational equilibrium, NO otherwise.
Figure 2.5: Algorithmic problems studied. Those not marked with a dagger
are representation-invariant.
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∃PNE
Input: A representation of a game G.
Output: YES if G has a pure-strategy equilibrium, NO otherwise.
MaxPayoff
Input: A representation of a game G and some v ∈ Q.
Output: YES if there exists an equilibrium σ of G such that
ui(σ) ≥ v for all i, NO otherwise.
SubsetInNash
Input: A representation of a game G and some T ⊆ ⋃Si.
Output: YES if there exists an equilibrium σ of G such that all
strategies in T are included in the support of σ.
NashInSubset
Input: A representation of a game G and some T ⊆ ⋃Si.
Output: YES if there exists an equilibrium σ of G such that all
strategies in the support of σ are included in T .
DValue
Input: A representation of a two-player, zero-sum game G and
some v ∈ Q.
Output: YES if the value of G is at least v, NO otherwise.
Value
Input: A representation of a two-player, zero-sum game G.
Output: The value of G.
Evaluation
Input: A representation of a game G and (the non-zero entries
of) a strategy profile σ..
Output: ui(σ) for ever player i.
FindNash
Input: A representation of a game G.
Output: Some equilibrium of G.
Figure 2.6: Other standard problems about games. Aside fromDValue, these
are not addressed in this thesis.
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equilibrium is an Ô-equilibrium, but an Ô-equilibrium could be arbitrar-
ily distant from any actual equilibrium in the space of strategy profiles
– see Corollary 11 of Etessami and Yannakakis [17].
It is common practice to study algorithmic problems either in the
case of two-players and exact equilibria, or multiple players and Ô-
equilibria, as that facilitates tight complexity bounds. RationalNash
is an exception to this, as the two-player case trivialises away, and an
Ô version of the problem is rather meaningless. IrrationalNash, too,
does not admit a relaxation to Ô-equilibria, though the problem remains
non-trivial in the case of two-players.9
Some of the decision problems in Figure 2.5 closely resemble the
ones in Figure 2.6. It is easy to show that the problems we study are
reducible from the standard problems in the literature.
Proposition 2.1.31. The following reductions hold for Boolean games:
• MaxPayoff ≤Pm ∃GuaranteeNash.
• NashInSubset ≤Pm ∃NashSat.
• SubsetInNash ≤Pm the complement of ∀NashSat.
Proof. Clearly (G, u) ∈MaxPayoff if and only if (G, [u, u]) is a posi-
tive instance of ∃GuaranteeNash.
Given (G, {si : i ∈ T}), where each si is a pure strategy (and hence
a truth assignment), let ϕi be the formula that is true if and only if the
truth assignment is si. I.e., ϕi is a conjunction of positive literals for
those variables made true by si and negative literals for those variables
made false. Now observe that:
(G, {si : i ∈ T}) ∈ NashInSubset ⇐⇒ (G,
∨
i∈T
ϕi) ∈ ∃NashSat,
as if there exists a Nash equilibrium σ the support of which is contained
in {si : i ∈ T}, no matter which si is realised the corresponding ϕi
makes the disjunction true.
Likewise:
(G, {si : i ∈ T}) ∈ SubsetInNash ⇐⇒ (G,
∨
i∈T
¬ϕi) /∈ ∀NashSat,
because if there exists an equilibrium realising each si with non-zero
probability, it cannot be the case that in every equilibrium at least one
ϕi is false with probability 1. q.e.d.
The reason why we study ∃GuaranteeNash rather than MaxPay-
off is to make our results comparable to the work of Schoenebeck and
9 Bilò and Mavronicolas [18] claim that every two-player game has only rational equi-
libria, and hence do not study the two-player case of IrrationalNash. This is
only true of non-degenerate games, however, and determining whether a game is
non-degenerate is no easy task (Campbell and Knight [19]).
30 preliminaries
Vadhan [20]. ∃NashSat and ∀NashSat are preferred to the subset
problems as they are more natural in the Boolean games setting – it
is hard to envisage why we would care whether certain arbitrary truth
assignments are present in an equilibrium, but with ∃NashSat the so-
cial planner could specify a policy as a propositional formula and then
verify whether it is possible to implement.
2.2 the work of others
2.2.1 Algorithmic game theory
The realisation that games are hard is by no means novel; after all,
Nash concluded his 1951 paper by stating:
The complexity of the mathematical work needed for a com-
plete investigation increases rather rapidly, however, with
increasing complexity of the game; so that analysis of a
game much more complex than the example given here
might only be feasible using approximate computational
methods.
Initially, the algorithmic study of strategic games was based on the
relationship between Nash equilibria and solutions to linear systems in
the setting of bimatrix games. It was in this framework that the most
famous algorithm for computing the equilibria of a (two-player) game
was given (Lemke and Howson [21]), and the complementarity pivot
theory developed (Cottle and Dantzig [22]). While our interest in the
present work is not so much practical algorithms as complexity bounds,
the relationship to linear programming yields a result vitally relevant
to us – the existence of rational-valued equilibria in rational-valued two-
player games. We shall expound on this in greater detail in Section 3.3.
Furthermore, bireducibility between linear programming and Value
established that the problem is FP-complete (Dantzig [23]).10
Gilboa and Zemel [25] were the first to study decision problems
about games. The authors demonstrate that MaxPayoff, Second-
Nash, NashInSubset, SubsetInNash, MaxSupport and MinSup-
port are all NP-complete in the setting of two-player games in normal
form. These results were strengthened by Conitzer and Sandholm [26],
who showed that approximation variants of these problems remain hard,
as well as the #P-hardness of counting equilibria. This is the origin of
the established wisdom in algorithmic game theory – ‘non-trivial ques-
tions about Nash equilibria are NP-hard. To simplify presentation, we
denote such a “non-trivial question” as the pseudo-problem ?Nash, al-
though it should be noted that there does not exist a unifying result à
10 To be precise, at the time of writing Dantzig only showed that Value is equally
hard to linear programming. The fact that linear programming could be done in
polynomial time was not known until Khachiyan [24]
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Decision Complexity Function Complexity
∃PNE AC0 Value FP-c
?Nash NP-c FindNash PPAD-c
RationalNash† NP-h ApproxNash† SQRTSUM-h
IrrationalNash† NP-h #Nash #P-h
Table 2.1: Complexity of algorithmic problems about games in normal form.
Results are for the two-player case unless marked by dagger.
la Rice’s Theorem regarding precisely which problems ?Nash encom-
passes. NP-hardness of RationalNash and IrrationalNash, which
as we have argued are a bit different from ?Nash, was established by
Bilò and Mavronicolas [18].
The complexity of FindNash remained an open problem for a long
time before the Ô version of the problem was finally shown to be PPAD-
complete by Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou [27]. The origi-
nal proof was for four players, and in fact it was already known that
whatever the complexity for the general case, four-player games are
no easier (Goldberg and Papadimitriou [28]); the three-player case was
proved shortly after (Daskalakis and Papadimitriou, Chen and Deng
[29], [30]), and the PPAD-completeness of (exact) FindNash for two-
player games was established by Chen and Deng [31]. The hardness of
the problem persists even if most of the entries in the bimatrix represen-
tation of the game are zero (Chen, Deng, and Teng [32]). The problem
of approximating an actual equilibrium, as opposed to computing an
Ô-equilibrium, was shown to be hard for SQRTSUM (a class believed
to lie between #P and FPSPACE) by Etessami and Yannakakis [17].
One may wonder to what extent these results are pertinent to Boolean
games; these are, after all, a very restricted class of games – the payoffs
are either 1 or 0. It would be reasonable to assume that some of the
difficulty of reasoning about games concerns graded preferences, and it
is tempting to ask whether the win-lose case is therefore easier. This
does not appear to be the case. Even before the difficulty of FindNash
was finalised, it was known to be no harder in the general case than
for win-lose games (Abbott, Kane, and Valiant [33]), and Chen and
Teng [34] extended this result to an approximation scheme. Decision
problems were studied by Codenotti and Štefankovič [35] and Bilò and
Mavronicolas [36], which affirm the general pattern of things: nontrivial
problems are NP-hard. There do, however, remain problems known to
be hard for rational-valued games that have not yet been shown to be
hard in the win-lose case, notably IrrationalNash.
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2.2.1.1 Succinct representations
It was not lost on the algorithmic game theory community that the
normal form has scaling problems, and a wide variety of succinct repre-
sentations of games exist in the literature. Loosely speaking these can
be split into two general categories: those which attain succinctness by
exploiting game-theoretic properties, such as player dependency, sym-
metry of moves, information structure; and those that attain succinct-
ness by exploiting computational properties – ultimately, whether or
not a certain string of 1s and 0s can be written in a more concise form
than it is. Boolean games fall into the second camp: some data has
a concise logical representation, while an algorithmically random se-
quence of bits does not; this has little to nothing to do with the actual
properties of the game. In this section we will focus mainly on the first
category, as we shall deal with Boolean and related game representation
shortly.
The most famous of these, perhaps, is the extensive form. In Sec-
tion 2.1.2 we have discussed how extensive games could be treated ei-
ther as games in their own right, or simply as compact representations
of strategic games. The second stance is taken by Koller, Megiddo, and
von Stengel [37], who demonstrate that the complexity of Value for
games in extensive form is in FP (an alternative proof of completeness
can be found in the appendix of Fortnow, Kabanets, Impagliazzo, et al.
[38]). Note that this is no harder than for games in normal form; we
shall see that this is a recurring pattern, suggesting that the representa-
tion complexity of games (at least in terms of worst case, pathological
behaviour) lies not in their intuitive, game-theoretic properties, but
rather in the purely algorithmic structure of the players’ preferences.
Graphical games were first introduced by Kearns, Littman, and Singh
[39] and achieve succinctness by focusing on the dependencies between
players – Player i is said to depend on Player j just if there exists
a strategy profile σ and a sj ∈ Sj such that ui(σ) Ó= ui(σ−j(sj)).
A graphical game is represented by the dependency graph, which has
a vertex for every player and an edge between i and j just if Player
i depends on Player j. Every vertex is then labelled with a payoff
table consisting only of the strategies of adjacent vertices. The size of
such a representation is O(nmaxi |Si|d ·maxj,s |uj(s)|), where d is the
maximum degree in the dependency graph. This means that should the
dependency graph have bounded degree, the representation size of the
graphical game would be polynomial in the number of players.
Here, too, increased succinctness does not seem to lead to increased
complexity. The main focus of Kearns, Littman, and Singh, in fact, is
on the existence of efficient algorithms for graphical games with simple
dependency graphs rather than on the succinctness achieved by such
representations. Later, Goldberg and Papadimitriou [28] present a re-
duction from FindNash for graphical games with a degree bound of d
to FindNash for normal-form games with d2 players.
2.2 the work of others 33
Papadimitriou [11] presents a generalised scheme for reasoning about
succinct representations of games. He defines a succinct game to be the
triple (I, T, U). I is a set of acceptable inputs to T and U , both of which
are polynomial-time functions. T on input w returns (|N |, |S1|, . . . , |Sn|),
i.e. the number of players and strategies in the game. U on input (w, i, s)
returns ui(s) in the game identified by w.
This notion is very similar to Definition 2.1.2. As far as the formalisa-
tion is concerned, the only real difference is that T and U are required
to be polynomial time, whereas f can be any computable function.
In terms of intended purpose the difference is more significant. The
succinct games of Papadimitriou [11] are intended to be used as an
interface – T and U are supposed to tell us all we need to know to play
the game, and how these algorithms are implemented is unimportant.
Definition 2.1.2 is more abstract in nature – it tells us that in principle
we could recover an explicit representation of the game, but it is up to
the representation itself to provide us convenient ways to evaluate the
outcome of the game.
The main focus of the paper is on games of polynomial type, that is Boolean games are
not of polynomial
type
games for which |N | and |Si| are polynomial in |w|. This encompasses
most of the typical succinct representations (symmetric, anonymous,
polymatrix, etc). It is shown that for all games of polynomial type the
complexity of computing a correlated equilibrium is in FP – the same
as for games in normal form. Daskalakis, Fabrikant, and Papadimitriou
[40] add to this by showing a reduction to FindNash in a two-player,
normal-form game for all games of polynomial type where expected
utilities can be calculated by an arithmetic circuit of a certain kind.
While there certainly are problems and representations in these frame-
works which have a higher computational complexity than the normal
form – Evaluation for games of polynomial type is #P-hard – in gen-
eral, these representations do not appear to be sufficiently succinct to
reflect in higher complexity results. As we shall shortly see, this stands
in stark contrast to Boolean games and related representations.
2.2.2 Boolean games
The concept of a Boolean game was first introduced by Harrenstein, van
der Hoek, Meyer, et al. [2] (but see also Harrenstein’s 2004 thesis [41]).
At first glance, these entities do not appear to have much in common
with Definition 2.1.15, so we feel we ought to demonstrate how the
original definition evolved into the one commonly known today before
the reader shuts the cover of this thesis in disgust.
Definition 2.2.1. An old-style Boolean game is defined inductively
from two disjoint sets, A1 and A2, termed Player One’s and Player
Two’s actions:
• 1 and 0 are games.
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• If G1 and G2 are games, and α ∈ A1 or A2, then α(G1, G2) is a
game.
1 is the game where Player One wins, and 0 where he loses. The game
α(G1, G2), for α ∈ Ai, allows Player i to choose whether to continueA given α can
appear any
number of times in
the definition.
play in G1 or G2. We interpret performing action α as choosing G1, and
refraining from α as G2. As a result the set of pure strategies of Player
One is 2A1 , and of Player Two is 2A2 . Interpreting a win as a utility of
1 and a loss as a utility of 0, the utility function can be recovered by
traversing the induced game tree. 
This ought to remind the reader of the extensive form – an old-style
Boolean game is just a game tree with payoffs in { 0, 1 } and a branching
factor of two.11 This leads to the following observation:
Fact 2.2.2. Old-style Boolean games can be viewed as a representation
of extensive games (and, via Definition 2.1.27, of strategic games), by
means of interpreting a sentence of the form α(G1, G2) as a game tree
with children G1 and G2, and the root owned by whichever player owns
α. This representation is adequate with respect to the class of two-player
win-lose games where the cardinality of the strategy sets is a power of
two.
Moreover, if an extensive game of this form has a game tree with m
nodes then it has an old-style Boolean game representation the induced
tree of which has at most m logm nodes.
Proof. Recall that a strategy in a game tree is a choice of action at
every node. It follows that if |Si| = 2k, then it must be the case that
the number of actions available to Player i at every node is a power of
two. This means that whenever Player i has 2j actions available at an
information set we could just as well replace them with a sequence of j
binary decisions, i.e. actions in the sense of old-style Boolean games. As
the maximum number of actions Player i could have available to him is
bounded by m, the number of nodes, we would not need to introduce
more than m logm new decisions. q.e.d.
The old-style Boolean game, however, has a connection with logic
that was noted by Harrenstein, van der Hoek, Meyer, et al. [2] in Section
7 of their work, where the authors demonstrate the relationship between
winning a game and satisfying a propositional formula. This sounds a
lot closer to home, and indeed we demonstrate how this allows us to
embed an old-style Boolean game into the sort of Boolean game used
in this thesis.
11 Although do note that the notion of an action in an old-style Boolean game is not
the same thing as an action in an extensive game – a player that has only two
choices available to him would have two actions in an extensive game but only one
in a Boolean game, because the player has the power to not perform the action in
the latter.
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Fact 2.2.3 (Harrenstein, van der Hoek, Meyer, et al. [2]). Old-style
Boolean games are linear-time embeddable into Boolean games.
Proof. The key is to inductively associate a formula Form(G) with
every game, G. This formula will be the goal formula of Player One.
The set of Player One’s variables, Φ1, is set to A1 and Φ2 to A2.
For the base case, let Form(1) = Û and Form(0) = ⊥.12 For α(G1, G2),
Form(α(G1, G2)) = Form(α ∧ Form(G1)) ∨ Form(¬α ∧ Form(G1)).
The desired Boolean game is:
Φ1 =A1,
Φ2 =A2,
γ1 =Form(G),
γ2 =¬γ1. q.e.d.
We do note, however, that whilst the authors certainly understand
the connection between Boolean games and propositional formulae,
they stop short of identifying the one with the other – the game is
related to the formula, but it is never identified with it.13 The step of
dropping the game tree and keeping only the formula was taken only
by Bonzon, Lagasquie-Schiex, Lang, et al. [42], from whence Defini-
tion 2.1.15 derives. After the redefinition by Bonzon, Lagasquie-Schiex,
Lang, et al., old-style Boolean games disappear from the literature.
2.2.2.1 Algorithmic properties
The original paper on Boolean games dealt with their algebraic prop-
erties as well as the notion of relativised validity – for Player One to
have a winning strategy means that there is an assignment to Φ1 rela-
tive to which γ1 is a tautology, which is clearly a property of logical as
well as game-theoretic interest. Neither of these topics are the focus of
this thesis, though we do briefly note a connection between the algebra
of Harrenstein, van der Hoek, Meyer, et al. and a family of auxiliary
games we use in our proofs in Section 3.2.2.
Of more direct interest to us is the first algorithmic study of Boolean
games – that of Dunne and van der Hoek [43]. As algorithms need
clearly defined input, this work raised the question of how a Boolean
game is to be represented – the original definition, after all, is induc-
tive. In order to study the algorithmic properties of Boolean games,
therefore, Dunne and van der Hoek made a similar distinction between
12 For Harrenstein, van der Hoek, Meyer, et al., any propositional tautology or con-
tradiction would suffice. We, on the other hand, require that it be a propositional
constant, otherwise old-style 1 would have one strategy for Player One, while the
Boolean game image two. These two strategies are in some sense immaterial, p∨¬p is
true regardless of what Player One does with p, but our notion of game equivalence
requires the number of strategies to be the same.
13 If this sounds like a philosophical distinction, then that is because Harrenstein is a
philosopher.
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a game and a representation to that of ours, except the underlying ob-
ject for which they sought representations was not the finite strategic
game but the old-style Boolean game itself.
Dunne and van der Hoek suggest two ways to represent such a
game. Firstly, the “extensive form” is the canonical one suggested by
the statement of the definition, i.e. a sequence of symbols of such as
α(β(1,0), θ(0,0)) is interpreted as the implied game tree. Second, the
“concise form” is a sentence in the algebraic language defined by Har-
renstein, van der Hoek, Meyer, et al. [2] which uniquely identifies some
such game. This concise form is morally equivalent to the representa-
tion we use; while on the surface the concise form is built up using
symbols like + and ·, whereas ours is in the language of propositional
logic, the isomorphism between the algebra of old-style Boolean games
and the Lindenbaum algebra of propositional logic proved by Harren-
stein, van der Hoek, Meyer, et al. [2] means that we can replace such a
sentence with an equivalent propositional formula in linear time. As a
result, complexity results for concise form old-style Boolean games ap-
ply equally to the framework adopted here. On the other hand, we can
construct simple examples of games whose (smallest) extensive form is
exponentially larger than the (smallest) concise form.
Fact 2.2.4. Let G be a zero-sum Boolean game with Φ1 = { p1, . . . , pk },
Φ2 = { q1, . . . , qk }, and γ1 =
∧(pi ↔ qi). The concise form of this game
is of order |γ1|, that is O(k), but the smallest game tree has at least 2k
nodes.
Proof. We argue that the tree must have a leaf for every satisfying
assignment of γ1, of which there are 2k.
Observe that in the game described Player One has a winning re-
sponse to every strategy of Player Two. That is, if we fix any pure
strategy ν2 for Player Two, there exists a ν1 for Player One such that
Player One wins in the profile (ν1, ν2). Moreover, such a ν1 is unique
with respect to a given ν2, and ν2 is unique with respect to ν1. In other
words, if we fix ν2 then there exists exactly one ν ′ for which ν ′, ν2  γ1,
and likewise if we fix ν1 then there exists exactly one ν ′′ for which
ν1, ν ′′  γ1.
Now consider a game tree with less than 2k leaves and two profiles,
(ν11 , ν21) and (ν12 , ν22), such that Player One wins in both. There are
2k such profiles, so we can assume without loss of generality that the
plays induced by (ν11 , ν21) and (ν12 , ν22) terminate in the same leaf node,
l. Recall that a play is a path from the root to a leaf, and such a path is
unique in a tree, ergo (ν11 , ν21) and (ν12 , ν22) must induce the same play.
This gives us our contradiction – a strategy in a game tree is a choice
at every node, but decisions made at nodes that do not lie along the
play path cannot affect the outcome of the play. This means (ν11 , ν22)
and (ν12 , ν21) must also terminate at l, as they only differ in choices made
on nodes not lying on the path. This is impossible, because Player One
ought to lose at these profiles. q.e.d.
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The core results of Dunne and van der Hoek concern four problems:
WS, WE, Equiv and GE. WS concerns the existence of a winning
strategy for a given player, which we define below:
Definition 2.2.5. A winning strategy for Player i in a win-lose game G
is a strategy, sj , such that ui(σ−i(sj)) = 1 for all σ. I.e., sj guarantees
Player i a payoff of 1 regardless of the play of the other players. 
Fact 2.2.6. For a two-player zero-sum win-lose game, the following
three propositions are equivalent:
1. Some player has a winning strategy.
2. The value of the game is 1 or 0.
3. The game has a pure-strategy equilibrium.
The notion of a winning strategy is defined for all win-lose games, but
is most natural for the two-player zero-sum case; in more complicated
games winning strategies are rare and not particularly interesting (if a
player can win irrespective of the choices of the other n−1 players, what
purpose do those players serve?). Note also that there is no generality
lost in assuming the winning strategy is pure: if a mixed strategy is
winning, so is every strategy in its support.
WE takes as input a Boolean game without a partition of actions14,
and asks whether there is some partition of variables that would provide
Player i with a winning strategy. Equiv and GE deal with two notions
of game equivalence.
For concise form representations: WS is Σp2-complete, WE is NP-
complete, Equiv is coNP-complete and GE is coDp2-complete15. For
extensive form representations, all four problems are in P – this ought
not to surprise us, as we have already established that the concise form
is more succinct.
As we have already mentioned, Bonzon, Lagasquie-Schiex, Lang, et
al. [42] introduce the newer definition of Boolean games, generalising
the concept to variable-sum games with any number of players. In
addition, they show that ∃PNE, and deciding whether a strategy is
dominated, are both Σp2-complete. The authors also observe that if the
goal formulae of the players, γi, are restricted to easier fragments of
propositional logic then the complexity of ∃PNE can decrease. This
line of inquiry was later taken up by Dunne and Wooldridge [44]. We
summarise their results in Table 2.2.
To address the difficulty of ∃PNE, Dunne and Wooldridge [44] con-
sider an alternative solution concept: a k-bounded equilibrium, from
which no player has incentive to deviate without switching the value
14 Such objects are called “Boolean forms” in the early literature on Boolean games.
15 A rather arcane complexity class. A language in Dp2 is the intersection of L1 ∈ Σp2
and L2 ∈ Πp2. Not to be confused with ∆p2, which is contained within Σp2 ∩ Πp2, i.e.
L ∈ ∆p2 only if L is in both Σp2 and Πp2.
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Constraints on goal Complexity
None Σp2-complete
DNF NP-complete
Satisfiability in P NP†
Horn-renameable DNF P
Affine form P
2CNF P
Monotone CNF P
k-clause CNF P†
Table 2.2: Complexity of ∃PNE under various restrictions on goal formulae.
Results marked by dagger are due to Dunne and Wooldridge [44],
unmarked to Bonzon, Lagasquie-Schiex, Lang, et al. [42].
assigned to at most k variables. Such a solution concept clearly only
makes sense in the setting of Boolean games, and represents the idea
that players themselves may be operating under computational con-
straints, and thus only capable of considering a small number of local
deviations. For a constant k, such an equilibrium can be found in poly-
nomial time, and in the case where every player’s goal is in CNF with
at most k clauses, then every pure equilibrium is k-bounded; hence the
result in Table 2.2.
An alternative approach to tackling the complexity of Boolean games,
presented by Bonzon, Lagasquie-Schiex, and Lang [45], is based on the
dependency structure of the game. Player dependency is used in the
same sense as earlier, Player i is dependent on Player j if the utility
Player i receives from a profile depends on the strategy chosen by Player
j, and there is reason to expect that a game with a sparse network of
dependencies ought to be tractable – we would have little trouble pre-
dicting the outcome of two hundred rock-paper-scissors matches taking
place in tandem, even though the normal form of such a game is enor-
mous. We have seen that in algorithmic game theory proper this is the
motivation behind graphical games; the work of Bonzon, Lagasquie-
Schiex, and Lang is hence the Boolean game equivalent.
In the framework of Boolean games dependency between players has
a logical characterisation: Player i is not dependent on Player j if and
only if γi is logically equivalent to a γ′i that does not contain any vari-
ables from Φj . Granted, this is hardly a trivial problem to solve, but
seeing how the normal-form alternative would be to enumerate each
and every single possible strategy profile, this could be seen as an im-
provement. Bonzon, Lagasquie-Schiex, and Lang note two other possi-
ble notions of dependency; the first, peculiar to Boolean games, is to
simply consider which variables appear in γi and assume that every one
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of those is a dependency. Clearly, this is sufficient but not necessary for
dependency proper, and in the worst case this could be arbitrarily bad
– one could construct a Boolean game where every formula contains
every variable but depends on none of them. However, this notion has
the advantage of being trivial to compute, and in the case where the
formulae can be assumed to be close to minimal this is a very cheap
way to construct a dependency graph. The second, stronger, notion is
based on the observation that dependency is not the same thing as
need. Under the definition given Player i with γi = p∨ q and Φi = { p }
is dependent on the player controlling q, but clearly, Player i does not
need any other player – he can satisfy γi unilaterally. This stronger
notion, of need rather than dependency, has not, to date, been studied
in the literature.
Given a dependency graph, Bonzon, Lagasquie-Schiex, and Lang [45]
demonstrate that if the irreflexive fragment of the graph is acyclic,
then the game is guaranteed a pure-strategy equilibrium; moreover, by
splitting the graph into cliques the number of operations necessary to
compute such an equilibrium can be reduced.
2.2.2.2 Applications
Boolean games have proven to be popular in the multiagent commu-
nity, perhaps because whilst being concise they nevertheless retain an
intuition of play – it is a lot easier to get an intuitive grasp of what is
going in inside a Boolean game than a Turing machine that spits out
utilities. However, as the basic Boolean model is perhaps too simple to
model many phenomena of interests, research has also focused around
various variations on the theme.
This body of work can be roughly divided into three areas: the study
of the cooperation and coalition formation in Boolean games, incentive
engineering for Boolean games, and the use of Boolean games as models
of concrete phenomena of interest. We will address the three in turn.
The first paper to study cooperation in a Boolean games setting is
Dunne, van der Hoek, Kraus, et al. [46]. The authors study the ability
of players to form coalitions to better achieve their goals, the primary
solution concept studied being the core:
Definition 2.2.7. We say that a strategy profile ν is blocked by a
coalition C ⊆ N through a profile ν′ if the players in C strictly prefer
ν′ to ν, and can deviate from ν to ν′ unilaterally. That is:
1. ν′ ¼i ν for all i ∈ C.
2. For all p /∈ ⋃i∈C Φi, ν′  p iff ν  p.
The set of strategy profiles not blocked by any coalition is called the
core. 
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The authors are also the first to introduce a cost function into a
Boolean game, which proved to be a fertile innovation – virtually ev-
ery paper that followed included costs in one way or another. A cost
function is some c : Φ → R≥0, with c(p) indicating the cost Player i
incurs for setting p to true. Player i wants to satisfy γi, yet at the same
time wishes to minimise the costs he incurs in doing so, which allows
to represent more fine-grained distinctions between profiles than the
purely dichotomous preferences of Boolean games proper. However, a
notion of dichotomy is preserved in that every profile that satisfies γi
is preserved to those that do not, regardless of cost.16
The complexity of deciding whether a given truth assignment belongs
to the core is shown to be coNP-complete, deciding whether the core
is non-empty Σp2-complete and checking whether a given truth assign-
ment characterises the core Πp2-complete. Further work on cooperative
Boolean games was done by Bonzon, Lagasquie-Schiex, and Lang [47]
in their study of effectivity functions, and Sauro, Torre, and Villata [48]
extended the study of dependency in Boolean games to the cooperative
setting.
Ben-Naim and Lorini [49] study the power of players in this setting –
that is, which agents are essential to a coalition achieving its goal, and
which are essentially freeloaders.
A variation of cooperative Boolean games was considered by Popovici
and Dobre [50], where every player receives a certain amount of cur-
rency upon satisfying his formula. In this sense this framework is closer
to the cooperative games of classical game theory, which are charac-
terised by a function f : 2N → R which determines the payoff ev-
ery coalition can achieve by itself. However, the similarities end here.
Popovici and Dobre do not have much to say about the standard ques-
tion of cooperative game theory proper: how should coalition C dis-
tribute f(C) among its members to prevent deviation? Instead, their
notion of the core is based on a coalition trying to maximise its total
value.
An alternative model of coalition formation is a hedonic game (Drèze
and Greenberg [51]). In a hedonic game each player has his own pref-
erence order on possible coalitions, i.e. subsets of N , and seeks to find
himself in the best coalition possible. Solution concepts are partitions of
N into coalitions satisfying various notions of stability. As every player
needs to rank all 2N coalitions, succicnt preference representation plays
a key role in the study of hedonic games; thus Aziz, Harrenstein, Lang,
et al. [52] introduce the Boolean hedonic game, where every player is
equipped with a propositional formula telling him which coalitions are
acceptable and which are not.
On the incentive engineering front, the framework typically consists
of a Boolean game (with costs) and a social planner wishing to imple-
16 It is not necessarily clear how to extend this notion to mixed profiles, but every
paper discussed in this section deals with pure profiles only.
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ment some social goal, which is generally a special formula Γ that the
planner wishes to see in some or every equilibrium. In the setting of tax-
ation schemes (Endriss, Kraus, Lang, et al., Wooldridge, Wooldridge,
Endriss, Kraus, et al. [53]–[55]) the planner does this by choosing a
taxation policy, τ : Φ→ R+, which adds to the players’ costs. Deciding
whether it is possible to implement Γ is shown to be Σp2-complete. The
problem of actually computing a taxation scheme is studied experimen-
tally by Levit, Grinshpoun, Meisels, et al. [56].
Turrini [57] considers transfers rather than taxation schemes – the
difference being that these are not decided on centrally, but rather
every player individually decides how much of his utility he would like
to share with the other players. Deciding whether there exists a transfer
scheme guaranteeing a pure-strategy equilibrium is also Σp2-complete.
In light of these two directions, Harrenstein, Turrini, and Wooldridge
[58] introduce the notion of a hard equilibrium, an equilibrium that can-
not be eliminated by transfers or taxes, as opposed to a soft equilibrium
that can. The authors provide a purely logical characterisation of the
notion.
Kraus and Wooldridge [59] consider a Boolean game where the vari-
able sets Φi do not totally partition Φ – certain variables remain unal-
located. It is the social planner’s task to distribute those variables in a
manner that ensures Γ is satisfied in some or every equilibrium. Both
problems are Σp2-complete, and an optimisation version lies somewhere
within FPΣ2p .
The framework of Grant, Kraus, Wooldridge, et al. [60] also involves
unallocated variables, but these are environment variables, ΦE , which
are not handed out to players but instead are preset to some value. This
value is not known by the agents; every agent only has a belief function,
bi : ΦE → B, and plays the game according to those. The planner may
attempt to influence players’ behaviour by informing them, privately or
publicly, of the true state of some or all of ΦE . In doing so the planner
hopes to satisfy Γ, and the complexity results are similar: deciding
whether the desired announcement exists is Σp2-complete, computing a
minimal one is within FPΣ2p .
An alternative take on cost is presented by Harrenstein, Turrini, and
Wooldridge [61] in the form of electric Boolean games, where costs
do not affect preferences, however the total costs incurred by a player
must be less than his endowment. The metaphor used is that players
are constrained by a finite battery charge – they do not care how much
energy they expend to meet their goal, but once they run out they
can take no further actions. The planner may redistribute endowments
with the hope of inducing the players achieve a certain equilibrium.
This problem lies somewhere within ∆p2.
The use of Boolean games to actually model scenarios in the multia-
gent setting has been sparse, but varied. Lukasiewicz and Ragone [62]
consider a variation of Boolean games, where the players have goals in
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description logic, to model agents in the semantic web, Galafassi and
Bazzan [63] model a Boolean network as a Boolean game to implement
an evolutionary algorithm for the network and Levit, Grinshpoun, and
Meisels [64] consider an iterative17 version of Boolean games with costs
and environmental variables to model the charging of autonomous elec-
tric vehicles.
The work of Bradfield, Gutierrez, and Wooldridge [66] does not easily
fit into any of the three categories we have identified. The authors
impose an event structure on a Boolean game, i.e. a directed acyclic
graph on Φ that determines the information a player can take into
account before assigning a truth value to a variable. As such, a strategy
for Player i is not a choice of a true or false value for each p ∈ Φi, but
a choice of a function fp : 2Φp → { true, false }, where Φp is the set of
predecessors of p in the graph. Note that this framework differs from
an extensive form in two ways: first, the graph is not necessarily a
tree; and second, a player’s choice can only depend on the immediate
predecessors, rather than the entire history to date.
2.2.3 Related games and extensions
2.2.3.1 Boolean games with richer preferences
An often voiced concern about Boolean games is that, being only able to
represent win-lose games, they inevitably trivialise strategic interaction.
Now, while we have seen that win-lose games are certainly far from
trivial computationally, it is nevertheless true that their breadth of
application is somewhat limited – after all, even Prisoner’s Dilemma
has no Boolean representation. The cost function introduced above is a
popular solution, but there have been numerous attempts to introduce
graded preferences at a more fundamental level.
The first such attempt was that of Bonzon, Lagasquie-Schiex, and
Lang [67]. They consider two extensions. The first is a Boolean game
with prioritised goals, or a PG-Boolean game. A PG-Boolean game
equips each player, i, with k sets of propositional formulae: Γi1, . . . ,Γik.
The formulae in Γij are perceived to have a higher priority than the for-There are several
ways to formalise
this as a preference
order, which we
will not dwell on.
mulae in Γij′ for j < j′, and Player i would rather satisfy the formulae
with higher priority. PG-Boolean games can be seen as a generalisa-
tion of distributed evaluation games (Harrenstein [41], Section 8.4) to
more than one priority level. The second approach equips each player
with a CP-net over the variable set Φ, yielding a CP-Boolean game.
Players choose a truth assignment to the variables under their con-
trol, and then consult their CP-net to decide how they feel about the
outcome. Bonzon, Lagasquie-Schiex, and Lang observe that a certain
acyclicity condition on the CP-nets involved can guarantee the exis-Without a way to
compare mixed
profiles, in these
games a mixed
equilibrium is
ill-defined.
17 Not to be confused with the iterated games of Gutierrez, Harrenstein, and
Wooldridge [65]
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tence of a unique (pure-strategy) equilibrium. Following this, Bonzon,
Devred, and Lagasquie-Schiex [68] present algorithms that transform
an argumentation framework into a CP-Boolean game.
The reader will note that these two extensions involve purely ordi-
nal, and not necessarily complete, preferences. As such, even though
PG- and CP-Boolean games contain finite strategy sets, they are not
representations of finite strategic games in the sense of Definition 2.1.1.
Mavronicolas, Monien, and Wagner [69] present a cardinal, rather
than ordinal, extension in the form of weighted Boolean formula games.
Players assign truth values to a set of variables as with Boolean games,
but in lieu of a goal formula each player possesses a set, Γi, of formu-
la/integer pairs. The utility Player i derives from ν is: (ν  γ) is 1 if
ν  γ and 0
otherwise.
∑
(γ,α)∈Γi
α(ν  γ),
Mavronicolas, Monien, and Wagner consider the complexities of pure-
strategy and payoff-dominant equilibria, and identify a subclass of
weighted Boolean formula games that bears a relation to the congestion
games of Rosenthal [70].
Bilò [71] independently developed a framework virtually identical to
the weighted Boolean formula game; the only difference in a satisfiabil-
ity game of Bilò is that a player’s strategy set is Si ⊆ 2Φi , i.e. some sub-
set of possible assignments, while in weighted Boolean formula games
Si = 2Φi . Bilò shows that in a restricted fragment (the goal formulae
are all CNF or all DNF and contain at most two literals, every player
controls only one variable or is only allowed to set one variable to true)
it is possible to compute a mixed equilibrium in polynomial time. We
note that this is the only result on mixed strategies in a setting closely
related to Boolean games outside of the present work.
2.2.3.2 Games with other logics
Boolean games can be seen to belong to a wider family of game rep-
resentations in which players possess goals in some logical language L,
and strategy profiles induce models of L in some natural way. An alter-
native way to represent richer player preferences, therefore, could be to
choose a richer logic.
Iterated Boolean games (Gutierrez, Harrenstein, andWooldridge [65])
involve players possessing preferences in LTL. The game is played by Linear temporal
logic, introduced
by Pnueli [72].
requiring each player to submit a response function. As in the case of
Boolean games, Player i controls the variables in Φi; however, he does
not choose a single truth assignment, but a truth assignment for every
possible time period, and the choice of assignment for period k can de-
pend on everything that happened in periods j < k. By playing these
response functions against each other, an ω-word over 2Φ is generated,
which is a model of LTL. It should be noted, that while it is natural
to interpret an iterated Boolean game as playing a Boolean game over
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and over again, it is certainly not equivalent to a repeated game in the
standard sense of economics.
An important thing to note about iterated Boolean games is that,
unlike almost every other game representation we have considered, the
games these represent are not finite. Player i’s set of strategies contains
every function f : (2Φ)∗ → 2Φi , which is not even denumerable. The
authors restrict themselves to functions representable by a finite-state
transducer, and a consequence of Pnueli and Rosner [73] is that if a
player cannot achieve his goal with such a strategy then he cannot
achieve it at all, but that nevertheless leaves an infinite number, albeit
of finitely representable, strategies to choose from.
An iterated version of electric Boolean games is also studied by Har-
renstein, Turrini, and Wooldridge [61].
The Łukasiewicz games of Marchioni and Wooldridge [74] are based
on a finitely-valued Łukasiewicz logic: the players assign a value inAs the logic is
finitely-valued,
this is indeed a
finite strategic
game.
{ 1/k, . . . , k/k } to every variable under their control, and reap utility
equal to the degree to which their goal formula is satisfied. This of
course allows players to possess far more intricate preferences than in
the case of Boolean games, as every continuous piecewise linear function
f : [0, 1]k → [0, 1] with integral coefficients can be expressed as a for-
mula of Łukasiewicz logic.18 The main result of the paper is that given
a Łukasiewicz game, it is possible to construct a formula of Łukasiewicz
logic that is satisfiable if and only if the game has a pure-strategy equi-
librium. In contrast, in the case of Boolean games that formula would
have to be in ∃∀QBF.For quantified
Boolean formulae
see, e.g., Section
17.2 of
Papadimitriou [76].
For multimodal S5,
van Ditmarsch,
van der Hoek, and
Kooi [77].
Ågotnes, Harrenstein, van der Hoek, et al. [78] introduce epistemic
Boolean games, where players have goal formulae in the language of
S5n. Given the great number of modal logics out there, and the in-
terest modal logicians have shown towards aspect of game theory, it
may be surprising that such an extension took as long as it did to ap-
pear. The reason is that providing modal logics with a Boolean games
treatment can be tricky – a model of modal logic generally involves a
Kripke structure, and it is by no means clear how the players’ choice
of strategies are to represent one in a graceful way. In the case of iter-
ated Boolean games, as we have saw, the problem was dealt with by
the fact that LTL has a canonical model: the straight line. In the case
of epistemic Boolean games, Ågotnes, Harrenstein, van der Hoek, et
al. take a different approach. Each player is provided with a “visibility
set” Θi ⊆ L(Φ). These together define a Kripke structure with worlds
labelled by 2Φ and Player i’s indistinguishability relation being a ∼i b
if and only if for all ϕ ∈ Θi, a  ϕ ⇐⇒ b  ϕ. In other words the
Kripke structure is implicitly fixed in advance, and the players only
select which world to evaluate their formulae at.
18 Known as McNaughton’s theorem in the logical community (McNaughton [75]). Not
to be confused with the better known McNaughton’s theorem of automata theory.
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Epistemic Boolean games, being representations of finite win-lose
games, are no more expressive than Boolean games, but the authors
demonstrate that, unless P=PSPACE, they can be exponentially more
succinct. En revanche, the complexity seems to be higher: determining
whether a (pure) strategy profile is an equilibrium, or even evaluating
a player’s goal formula at it, is PSPACE-complete.
In a separate paper, Ågotnes, Harrenstein, Van Der Hoek, et al. [79]
also consider an epistemic strengthening of an equilibrium in a Boolean
game extended with visibility sets: a strategy profile that not only is
in equilibrium, but every player can verify that it is.
Finally, the epistemic logic literature contains games similar in spirit
to Boolean games such as question-answer games (Ågotnes, van Ben-
them, van Ditmarsch, et al. [80]), knowledge games (van Ditmarsch
[81]), and public announcement games (Ågotnes and van Ditmarsch
[82], [83]). Like in Boolean games, players are trying to satisfy a goal
formula, this time of an epistemic language. A crucial difference is that
the players do not, by their choice of strategies, specify a model of the
logic; rather, they modify an existing model that is supplied with the
game description. For instance, a public announcement game starts at
a given vertex in a Kripke structure in which every player then makes
a public announcement, with the hope that the upgraded model will
be one that will satisfy his goal formula.
2.2.3.3 Games with circuits and machines
We address a class of representations known as circuit games in some
detail, as the work in this area is the most relevant to the technical part
of this thesis – more so than the literature on Boolean games proper.
There are three papers on the subject: Feigenbaum, Koller, and Shor
[84], Fortnow, Kabanets, Impagliazzo, et al. [38] and Schoenebeck and
Vadhan [20]. In light of the pedantic stance we have hitherto taken, we
feel obliged to point out that all three works give a different definition
of the games studied, and Feigenbaum, Koller, and Shor do not use
the word “circuit” anywhere in their paper. We begin by giving the
definition of Schoenebeck and Vadhan, before discussing how they differ.
Definition 2.2.8. A circuit game19 is a representation of a finite strate-
gic game consisting of n disjoint sets of input gates, Ii∈N , and n Boolean
circuits, Ci∈N , with input gates I =
⊎
i∈N Ii and any number of output
gates.
A pure strategy for Player i is an initial configuration of his input
gates, ιi : Ii → { 0, 1 }, and his payoff from profile ι = (ι1, . . . , ιn) is
Ci(ι). I.e., the rational number encoded by the output gates of Ci with
initial configuration ι. 
19 One is tempted to call this a Boolean circuit game, but Schoenebeck and Vadhan
reserve that term for circuit games with |Ii| = 1. We shall avoid the term to avoid
confusion.
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Fact 2.2.9. Circuit games are adequate with respect to the class of
rational-valued games where the cardinality of every player’s strategy
set is a power of two.
The definition of Fortnow, Kabanets, Impagliazzo, et al. [38] deals
with two-player, zero-sum games only, which it specifies via a payoff ma-
trix (see Definition 2.1.13). The succinct representation of the payoff
matrix M is a circuit C that on input i, j outputs mi,j , the (i, j)-entry
of M . Player One’s strategy is then to choose the i value, and Player
Two the j value. Strictly speaking, this definition differs from a circuit
game in that there is only one circuit and there does not seem to be
a restriction on the number of strategies players possess (thought Fort-
now, Kabanets, Impagliazzo, et al. do not specify what happens if the
players choose i, j for whichMi,j is undefined), but it is morally equiva-
lent; certainly, there exists a polynomial-time biembedding betwixt the
fragment of circuit games á la Fortnow, Kabanets, Impagliazzo, et al.
with strategy set cardinalities being powers of two, and the two-player
zero-sum fragment of the circuit games of Schoenebeck and Vadhan.
The games of Feigenbaum, Koller, and Shor [84], however, are suffi-
ciently different to merit a definition of their own:
Definition 2.2.10. A referee game is a representation of two-player
zero-sum games specified by a polynomial-time deterministic machine
augmented with two communication channels, known as the referee,
and an initial input string w.
The referee can use the channels to privately send messages to Player
One and Two (and if the referee does not want the message to be private,
it can of course send a copy to the other channel). The recipient can
then send a response. The players are arbitrarily powerful, and can
perform any computation they need before responding, but because of
the constraints of the referee the response needs to be polynomial in
the size of the query. Upon terminating, the referee outputs the payoff
to Player One. 
Upon seeing this definition one may be tempted to dismiss the dif-
ference on grounds of universal computability; what, after all, is the
difference between a circuit and a Turing machine? However, there is a
crucial reason why we cannot admit this perspective: the strategy sets
are different.
A polynomial-time referee can ask at most a polynomial number of
questions, however the response to each question can modify its subse-
quent behaviour, and thus the game as a whole is better thought as a
nondeterministic process (with player choice the only source of nonde-
terminism), and this process generates a computation tree polynomialThis tree is in fact
the extensive form
of the game.
in depth but with exponentially many nodes. A pure strategy for Player
One is a choice for each of his nodes, which means it is exponential in
the size of the referee, and hence there is a double-exponential number
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of strategies. Given the framework we have adopted, we cannot equate
referee games with circuit games in any meaningful way.
As such, we cannot freely import arbitrary results of Feigenbaum,
Koller, and Shor [84] into the setting of circuit games, but that need
not vex us as we are only interested in one – the complexity of DValue.
As it happens, the complexity of DValue is no harder for referee
games than circuit games, as the reader can observe by noting that
in the game constructed in the proof of Theorem 4.6 of Feigenbaum,
Koller, and Shor [84], and restated in the prelude to Theorem 6.1.1 in
the current work, the referee asks a grand total of two questions; such
a tree is of constant size. This is ultimately due to a result we have
already mentioned: despite the increased succinctness of extensive form
representations, the complexity of Value for the extensive and normal
form is the same. The proof of Feigenbaum, Koller, and Shor [84] will
serve as the basis of our argument in Chapter 6.
Other results relevant to us from the work on circuit games is that
∃GuaranteeNash is NEXP-complete for two-player games, and Is-
Nash coNP#P-hard if the number of players is unbounded (Schoenebeck
and Vadhan [20]). We derive the same results for Boolean games in
Chapter 5
The Turing machine games of Àlvarez, Gabarró, and Serna are simi-
lar in flavour. The authors study concise representations of both exten-
sive (Àlvarez, Gabarró, and Serna [13]) and strategic games (Àlvarez,
Gabarró, and Serna [10]).
Àlvarez, Gabarró, and Serna consider three representations of a strate-
gic game. The explicit form involves listing the strategies of the players’
and the graphs of their utility functions – the normal form in our par-
lance. The implicit form involves providing a polynomial-time Turing
machine and a length constraint on the strategy of each player. Thus
a player prescribed to choose a strategy of length of k can choose any
string in { 0, 1 }k as his strategy. After the players write their choices
on the tape, the machine is activated and computes the payoff vector.
We could thus identify the implicit form with a circuit game modulo
universal computability, or if we would rather tread the cautious party
line we have adopted then we would merely say that there is a natu-
ral polynomial-time biembedding between them. The general form is
intermediate between the two: utility functions are represented implic-
itly via a Turing machine, but strategy sets are listed explicitly. Players
choose an appropriate primitive symbol from their strategy set to in-
scribe on the input tape, and then the game proceeds as before. As
could be expected, the complexity of the general form lies between the
two – the problem of ∃PNE is NP-complete, as opposed to Σ2p-complete
for the implicit form. For the explicit form, being the normal form, the
problem is in P (even in AC0).
The convenience of an infinite tape, however, allows Àlvarez, Gabarró,
and Serna to define game representations that have no parallels in the
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circuit or Boolean game setting: the uniform explicit and general forms.
Here a single machine defines a family of games rather than a single
instance. For example, a uniform general form of rock-paper-scissors is
a Turing machine that on input rock, paper will output (0, 1) and on
rock, paper, rock the output will be (0, 1, 0).20
The general form of Àlvarez, Gabarró, and Serna [10] appears earlier
in Gottlob, Greco, and Scarcello [85]; the authors consider games in the
normal form, as a graphical game, and in general form, which they de-
fine as the setting where the strategy sets of all players are represented
explicitly, but the utility and neighbourhood functions are given as a
polynomial time Turing machine. The difference from the general form
of Àlvarez, Gabarró, and Serna [10] lies in that to evaluate the utility
of Player i in a Gottlob, Greco, and Scarcello game one would first
evaluate i’s neighbourhood, then write down the strategies of all of i’s
neighbours on the tape of the utility machine, whereas in a game of
Àlvarez, Gabarró, and Serna one would write down the strategies of all
players on the utility machine’s tape immediately. In the worst case,
the players’ neighbourhoods are the entire set, and the two game rep-
resentations become equivalent; indeed, Gottlob, Greco, and Scarcello
[85] demonstrate that the complexity of ∃PNE is NP-complete. How-
ever, restrictions on the dependency structures of players reduces the
complexity of some problems.
20 There are, of course, many ways to extend the scoring system of rock-paper-scissors
to more than two players. As exciting as such an exercise may be, here we take the
simplistic approach of requiring a player to win every match.
Part II
COMPLEXITY RESULTS

3
AUXIL IARY RESULTS
In all the parts of human knowledge, whether terminating in science
merely speculative, or operating upon life, private or civil, are
admitted some fundamental principles, or common axioms, which,
being generally received, are little doubted, and, being little doubted,
have been rarely proved.
— Samuel Johnson, Taxation no Tyranny
We have two goals in this chapter. In Section 3.1 we introduce short-
hand expressions for formulae of propositional logic that will occur
frequently in the proofs to come. In Section 3.4 we introduce a family
of gadget games which have a predetermined value; these will be used
to simulate finer-grained preferences than the Boolean game model al-
lows. Section 3.3, included for completeness, reproduces some standard
results about the relation of game theory to linear programming, and
why two-player games have rational equilibria.
3.1 encoding integers in logic
The goal of this section is to introduce shorthand and notation that will
allow us to discuss integers and arithmetic in the language of proposi-
tional logic. This will ultimately allow us to interpret a player’s strategy
as a choice of integers, and a goal formula as an arithmetical constraint.
Our constructions will often involve sequences of propositional vari-
ables, so we will use the notation pm to mean p1, . . . , pm. Sequences
differ from sets in that they have an order, which allows us to inter-
pret a truth assignment to a sequence as an integer. We do this in the
standard way – a truth assignment that sets pi to true defines a binary
integer where the ith most significant bit is 1.
Definition 3.1.1. Let pm be a sequence of m propositional variables,
and ν a truth assignment to pm. We use JpmKν to denote the numeric
value associated with ν via its assignment to pm. That is: (ν  pi) is 1 if
ν  pi, 0
otherwise.JpmKν = m∑
i=1
2m−i(ν  pi).
If ν is clear from context, we just write JpmK. 
This is quite sufficient to interpret any pure strategy in a Boolean
game as a choice of integer. To test whether such an integer satisfies
an arithmetical constraint we need to introduce formulae that verify
operations of (finite) arithmetic. Throughout the following arguments
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the reader should bear in mind that what we are trying to establish is
that these formulae can be constructed in time polynomial in the bit
length of the integers under consideration – that such formulae exist at
all follows trivially from the expressive completeness of propositional
logic.
Arithmetic is a consequence of equality and successor, so it befits us
to start with these.
Lemma 3.1.2. Let Equal(pm; qm) denote a term that is true if and
only if JpmK = JqmK. I.e., ν  Equal(pm; qm) if and only if JpmKν =JqmKν .
We can construct Equal(pm; qm) in time linear in m.
Proof. Two binary integers are equal if and only if they are bitwise
equal. This gives us the following:
Equal(pm; qm) =
∧
1≤i≤m
(pi ↔ qi). q.e.d.
Lemma 3.1.3. Let Succ(pm; qm) denote a term that is true if and
only if JpmK + 1 = JqmK.
We can construct Succ(pm; qm) in time quadratic in m.
Proof. 2m−1 does not have an m bit successor, so we first require that
pm is not all 1s:
Succ(pm; qm) = ¬(
∧
1≤i≤m
pi) ∧ Succ′.
Succ′ will do the heavy lifting.
For intuition, recall that adding a 1 to a binary integer x can have
one of two outcomes: either x ends in a 0 and this 0 is replaced with a
1, or x ends with a 1 in which case that 1 is replaced with a 0 and a
carry operation occurs – which is, of course, simply the act of adding
a 1 to a rightshift of x.
In other words, we have a recursive operation that replaces the right-
most consecutive block of 1s in x with 0s, the subsequent 0 with a 1,
and leaves the rest of the integer unchanged.
This gives us Succ′:(
¬pm →
(
qm ∧Equal(pm−1; qm−1)
)
∧
(
(pm ∧ ¬pm−1)→
(¬qm ∧ qm−1 ∧Equal(pm−2; qm−2)))
...
∧
(
(¬p1 ∧
∧
1<i≤m
pi)→ (q1 ∧
∧
1<i≤m
¬qi)
)
.
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For the reader who abhors ellipses, we can restate this in one line:
Succ′ =
∧
i≤m
((¬pi ∧ ∧
j>i
pj
)→ (Equal(pi−1; qi−1) ∧ qi ∧ ∧
j>i
¬qj
))
.
This is quadratic in the number of variables, giving us the desired
result. q.e.d.
The reader will note that in the proof above the knowledge that
we can represent Equal(pm; qm) concisely simplified our argument for
Succ(pm; qm). This is of course perfectly natural mathematical think-
ing – the more we can say the more we can define, and the more
we define the more we can say. Following this line we can now use
Succ(pm; qm) to deal with the less-than order.
Lemma 3.1.4. Let Less(pm; qm) denote a term that is true under ν
if and only if JpmKν < JqmKν .
We can construct Less(pm; qm) in time cubic in m.
Proof. Let a[i] be the ith most significant bit of a.
Intuitively, if JpmK < JqmK for two big-endian binary digits then if we
read the bits of the two from left to right we will see a 0 in JpmK before
we see one in JqmK. That is, there exists a k such that:
JpkK = JqkK,
ν 2 pk+1, ν  qk+1.
It follows that the first bit where the two integers differ is a 1 for JqmK
and a 0 for JpmK. This is clearly both necessary and sufficient.
Since there are only m possible values of k, this can be replaced by
a cubic size formula that looks as follows: Recall that the
size of
Succ(pm; qm) is
quadratic.
∨
0≤k<m
Succ(pk; qk). q.e.d.
Corollary 3.1.5. Let LessEq(pm; qm) denote a term that is true un-
der ν if and only if JpmKν ≤ JqmKν .
We can construct LessEq(pm; qm) in time cubic in m.
Lemma 3.1.6. Let Add(pm; qm; rm) denote a term that is true if and
only if JpmK + JqmK = JrmK.
Add(pm; qm; rm) can be replaced by a formula of propositional logic
cubic in m.
Proof. Binary addition is easy: 0 is identity, and 1 + 1 is 0. In other
words if the summands are the same the answer is 0, if they are different
the answer is 1. Thus if no carry occurred at position i+ 1, then ri ↔
(¬(pi ∧ qi)). If a carry has occurred, we add another 1 to this result,
which gives us ri ↔ (pi ∧ qi).
The trick is determining whether a carry has occurred – we have no
memory mechanism to store this information. However, our constraint
54 auxiliary results
is polynomial time, and this is sufficiently generous to allow us to ex-
plicitly verify whether a carry bit has reached i by checking every j > i.
The necessary subformula is the following:
Carry(i) =
∨
j≥i+1
(
(pj ∧ qj) ∧
∧
i+1≤k<j
(pk ∨ qk)
)
.
In words, Carry(i) holds just if there exists a j > i such that the bits
at the jth position are both 1, and every single position between j and
i has at least one of the bits being 1.
Our final formula is:
Add =
∧
i≤m
[(
¬Carry(i)→ (ri ↔ (¬(pi ↔ qi))))
∧
(
Carry(i)→ (ri ↔ (pi ↔ qi)))]
∧¬
(
(p1 ∧ q1) ∨
(
Carry(1) ∧ (p1 ∨ q1)
))
.
The last line states that integer overflow has not occurred. This is added
because we are interested in exact addition, not addition modulo 2m.
This is cubic in m, proving the lemma. q.e.d.
Lemma 3.1.7. Let Sub(pm; qm; rm) denote a term that is true if and
only if JpmK− JqmK = JrmK.
Sub(pm; qm; rm) can be replaced by a formula of propositional logic
cubic in m.
Proof. We begin by verifying that the difference is not negative. This
is rather simple:
NoNegative = LessEq(qm; pm).
Borrow bits behave a little differently from carry bits because sub-
traction does not commute. A borrow case takes place at position i just
if at some j > i the minuend contains a 0 and the subtrahend a 1, and
in every succeeding position the subtrahend bit is at least as big as the
minuend.
Borrow(i) =
∨
j≥i+1
(
(¬pj ∧ qj) ∧
∧
i+1≤k<j
(pk → qk)
)
.
In the absence of a borrow bit, we require ri ↔ (¬(pi ↔ qi)). In the
presence of a borrow bit, ri ↔ (pi ↔ qi). This gives us the result:
Sub′ =
∧
i≤m
[(
¬Borrow(i)→ (ri ↔ (pi ↔ qi)))
∧
(
Borrow(i)→ (ri ↔ (¬(pi ↔ qi))))].
Sub(pm; qm; rm) =NoNegative ∧ Sub′. q.e.d.
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At times in lieu of testing JpmK for one of these three relations againstJqmK, we may wish to test, for example, whether JpmK < 3. In other
words, we would like to have access to constants as well as variables,
and that is the purpose of the following definition:
Definition 3.1.8. Let j be a binary integer of length m. We use pjq
to denote a sequence of the logical constants Û and ⊥, the ith element
of which is Û if and only if the ith most significant bit of j is 1.
The intended use of pjq is as an argument to the parametrised for-
mulae defined so far. For example, we interpret Less(pm; pjq) in the
sense of Lemma 3.1.4, except every instance of qi is replaced with Û or
⊥ depending on whether the ith bit of j is a 1 or 0. 
Finally, we want some formulae to assert that a certain number of
their arguments are true.
Lemma 3.1.9. Let OneOf(pm) andNoneOf(pm) denote terms that
are true just if exactly 1 and 0 respectively of the pi variables are true.
These terms can be constructed in time polynomial (quadratic and linear
respectively) in m.
3.2 games of any value
We have seen that Theorem 2.1.12 endows two-player zero-sum games
with something resembling a unique solution. From a purely extensional
point of view, this solution could well be the only thing we want from a
game; knowing that Player One, playing rationally, can expect to get a
utility of v from a game is already useful enough without caring about
the details of how that utility is obtained.
We would like to be able to introduce such games into our proofs
without explicitly constructing them each time, so it pays to construct
them here. But first, we ought to convince ourselves that such games
do, in fact, exist.
In a win-lose game, v ∈ [0, 1]Q is the probability of Player One win-
ning the game. Given v = a/b we can uniformly construct a family of
games in which Player One chooses an interval of length a over [0, b−1]N, Such an interval is
allowed to loop
around the end
points b− 1 and 0.
and Player Two chooses a single integer from the same range. If a and b
are coprime, i.e. the fraction a/b is maximally reduced, we can show that
this game has a unique equilibrium – the profile where Player One ran-
domises equally over every interval and Player Two over every integer –
the value of which is clearly a/b = v. The vocabulary we have developed
in Section 3.1 will allow us to express this as a Boolean game.
Lemma 3.2.1. For v ∈ [0, 1]Q we can construct, in time polynomial
in |v|, a two-player, zero-sum Boolean game with value v and a unique
equilibrium.
We shall refer to this game as G(v).
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Proof. Let v = a/b. We insist that a, b are coprime.
Consider the game where Player One selects two numbers c1, c2 ∈
[0, b− 1]N with the property that c2− c1 ≡ a− 1 mod b (the start and
end points of an interval of length a). Player Two selects d ∈ [0, b− 1]N.
The game is won by Player One if c2 ≥ d ≥ c1 (Player Two’s choice
is in a non-looping interval), d ≥ c1 > c2 (Player Two’s choice is in a
looping interval left of b− 1) or c1 > c2 ≥ d (Player Two’s choice is in
a looping interval right of 0).
To give this game a Boolean rendition we need the following variables:
Φ1 ={p1, . . . , pm, q1, . . . , qm, s1, . . . , sm, t1, . . . , tm},
Φ2 ={r1, . . . , rm}.
The interpretation is that JpmK = c1, JqmK = c2 and JrmK = d. The s
and t variables come in to play if Player One wishes to play a looping
interval, in which case JsmK is the distance between 0 and c2, whileJtmK is the distance between c1 and b− 1. These variables are added to
give us a way to check that if Player One plays a looping interval, its
length is still a.
Player One’s goal formula is the following:
γ1 =
(
Sub(qm, pm, pa− 1q) ∧LessEq(qm, pb− 1q)
∧LessEq(rm, qm) ∧LessEq(pm, rm) ∧Equal(sm, p0q)
∧Equal(tm, p0q)
)
∨
(
Add(sm, tm, pa− 1q) ∧ Sub(qm, p0q, sm)
∧ Sub(pb− 1q, pm, tm) ∧
(
LessEq(rm, qm) ∨LessEq(pm, rm)
))
∨Less(pb− 1q, rm).
The first disjunct handles the case where the interval is non-looping:JqmK− JpmK = a− 1 (because the interval is closed) and Player Two’s
choice falls between them. We require that JsmK = JtmK = 0 to ensure
the equilibrium is unique, as otherwise Player One would have been
able to assign any value to those variables without affecting his chance
of winning. The second disjunct handles the looping case; here JsmKThe reader will
note that JsmK is
superfluous. It is
included solely for
symmetry withJtmK.
and JtmK store the length of the interval on either side of zero. The
last disjunct of serves to award the game to One should Two name a d
outside of [0, b− 1]N.
As the game is zero-sum, γ2 is simply ¬γ1.
Now let us verify that the equilibrium is unique. We say the cover
weight of a number i is the sum of the weights Player One attaches to
every interval containing i. In other words, the cover weight of i is the
probability that Player Two will lose if she plays i with probability 1. If
wj is the weight Player One attaches to the interval starting at j then
the cover weight of i, ci, can be expressed as follows:
ci =
i∑
j≡i−a+1 mod b
wj .
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That is, the first wj in the sum is the interval with i at its rightmost
point, and hence its leftmost point is at i− (a− 1) mod b.
Now observe that a best response for Player Two to any strategy of
Player One is to play arg mini ci with probability 1, giving Player One
a utility of mini ci; Player One’s maxmin strategy is thus to maximise
the smallest of the cover weights. Furthermore, we can see that the sum
of all the cover weights is invariant and equal to a (as the sum of all
wi is equal to 1 and each wi appears in a distinct cover weight terms).
It follows that the only way to maximise the smallest cover weight is
to make all ci equal.
We will demonstrate that ci = ci+1 implies that wi−a+1 mod b = wi+1.
As a is a generating element in the additive group of b elements, this This is why we
assume a and b are
coprime.
will establish that all wi must be the same.
The argument itself is trivial. Suppose ci = ci+1. If we expand this
we have:
wi−a+1 + wi−a+2 + · · ·+ wi = wi−a+2 + wi−a+3 + · · ·+ wi+1.
By subtracting (wi−a+2+· · ·+wi) from both sides we have that wi−a+1 =
wi+1.
We have thus shown that:
a) In every equilibrium Player One must make all the cover weights
equal.
b) The only way to make all the cover weights equal is to play every
interval with equal weight.
This settles the argument for Player One. We turn to Player Two.
This time we define the breadth of the interval starting at i, bi, to be
the sum of the weights, wj , that Player Two attaches to every number
in that interval:
bi =
i+a−1 mod b∑
j=i
wj .
By an argument parallel to the one above, we see that Player Two seeks
to choose a strategy that will make all bi equal. Assuming bi = bi+1,
this leads us to:
wi + wi+1 + · · ·+ wi+a−1 = wi+1 + wi+2 + · · ·+ wi+a.
This allows us to invoke the same argument.
In sum, we have shown that every equilibrium involves all ci and bi
being equal, and the only way to achieve this is by randomising equally
over all intervals and integers. This equilibrium is thus unique. q.e.d.
G(v) will serve us as a gadget game to get around the win-lose re-
striction of Boolean games; it may well be the case that in any pure-
strategy profile Player One either wins or loses, but Player One is an
expected-utility maximiser – he is indifferent between a utility of 1/2
58 auxiliary results
and a probability 1/2 of getting a utility of 1. This will allow us to sim-
ulate an outcome of 1/2 for Player One by giving him the opportunity
to play G(1/2) instead.
3.2.1 Subgames
If G(v) is to be used as a gadget in a larger construction, it behoves us
to establish a means to refer to the constituents of G(v).
Definition 3.2.2. Let G = (Φ1, . . . ,Φn, γ1, . . . , γn) be a Boolean game.
We use γi(G) to refer to γi and vari(G) to refer to Φi. This notation
will be useful in the presence of multiple games, as it will allow us to
distinguish between γi(G) and γi(G′).
If G is a game or ϕ is a formula, we will also write var(G) and
var(ϕ) to refer to the set of all variables present in the game or formula
respectively. 
Let G(1/2) and G′(1/2) be two disjoint games with value 1/2. Consider
the following Boolean “interpretation” of Battle of the Sexes:Note that Player
Three in the
overarching game
controls the
variables that
would have
belonged to Player
Two in a gadget
game. Our
notation allows
this.
Φ1 ={Box1 } ∪ var1(G(1/2)),
Φ2 ={Box2 } ∪ var1(G′(1/2)),
Φ3 =var2(G(1/2)) ∪ var2(G′(1/2)),
γ1 =(¬Box1 ∧ ¬Box2) ∨ (Box1 ∧ Box2 ∧ γ1(G(1/2))),
γ2 =(Box1 ∧ Box2) ∨ (¬Box1 ∧ ¬Box2 ∧ γ1(G′(1/2))),
γ3 =γ2(G(1/2)) ∧ γ2(G′(1/2)).
Intuitively, Player One wins if both players go to see ballet, or if both
see boxing and Player One beats Player Three in Matching Pennies.It is possible to
eliminate Player
Three by
absorbing his rôle
by the other two
players, but that
would make the
current example
less transparent.
Player Two wins if both see boxing, or both see ballet and she wins the
Matching Pennies side game. Player Three is interested in winning both
games of Matching Pennies. This ought to have the effect of giving us an
equilibrium where both players go to boxing, and play the equilibrium
play in the side games. Player One would derive a utility of 1/2. How
could we prove this?
One is tempted to argue as follows:
Let σ be a strategy profile that involves both players play-
ing Box i with probability 1 and playing the equilibrium
strategies against Player Three over the gadget games. This
profile is in equilibrium: no player has incentive to deviate
in the gadget games, as they are in equilibrium. Player One
has no incentive to play Box1 with a probability lower than 1
as any profile obtained by switching his assignment to false
would yield him a utility of 0, but he is currently getting
1/2 – the probability of winning G(1/2), and hence satisfying
(Box1 ∧ Box2 ∧ γ1(G(1/2))). Mutatis mutandis, for Player
Two.
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Unfortunately, there are a number of problems with this approach.
First, the strategy profile itself is ill-defined; it makes no sense to
speak of “playing Box i with probability 1 and playing the equilibrium
strategies against Player Three over the gadget games”, as a player’s
strategy is not divided into components. A pure strategy is an assign-
ment to every variable in Φi, and a mixed strategy is a distribution over
such complete assignments. If we are to use such locutions, we need to
be clear about what they mean:
Definition 3.2.3. Suppose Player i controls Φi = A unionmulti B. When we
say that Player i plays A with distribution P and B with distribution
Q, what we mean is that Player i plays the mixed strategy that, for
any νA : A → B and νB : B → B, realises νAνB with probability
P (νA)Q(νB). 
In other words, Player i is assigning truth values to the variables in A
independently of his assignments to the variables in B. In our example,
Player One’s assignment to Box1 is independent from his assignment
to var1(G(1/2)).
Next, while our game intuitively contains G(1/2) and G′(1/2) as sub-
games, formally this is meaningless – the notion of a subgame is a
property of extensive, rather than strategic games. Hence, we need to
be clear as to what we mean when we say that the gadget games are
in equilibrium.
Definition 3.2.4. Let σ be a strategy profile of G, and G′ a game
with var(G′) ⊆ var(G). We use σ|G′ to denote the probability distribu-
tion over var(G′) that is obtained by marginalising over the variables
var(G) \ var(G′) from σ.
In other words, the probability of ν ′ : var(G′)→ B being realised in
σ|G′ is the sum of the probabilities of every ν : var(G)→ B that agrees
with ν ′ being realised by σ.
We say that G′ is in equilibrium in G just if σ|G′, interpreted as a
profile of G′, is an equilibrium of G′. 
Bear in mind that what follows from the definition is that if G′ is
in equilibrium in σ and Player i controls the variables varj(G′) (and
nothing more in var(G′)), then Player i has no strategy available to him
that will increase the probability of γj(G′) being realised. No more, and
no less. As such, in and of itself, the fact that G′ is in equilibrium tells
us nothing about the state of the larger game – it is entirely possible
for the subgames to be in equilibrium but not G itself. We must first
consider how the variables of G′ are partitioned among the players and
how the goal formulae of G′ relate to the goal formulae of G.
In the case of our example, the fact that the subgames are in equi-
librium tells us only that Player One has no strategy available to him
that will increase the probability of him satisfying his right disjunct –
that would require a profitable deviation in G(1/2). That happens to
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be sufficient, as it is clear that he has no deviation to satisfy the left
disjunct either.
Finally, it is not at all clear what we mean when we speak of Player
One deviating by changing the assignment to Box1 to true.
Definition 3.2.5. Suppose Player i controls Φi = A unionmulti B. Consider
a strategy profile σ where Player i plays A with distribution P and
B with distribution Q. When we say Player i deviates by changing
his assignment to A to P ′, we mean he deviates to playing A with
distribution P ′ and B with distribution Q. 
Such a definition may seem redundant, but it serves to highlight an
important issue – the locution “Player One deviates by changing the
assignment to Box1 to true” is only meaningful in the case where his
play of Box1 is independent with respect to his other variables. This is
the case in our example, but such phrases should not be thrown around
without verifying that they actually mean something in the situation
at hand.
These definitions will allow us to write proofs in terms of subgames
and components of strategies, which will simplify the arguments greatly.
However, we must not fall into the trap of assuming that if Player i,
controlling Φi = A unionmulti B, has no profitable deviation over A and no
profitable deviation over B available to him, then he has no profitable
deviation at all. All that means is that Player i has no profitable de-
viation that involves choosing assignments to A and B independently;
it could well be the case that there does exist a deviation, but within
it the choice of assignment to A would be determined by the choice of
assignment to B. In the example given this did not apply – Player One
had to choose one of two mutually exclusive disjuncts to satisfy, and
the left disjunct only depends on {Box1,Box2 }, so we have no need
to consider what Player One’s strategy with respect to var1(G(1/2)) is.
However, this is something that is worth bearing in mind in the proofs
that follow.
3.2.2 Scholium: algebra of games
The original Boolean game framework (Harrenstein, van der Hoek,
Meyer, et al., Harrenstein [2], [41]) included the base cases of 1 and
0, the games where Player One always wins and always loses respec-
tively. Of course, one could envisage an infinite number games that
share this property; 1 and 0 refer specifically to the games where nei-
ther player has any actions, but the authors were more interested the
essence of a situation where every choice of action leads to invariably
to victory or defeat rather than how this is actually realised. This lead
to the notion of strategic equivalence, G1 ≡ G2, which holds when every
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strategy profile s results in a win for Player One in G1 if and only if it
results in a win in G2 as well.1
The authors introduce algebraic operations on the set of equivalence
classes of games under ≡. Addition, G1 +G2, results in a game where
the games are played in parallel and Player One must win at least one.
Multiplication, G1 ·G2, results in a game where Player One must win
both. Complementation, G, results in a game where the winning and
losing plays are inverted or, equivalently, the game where we rename
Player One to Player Two and vice versa. A key result of the authors
is that Boolean games form a Boolean algebra modulo strategic equiv-
alence, under the operations +, · and .
In the setting of Boolean games the algebraic operations can be im-
plemented using logical connectives in the natural way. To wit, G1 +G2
can be implemented as follows:
Φ =Φ1 unionmulti Φ2,
γ1 =γ11 ∨ γ21 .
Likewise, G1 · G2 can be implemented via conjunction and G with
negation.
Now, if we feed 0 into Lemma 3.2.1 the resulting game, G(0), is one
where Player One is asked to name an interval of length 0. As this is
not possible, he loses no matter what strategies are picked – this game
is strategically equivalent to 0. As we have unwittingly introduced 0
into our framework, it is worth asking whether other parallels exist.
However, the notion of strategic equivalence is not very convenient
for us as we have not treated the names of the propositional variables
in our games in any canonical fashion, but this would be necessary for
us to compare strategy profiles across games. Given our focus on two-
player zero-sum games, a more natural notion is G1 ∼= G2, which holds
just if G1 and G2 have the same value. We would expect the following
behaviour:
G(v) +G(w) ∼= G(v + w − vw),
G(v) ·G(w) ∼= G(vw),
G(v) ∼= G(1− v),
and, indeed, combining disjoint G(v),G(w) with disjunction and con-
junction results in games with value v + w − vw and vw respectively.
Negation, however, does not in general yield us G(v); ∼= is a weaker
notion of equivalence than ≡, and simply negating Player One’s goal
formula (i.e. giving him Player Two’s goal formula) is insufficient. We
need to give him Player Two’s variable set as well; algebraic comple-
mentation needs to be implemented via rôle switch.
1 This, of course, presupposes some reasonable manner of dealing with strategies that
are not present in both games, which we will not concern ourselves with here.
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This suggests an alternative approach to definingG(v): we could start
with some base cases, and let the rest follow by induction. It turns out
the generating set is 0, plus the reciprocals of primes.
Proposition 3.2.6. For every v ∈ [0, 1]Q, the game G(v) can be ob-
tained by a finite number of +, · and operations on games of the form
G(0) and G(1/b), where b is a prime.
Proof. Clearly, once we have G(1/b) for primal b, we also have G(1/b)
for every b ∈ N.
Now, suppose for contradiction that G(a/b) cannot be represented as
a combination of such games. We can assume that a is the largest i forThe “largest
integer principle”
is applicable here
because we know
for a fact that
G(1) ∼= G(0).
which G(i/b) has no such representation.
Consider the following:
G(a/b) ∼=G
(a(a+ 1)
b(a+ 1)
)
,
∼=G
( a
a+ 1
)
·G
(a+ 1
b
)
,
∼=G
( 1
a+ 1
)
·G
(a+ 1
b
)
.
This gives us our contradiction, as a + 1 > a and if G(a+ 1/b) can be
represented, then so can G(a/b). q.e.d.
While neat, the utility of this result is limited. On the one hand
we could have avoided defining Add and Sub, as G(1/b) would have
only needed Less and Equal to construct, but on the other the direct
construction guarantees that G(v) has a Boolean representation that
is polynomial in |v|, whereas the iteration of algebraic operations here
is in general much longer. As it turns out, if v is a dyadic fraction then
the number of necessary operations is indeed polynomial in |v|, and we
could rewrite all our proofs to only use dyadic values, so this would
be sufficient. However, there is little reason to do so, especially since
the Add and Sub formulae are useful to us irrespective of their rôle in
constructing G(v).
3.3 two-player games and rational equilibria
It is a well-known fact that rational-valued two-player games admit
rational equilibria, the size of which is polynomial in the normal form
of the game. As with all well-known facts, figuring out precisely why
this is the case can be difficult for newcomers to the field, especially if
the space of time between the origin of such facts and the present is such
that the mathematical background of the aforementioned newcomers is
significantly different from that which was readily assumed in the days
when the facts were established. It is for the benefit of such newcomers
(and certainly not because the author had any such difficulty himself)
that we present the arguments in this section. A reader familiar with
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the material may find the following proofs unnecessarily meandering;
this is because they are intended to be comprehensible to those with no
previous knowledge of linear programming other than that the following
problem can be solved in polynomial time:
LinearProgramming
Input: A matrix of values A ∈ Qs×t, and vectors b ∈ Qs, c ∈ Qt.
Output: A solution, y, to the following optimisation problem:
Ay ≤ b,
y ≥ 0,
max cTy.
Theorem 3.3.1 (Khachiyan [24]). LinearProgramming is in FP.
As we shall see, Value can be reduced to LinearProgramming di-
rectly, whereas various problems in the variable-sum case can be solved
with a nondeterministic choice of a linear program to solve.
3.3.1 Zero-sum games
Consider a matrix representation of a two-player zero-sum game. That
is, a matrix M with mi,j = u1(si ∈ S1, sj ∈ S2). Let |S1| = k and
|S2| = q. If Player One is playing a maxmin strategy, then he seeks to
pick strategy weights x1, . . . , xk satisfying:∑
i≤k
xi =1,
x ≥0,
max
x
min
j
∑
i≤k
ximi,j .
This is, of course, not yet a valid instance of LinearProgramming
– the objective function is not linear. However, it is not far off from
being so: once the min function has made its selection, we are left with
a sum of linear terms. The choice made by the min function is also
easy to characterise, as we are looking for a v that is smaller than all q
possible choices. So what we do is introduce v as a new variable with
the requirement that v ≤ minj∑i≤k ximi,j . The objective function is
then simply to maximise v, giving us the following linear program:
v ≤
∑
i≤k
ximi,1,
...
v ≤
∑
i≤k
ximi,q,
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∑
i≤k
xi =1,
x ≥0,
max
x,v
v.
We can now construct the LinearProgramming instance:
1 −m1,1 . . . −mk,1
...
... . . .
...
1 −m1,q . . . −mk,q
0 1 . . . 1
0 −1 . . . −1


v
x1
...
xk
 ≤

0
...
0
1
−1

,
max v.
The vector to be optimised is (v, x1, . . . , xk). A is a (q + 2) × (k +
1) matrix, the first q rows of it deal with the v ≤ minj∑i≤k ximi,j
constraint and the last two ensure that ∑i≤k xi = 1. The function to
be maximised is just v. The fact that v is restricted to be positive is not
a restriction as, given Theorem 2.1.22, we can always shift the payoffs
into the positive region.
The following is immediate:
Proposition 3.3.2. DValue is in P and Value is in FP for matrix
games, and EXP, FEXP respectively for Boolean games.
3.3.2 Variable-sum games
The argument below is based on the support enumeration algorithm
(Kaplan and Dickhaut, von Stengel [87], [88]). The differences are due to
the fact that we do not assume that we are dealing with non-degenerate
games.
Lemma 3.3.3. Let (A,B) be a bimatrix representation of a two-player
zero-sum game G and X ⊆ S1, Y ⊆ S2. We claim the following:
1. G has one, zero or infinity equilibria with support (X,Y ).
2. We can ascertain whether an equilibrium exists and, if so, produce
one in polynomial time. Moreover, we can do this even if we are
looking for equilibria satisfying certain payoff constraints.
Proof. Recall from Fact 2.1.10 that a necessary condition for equilib-
rium is that a player be indifferent between every strategy in his sup-
port. For Player One this condition translates to:∑
sj∈Y
ai,jyj =α, for si ∈ X,
∑
i∈Y
yi =1,
y ≥0.
3.3 two-player games and rational equilibria 65
α is the (as yet unknown) utility Player One derives from the potential
equilibrium, and the yi variables are the strategy weights of Player Two.
For Player Two the same condition is the following:∑
si∈X
bi,jxi =β, for sj ∈ Y,∑
i∈X
xi =1,
x ≥0.
The variables xi being the strategy weights of Player One.
However, this is not sufficient – a player may well be indifferent
between the strategies in his support, but that does not mean he does
not have a profitable deviation with a strategy outside of it. We need
to check that α and β are at least as big as what the players can get
with any pure strategy: ∑
sj∈Y
a1,jyj ≤α,
...∑
sj∈Y
ak,jyj ≤α,
∑
si∈X
bi,1xi ≤β,
...∑
si∈X
bi,qxi ≤β.
Finally, if we want to bound α and β to be greater than certain values,
we can add this to the list as well.
This gives us a LinearProgramming instance (with a trivial ob-
jective function, over the variables x,y, α, β), and we can produce a
solution, or verify that none exists, in polynomial time. q.e.d.
Proposition 3.3.4. ∃GuaranteeNash is in NP for bimatrix games
and in NEXP for two-player Boolean games. ∀GuaranteeNash and
UniqueNash are in coNP for bimatrix games and coNEXP for two-
player Boolean games. ∃NashSat and ∀NashSat are in NEXP and
coNEXP respectively.
Proof. For ∃GuaranteeNash we need only nondeterministically choose
a support. For ∀GuaranteeNash there is a difficulty because the com-
plement involves finding an equilibrium where some player’s payoff is
strictly lower then some threshold, and the basic LinearProgram-
ming formulation does not handle strict constraints. Nevertheless, we
can address this by asking the instance to minimise α or β respectively, That is, maximise
−α or −β.and verifying by hand that the values returned by the algorithm are
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indeed strictly lower. For UniqueNash we consider the complement
SecondNash. We start by nondeterministically choosing a support
and finding an equilibrium. Having done so, we will have obtained the
strategy weights used in that equilibrium. Clearly, if there exists a sec-
ond equilibrium some strategy weight would have to be different; hence,
nondeterministically choose another basis, nondeterministically choose
a strategy weight, and have the linear programming instance maximise
or minimise that weight as the case may be.
For ∃NashSat and ∀NashSat, note that a formula is made true
with probability 1 if and only if every truth assignment in the support
satisfies that formula – the weights given to such assignments do not
matter. Hence, all we need to do is nondeterministically choose a sup-
port where either every strategy satisfies the formula, or some strategy
does not as the case may be. q.e.d.
3.4 discussion
Little in this chapter is new. Section 3.3 collates and adapts standard
results of the early days of computational game theory into a form that
is convenient for our purposes, but nothing we derive there should come
as a surprise to anyone well acquainted with the field. I am unaware
of the results in Section 3.1 being explicitly stated anywhere in the
literature, but the underlying ideas are behind standard constructions
throughout computer science. Any of the lemmata within would not be
out of place as an exercise in an undergraduate textbook. does present
a novel proof technique, by showing how propositional encodings can
allow us to build Boolean games of whatever nature we want, but the
significance of this will not be clear until we get to the actual proofs in
the later chapters.
That said, this is nevertheless one of the most important sections of
the present work. It is my desire that this thesis could be read inde-
pendently; the references to the literatures are intended to satisfy the
reader’s curiosity, not to clarify any of the arguments contained herein.
This chapter was written to serve that purpose.
4
KICKING DOWN THE DOOR
O gatekeeper, open thy gate,
Open thy gate so I may enter!
If thou openest not the gate so that I cannot enter,
I will smash the door, I will shatter the bolt,
I will smash the doorpost, I will move the doors,
I will raise up the dead eating the living,
So that the dead will outnumber the living.
— Ishtar’s descent into the underworld
This chapter contains Theorem 4.2.1, the proof of which demonstrates
that ∃GuaranteeNash is NEXP-complete for two-player Boolean
games. This is the main technical result of the thesis and all the rest
follow from it, either directly by presenting a reduction from some vari-
ant of ∃GuaranteeNash, or indirectly by using the proof techniques
introduced here.
4.1 a canonical problem
Every mathematical truth is a tautology, but some tautologies are easier
to spot than others; half the work in showing the hardness of a problem
is in choosing the right problem to reduce from.
Our main focus is on decision problems about Nash equilibria, prob-
lems that are typically NP-hard in the normal form. Given the expres-
sivity and succinctness of Boolean games, it would be reasonable to
hypothesise that NEXP is the class we are interested in. The trouble,
then, is that whereas compendia have been written on the topic of
NP-complete problems, the world of NEXP-completeness is a lot more
barren – Papadimitriou’s textbook (Papadimitriou [76]) spends a mere
six pages on exponential time, and aside from a problem of first order
logic the only problems considered are succinct versions of NP-complete
problems.1
The wider literature is hardly better. The fact is that NEXP is of
remote interest to most researchers, given the intractability of the prob-
lems involved. One is given the choice between concise circuit represen-
tations of known NP problems, and increasingly more arcane logical
problems. At that point one ought to ask, would it not be simpler to
just bite the bullet and encode a Turing machine directly?
This is precisely our approach.
1 Which is, of course, exactly what we are considering here.
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NEXPTM
Input: A nondeterministic Turing machineM , an input word w,
and a computation bound K in binary.
Output: YES if M accepts w in at most K steps, NO otherwise.
Fact 4.1.1. NEXPTM is NEXP-complete.
Proof. The key here is that K is given in binary, and hence K is expo-
nential in |K|. Thus, given an arbitrary nondeterministic exponential-
time machine M with clock f , we can construct an instance of NEX-
PTM (M,w, f(|w|)). By definition, (M,w, f(|w|)) ∈ NEXPTM if and
only if M accepts w in at most f(|w|) steps, which is exactly to say
that the machine M with clock f accepts w. q.e.d.
4.2 a payoff-constrained equilibrium
Theorem 4.2.1. ∃GuaranteeNash for two-player Boolean games is
NEXP-complete.
Proof. For NEXP membership, the problem is in NP for normal form
games so it is in NEXP for Boolean games – we can expand the game
into its normal form, which is exponential in the size of the Boolean
representation, and guess an equilibrium. For further details, the reader
can go back to Section 3.3.
For NEXP-hardness, we will reduce from NEXPTM. That is, we will
demonstrate that given a nondeterministic machine M , a binary input
string w, and a computation bound K in binary, we can construct in
polynomial time a two-player Boolean game G and a vector of payoffs
v such that there exists an equilibrium σ of G where each player i
attains a utility of at least v[i] if and only if M accepts w in at most
K steps.
Without loss of generality, we assume two restrictions onM . First,M
is augmented with a “do nothing” transition that is only activated from
an accepting state. This ensures that every run of M on w is defined
for all K computation steps, even if the machine stops computing early.
Second, we assume that M has just one accepting state qa, and if M
accepts it accepts with the head over the leftmost cell. This is not really
a restriction as we can always extend M into an M ′ that simulates M
until M reaches the accepting state, and then M ′ enters a routine
requiring it to move to the left of the tape and then accept.
Let k = |K|; and q = |Q|, the number of states of the machine.
Observe that since K is given in binary, 2k ≥ K. We can thus envisage
a run of M on w as being represented by a 2k × 2k table. Every row of
the table is a machine configuration (that is, the tape contents, machine
state and head location). Thus the ith row, jth column of the table tells
us the contents of the jth cell at the ith computation step; whether the
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2k

2k︷ ︸︸ ︷
1q0 1← 0← 1← ← · · · ←
0→ 1q1 0← 1← ← · · · ←
0→ 0→ 0q2 1← ← · · · ←
· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
0qa 0← 0← 0← 0← · · · ←
· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
0qa 0← 0← 0← 0← · · · ←
Figure 4.1: What a run of M on w = 1101 might look like. The row in the
middle represents the step in which the machine accepts, after
which it enters into a “do nothing” routine right through to step
2k − 1.
head is over the cell, to the left of it, or to the right; and, if the head
is over the cell, the machine state. This is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
We can say that such a table represents an accepting run if and only
if:
1. The 0th row represents the initial configuration. By this we mean We index the steps
and cells from 0.
Hence the final
step is K − 1.
that the (0, j)-entry is w[j], or blank if j ≥ |w|; the (0, 0)-entry
contains the head in state q0; for each j ≥ 1, the (0, j)-entry
asserts that the head is to the left.
2. The (K − 1, 0)-entry contains the head in the accepting state. The (i, j)-entry is
the ith row and
jth column. Think
of a matrix rather
than a chart.
3. Every consecutive pair of rows satisfies some transition rule of
the machine.
Points 1 and 2 are, of course, a lot simpler to verify than point 3; the
requirements are in some sense local – we need only to demonstrate
that the jth cell at step 0 does not contain w[j] to prove that point 1 is
not satisfied. Point 3, however, seemingly requires us to consider a pair
of rows in their entirety, which is problematic given that the length of
such a row is exponential in k. It is for this reason that we label every
entry of the table with the direction to the head. This will allow us
to reduce the problem of checking two rows for consistency to merely
finding a pair of inconsistent arrows.
We expand on this in the following lemma, showing that if the table
does not represent an accepting run, then there will exist a 2×2 square
in it witnessing that fact.
Lemma 4.2.2. There exists a finite set of requirements S such that
a table of the kind described above represents an accepting run if and
only if every 2× 2 square in the table satisfies every requirement in S.
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Proof. It should first be said that we allow our squares to loop around
the edges of the table. Thus, for example, there exists a square consist-Perversely, we
shall refer to the
(2k−1, 2k−1)-entry
as the “upper left”
of this square.
ing of the entries (2k − 1, 2k − 1), (2k − 1, 0), (0, 2k − 1) and (0, 0).
There are four requirements, although the fifth breaks down into a
(finite, polynomially bounded) slew of disjuncts:
1. If the square contains the (0, 0)-entry, that entry contains the
head in state q0.
2. If the square contains the (0, j)-entry, with j < |w|, that entry
contains w[j] and if j ≥ 1 asserts the head is to the left.
3. If the square contains the (0, j)-entry, with j ≥ |w|, that entry
contains the blank tape symbol and asserts that the head is to
the left.
4. If the square contains the (K − 1, 0)-entry, that entry contains
the head in the accepting state qa.
5. The square is consistent with some transition rule.
Little can be said about the first four requirements, it is clear that
they are necessary. To unpack the fifth requirement fully we would
need to fix the Turing machine in question and expend a lot of paper.
Instead, we will demonstrate what it means by showing how we can
verify that a square is consistent with the rule “Upon reading a 0 in
state q3 write 1, move left and transition to state q5” by comparing
it against a finite number of admissible square schemata. These areEvery schema
expands to at
most 81 concrete
squares, as a cell
can contain only 1,
0, or .
illustrated in Figure 4.2.
It should be clear that if the fifth requirement is not satisfied then
the table cannot represent an accepting run. It remains to argue that
if the table is not an accepting run one of the requirements is, in fact,
violated.
If the table does not contain the initial configuration in the first row
or an accepting state on the leftmost cell of the (K − 1)th row, one
of the first four requirements would be violated. The only remaining
possibility for the table to not represent an accepting run is the exis-
tence of rows i and i+ 1 which do not satisfy any transition rule of the
machine. We shall see that this is not possible.
Suppose that row i correctly describes a machine configuration (crit-
ically, it contains the head in exactly one entry and every other entry
correctly asserts the direction to the head), and every 2×2 square over
row i and i+1 satisfies the requirements. We will show that there exists
a (a, qx)→ (b,D, qy) such that:
1. The head is in exactly one position in row i + 1. This position
is one step in direction D from the location of the head in row i
(unless D = L and the head is in cell 0, in which case it remains
in cell 0), and the entries in row i+1 correctly assert the direction
to the head.
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j j + 1
i x
→ 0q3
i+ 1 xq5 1←
j j + 1
i 0q3 x←
i+ 1 1← x←
0 1
i 0q3 x←
i+ 1 1q5 x←
i < 2k − 1
j < 2k − 1
i < 2k − 1
0 < j < 2k − 1
i < 2k − 1
j j + 1
i x
←
y
←
i+ 1 x← y←
j j + 1
i x
→
y
→
i+ 1 x→ yq5
j j + 1
i x
→
y
→
i+ 1 x→ y→
i < 2k − 1
1 < j < 2k − 1
i < 2k − 1
j < 2k − 2
i < 2k − 1
j < 2k − 3
2k − 1 0
i 0q3 x→
i+ 1 1← x→
2k − 1 0
i x
←
y
→
i+ 1 x← y→
2k − 1 0
i x
←
y
→
i+ 1 x← yq5
i < 2k − 1 i < 2k − 1 i < 2k − 1
2k − 1 0
i x
← 0q3
i+ 1 x← 1q5
j j + 1
2k − 1 x y
0 z w
i < 2k − 1
Figure 4.2: Admissible squares for the rule (0, q3)→ (1, L, q5).
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2. The head in row i is in state qx, and in row i+ 1 in qy.
3. The tape in row i contains a under the head. In row i+1 the tape
contains b in the entry where the head was in row i and elsewhere
agrees with row i.
It is clear that these three properties will be sufficient to establish that
row i+ 1 follows from i via (a, qx)→ (b,D, qy).
Let the head in row i be in cell j, with a written on the tape. We
assume j > 0, the boundary case where j = 0 differs only that if D = L
the head must stand still. Consider two 2× 2 squares, one with upper
left corner (i, j−1) and the other with upper left corner (i, j). In order
to match an admissible schema, the left square must either contain a
in entry (i, j), b1 in entry (i + 1, j), the head in entry (i, j) in state
qx and the head in entry (i + 1, j − 1) in state qy1 in accordance with
some (a, qx)→ (b1, L, qy1), or both the lower entries of the square must
assert the head is to the right (that is, it is an admissible square for
some rule that asserts rightward movement). Likewise, the right square
must either agree with some (a, qx) → (b2, R, qy2), or assert the head
is to the left. We claim that it must be the case that exactly one of
these squares agrees with a machine rule in this fashion, and displays
the head in both rows; while the other asserts the head is in the correct
direction.
Suppose the contrary – first, that the left square claims the head
moved to the right and the right square that it moved to the left. In
order for the left square to be correct, this means entry (i+ 1, j) must
assert the head is to the right. However, in order for the right square
to be correct this entry must assert the head is to the left, and hence
there is no way to fill in that entry of the table to satisfy both squares.
Likewise, if the left square claims leftward movement and the right
square claims rightward movement, then again it will not be possible
to fill in (i+ 1, j) in a manner consistent with both squares.
This is the crux of the argument. We have established property 2,
taking qy = qy1 or qy2 as the case may be, and 3, as the entry under
the tape changes from a to b1 or b2 and, as can be seen from Figure 4.2,
in order to be correct, every square that does not cover the head’s
location in row i is obliged to copy the tape contents faithfully. To
establish that property 1 holds, we just need to verify that a second
head cannot appear in row i + 1. This can be seen from an inductive
argument. Without loss of generality, suppose D = L. The square with
upper left corner (i, j) contains ← in its bottom right corner. As such,
the square with upper left corner (i, j + 1) over must contain ← in its
bottom left corner, and as can be seen from Figure 4.2 this assures that
it also has ← in its bottom right corner, which inductively carries over
to all squares to the right.
The square with upper left corner (i, j − 1) contains the head in
its bottom left corner. Accordingly, the square with upper left corner
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(i, j − 2) must have the head in its bottom right corner and a → in
its bottom left corner – which leads to the induction in the leftwards
direction.
To recap: we have shown that if every 2 × 2 square over rows i and
i+1 satisfies an admissible square of some transition rule (the number of
both being polynomial in the size of the machine), then the properties 1,
2 and 3 hold, which establishes that row i+1 follows from row i via some
(a, qx) → (b,D, qy). This establishes that the five requirements given
above are in fact sufficient – if every square is an admissible square
of some rule, then every row follows by a valid transition rule from
the preceding row, and hence the table must represent a computation
history. q.e.d.
This gives us the framework for our construction. Player One, via
his choice of strategy, defines such a table and Player Two verifies that
every 2× 2 square in it satisfies all the requirements in S.
The players control the following variables:
Φ1 = {Zero1,One1,Left1,Right1} ∪ var1(G(3/4))
∪ {Time1k} ∪ {Tape1k} ∪ {State1q}.
Φ2 = {Zero2,One2, sZero2, sOne2,Left2,Right2, sLeft2, sRight2,
nZero2,nOne2,nsZero2,nsOne2,nLeft2,nRight2,
nsLeft2,nsRight2} ∪ var2(G(3/4))
∪ {Time2k} ∪ {Tape2k} ∪ {sTime2k} ∪ {sTape2k}
∪ {nTime2k} ∪ {nTape2k} ∪ {nsTime2k} ∪ {nsTape2k}
∪ {State2q} ∪ {sState2q} ∪ {nState2q} ∪ {nsState2q}.
A truth assignment to Φ1 should be interpreted as defining an entry
of the table with index (JTime1kK, JTape1kK); its tape contents (as given
by One1 and Zero1); and whether the head is to the left or right (as
indicated by Left1 and Right1) or directly above the entry, and, if the
head directly above, the machine is in the state indicated by State1i .
Likewise, an assignment to Φ2 defines a quadruple of entries which
constitute a 2× 2 square as in Lemma 4.2.2: the prefix “s” of variable
names denotes the successor cell on the tape, while “n” refers to the next
computation step, so Zero2 asserts that there is a 0 in the top left corner
of the selected square, and nsZero2 that there is a 0 in the bottom right.
There is at present no guarantee that these entries are well formed –
Player Two’s assignment could well assert the presence of both a 1 and a
0, more than one machine state, and other absurdities; these issues will
be dealt with in Player Two’s goal formula. The var(G(3/4)) variables
do not feature in this interpretation; their purpose is technical, and will
not be clear until the proof of Lemma 4.2.3.
We want Player One to describe the entire table, but so far a pure
strategy will only result in the description of a single entry. To address
this, we will require Player One to randomise over the pure strategies
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available to him, and in doing so the mixed strategy he chooses will
describe a table as a probability distribution. To force randomisation,
we could simply give Player One the goal of naming a table entry dif-
ferent from any of the four named by Player Two. However, we shall
do something a little more complicated: if Player One names the upper
left entry of Player Two’s square he loses outright, but should he name
any other entry he is given the chance of redeeming himself by win-
ning a side game of G(3/4). The explanation for this, too, must await
Lemma 4.2.3 in the sequel.
Player One’s goal is thus the following:
γ1 =AvoidC ∧ (Avoid ∨ γ1(G(3/4)),
AvoidC =¬(Equal(Tape1k;Tape2k) ∧Equal(Time1k;Time2k)),
Avoid =¬(Equal(Tape1k; sTape2k) ∧Equal(Time1k; sTime2k))
∧¬(Equal(Tape1k;nTape2k) ∧Equal(Time1k;nTime2k))
∧¬(Equal(Tape1k;nsTape2k) ∧Equal(Time1k;nsTime2k)).
Player Two’s goals are more complicated. First, one of the entries
she names must be the same as Player One’s, and preferably the top
left – we shall later see that this ensures that in equilibrium Player
One distributes equally over every entry of the table, thus describing
the entire computation history. Next, the contents of the matching
entry must agree with Player One – this ensures the players are talking
about the same table. Finally, the four entries must constitute a 2× 2
square with the upper left entry indexed by (JTime2kK, JTape2kK), and
this square must satisfy all the requirements in S – hence Lemma 4.2.2
will allow us to draw the connection between Player Two’s payoff and
the output of the machine.
The formula she is trying to satisfy is:
γ2 =
(
¬AvoidC ∨ (¬Avoid ∧ γ2(G(3/4)))) ∧Agree ∧ Require.
The subgoal Agree is a conjunction of four implications, each stating
that if one of the named entries matches Player One’s, the entries must
agree on the description of the cell.
The first of these implications is:(
Equal(Tape1k;Tape2k) ∧Equal(Time1k;Time2k)
)→(
(Zero1 ↔ Zero2) ∧ (One1 ↔ One2) ∧ (Left1 ↔ Left2)
∧ (Right1 ↔ Right2) ∧
∧
1≤i≤q
(State1i ↔ State2i )
)
.
The other three follow the same pattern.
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Require states that the entries specified form a 2 × 2 square of the
desired type which satisfies the requirements in S. To ensure the entries
picked are indeed a square the following is sufficient:
Succ(JTape2kK; JsTape2kK) ∧ Succ(JTime2kK; JnTime2kK)
∧Equal(JTape2kK; JnTape2kK) ∧Equal(JTime2kK; JsTime2kK)
∧Equal(JsTape2kK; JnsTape2kK) ∧Equal(JnTime2kK; JnsTime2kK)
∧OneOf(Left2,Right2,State2q) ∧OneOf(nsLeft2,nsRight2,nsState2q)
∧OneOf(sLeft2, sRight2, sState2q) ∧OneOf(nLeft2,nRight2,nState2q)
∧¬(One2 ∧ Zero2) ∧ ¬(nOne2 ∧ nZero2) ∧ ¬(sOne2 ∧ sZero2)
∧¬(nsOne2 ∧ nsZero2).
We will not give the final component – the check on requirements – in
detail. Recall simply that in Lemma 4.2.2 we have shown that every
transition rule corresponds to a constant number of admissible squares.2
We can thus invoke the expressive completeness of propositional logic to
argue that for each rule there is a formula Rulei that is satisfied if and
only if Player Two’s strategy matches one of the admissible squares for
that rule. Even if the size of this formula is exponential in the number of
admissible squares (it isn’t), exponential in a constant is still a constant.
The final component is thus simply a disjunction of all such Rulei.
We now claim that the existence of an accepting run of M on w in
at most K steps is equivalent to the existence of an equilibrium in the
game described where Player Two is guaranteed utility:
v[2] = 122k +
3
22k · 4 .
Suppose an accepting run exists. Consider the profile where Player One
randomises over every entry with equal probability, plays the equilib-
rium strategy in G(3/4), and his description of the table accords with
the accepting run. Player Two is randomising over every 2 × 2 square
with equal probability, playing the equilibrium in G(3/4), and her de-
scription of the square also accords with the accepting run. Player Two
has a 1/22k chance of matching the top left corner of her square to Player
One. If she does so, Agree is satisfied because both players are describ-
ing the same table and Require is satisfied because the table they are
describing is an accepting run, and hence satisfies every requirement in
S.
On top of this, she has a 3/22k chance of matching one of the other
entries to Player One. In this case, Agree and Require are satisfied for
the same reasons, but γ2(G(3/4)) has only a 1/4 chance of being satisfied.
This means that Player Two has an expected utility of v[2]. Now let us
verify that the profile is in equilibrium.
In this particular profile Player One earns 1−v[2] utility as he fails to This is not true
for an arbitrary
profile as the game
is not zero-sum.
2 In Figure 4.2 we have shown 11 schemata, and each schema expands to at most 81
squares. The upper bound is thus 891, regardless of the machine under consideration.
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satisfy his formula only if he lands on one of the cells named by Player
Two. We need only consider deviations in pure strategies. Whichever
cell Player One picks, he will have a 1/22k chance of landing on a top
left corner of Player Two’s square and a 3/22k chance on one of the other
entries, so his payoff would be no better; likewise if Player Two plays
(i, j) with probability 1 she will have a 1/22k chance of catching Player
One on the top left of her square and a 3/22k chance on the other three
entries.
Now, consider a strategy profile where no such run exists. Observe
that as Player Two’s goal formula is conjunctive, her utility is bounded
above by the probability of catching Player One and winning the side
game, i.e. of satisfying (¬AvoidCorner ∨ (¬Avoid ∨ ¬γ2(G(3/4)))). We
will show that there is exactly one way to satisfy this with probability
at least v[2], which will allow us to reduce the number of equilibria we
need to consider – any equilibrium that does not offer a v[2] chance of
satisfying (¬AvoidCorner ∨ (¬Avoid ∨ γ2(G(3/4)))) would yield Player
Two less than v[2] utility.
Let xi,j be the weight Player Two attaches to the square with upper
left corner (i, j). Note that Player One’s payoff for playing (i, j) with
probability 1 is 1− ci,j , defining ci,j to be:The reader may
recall the cover
weight of
Lemma 3.2.1.
ci,j = xi,j +
xi−1,j
4 +
xi,j−1
4 +
xi−1,j−1
4 .
As such, Player Two is obliged to play a strategy where ci,j ≥ v[2], else
Player One could deviate to that square and cause Player Two to earn
less than v[2] utility. In fact, ci,j = v[2] is the best she can hope for as
can be seen in the sum below:
∑
i,j<2k
ci,j = 1 +
3
4 =
22k
22k +
22k · 3
22k · 4 = 2
2kv[2].
As it happens, this system is linearly independent.
Lemma 4.2.3. Consider the following system of m2 linear equations,
taking subtraction in the indices to be modulo m:
ei,j = 4xi,j + xi−1,j + xi,j−1 + xi−1,j−1.
This system is linearly independent.
Proof. Phrased in the right way, the result follows from Gerschgorin’s
circle theorem (Gerschgorin [90]). Given a complex m2×m2 matrix A,
we define m2 discs, one for each row. Disc i has centre ai,i, the diagonal
entry for that row, and radius∑j Ó=i |ai,j |, the sum of the absolute values
of the non-diagonal entries. The theorem states that every eigenvalue
of A lies in at least one such disc.
As a consequence, if |ai,i| > ∑j Ó=i |ai,j | for each row i, no eigenvalue
can be zero, and hence A is non-singular. The reader will note that
if we construct a matrix by placing ei,j in the (i + kj)th row, we will
4.2 a payoff-constrained equilibrium 77
obtain a matrix where every row has 4 on the diagonal and three 1s
elsewhere in the row, hence allowing us to invoke the circle theorem.
As a side note, I believe the lemma statement still holds with a system
of the form ei,j = 2xi,j+xi−1,j+xi,j−1+xi−1,j−1. However, it is no longer
possible to obtain this result via the circle theorem. As a consequence
of Nott and Wilson ([91], but see also Section 2.6 of Kozintsev [92]),
this would be equivalent to claiming that eai
2pi
m2 + ebi
2pi
m2 + eabi
2pi
m2 Ó= −2
for all a, b ∈ Z. Whilst this is intuitively plausible, a formal argument
proved elusive.3 q.e.d.
In other words, there is a unique way to set every ci,j to v[2] – equal
randomisation.
We have thus established that in order for Player Two to attain at
least v[2] utility it is necessary (though not sufficient) that she ran-
domise equally over all possible squares. Let us thus consider any strat-
egy profile where she does so, but an accepting run of M on w does
not exist. First, suppose Player One places positive weight on every
entry. As what he describes cannot be the table of an accepting run,
we can invoke Lemma 4.2.2 to establish that there must be a 2 × 2
square which does not satisfy the requirements in S, and hence Player
Two loses utility.
Next, suppose Player One attaches zero weight to some entries. As
Player Two is randomising equally, she must attach the same weight
to square with top left corner (i, j), to which Player One attaches zero
weight, as to square with top left corner (i′, j′), which we choose to be
the entry to which Player One attaches the highest weight. This profile
cannot be in equilibrium: if x is the probability Player One attaches to
(i′, j′) then by transferring the weight Player Two currently attaches to
the square with top left corner (i, j) to the square with top left corner
(i′, j′) she will lose at most x · 322k·4 utility, and gain at least x · 122k utility
– which would be a profitable deviation.
This completes the proof. q.e.d.
With the proof still fresh in our minds, we can observe that we have
in fact proved something stronger than the theorem statement. This
will prove useful in future proofs:
Corollary 4.2.4. The following problem is NEXP-complete:
∃GuaranteeNash∗
Input: A Boolean game G and some v ∈ [0, 1]Q.
Output: YES if G has a rational-valued equilibrium σ such that
u1(σ) ≥ v.
3 This would mean we could use G(1/2) in the construction instead. This is desirable
because G(1/2) has a name, which would allow us to use that name to achieve some
illusion of effective academic prose. Is it sufficiently desirable to spend more time
trying to prove it? No. No it is not.
78 kicking down the door
Proof. The equilibrium we used to witness the payoff constraint being
met in the proof above was rational-valued; we are not claiming that
every equilibrium satisfying that constraint must be, but that there
exists at least one. We have also proved that if the machine does not
accept the input string in the time provided, then no equilibrium of the
game, rational or otherwise, can meet the constraint.
Only one player’s utility was necessary in the construction, so we
only need to consider one. q.e.d.
4.3 discussion
In this chapter we have established the first complexity result about
mixed equilibria in Boolean games, and introduced the proof ideas on
which all subsequent results in this work will rely on.
The reader will recall that we have chosen to study ∃GuaranteeNash
rather than MaxPayoff so that our work could be directly compara-
ble with Schoenebeck and Vadhan [9]. However, at this point we can
observe that no generality was lost: Player One’s utility in the con-
struction dominates Player Two’s, so our proof equally establishes the
NEXP-completeness of MaxPayoff.
It is worth asking what this result means, if anything? It is tempting
to argue that if the complexity of finding an equilibrium is hard, then
we cannot expect the players to find it.4 There are a number of problems
with this approach, not the least of which is that ∃GuaranteeNash
has nothing to do with actually finding an equilibrium. Second, there
is nothing in the theory of games introduced thus far that provides a
mechanism for a game arriving at an equilibrium; equilibrium is a place
you stay, not a place you go to.5 A far more relevant question, then,
for players actually playing a game is not ∃GuaranteeNash or even
FindNash, but IsNash. Finally, worst-case asymptotic complexity is
a poor guide to what is and is not actually feasible. In practice, we are
not necessarily interested in games that encode computation histories,
and typically an approximate solution is just as good as the real thing.
What this result does suggest to us is that Boolean games are, in-
deed, an appropriate model of succinct games. This is not as obvious
as it may not appear; after all, the extensive form allows us to repre-
sent an exponential number of strategies via a compact game tree, but
the complexity results suggest that for sufficiently complex games the
extensive form, too, blooms exponentially. From a more abstract angle,
this is also a further hint as to the source of complexity in games. The
fact that two-player games are hard tells us that we do not need a large
number of players; win-lose games tell us that we do not need complex
gradations of payoff, circuit games tell us that we do not need black-
4 “If your laptop can’t find it, neither can the market.” -Kamal Jain.
5 Even this is not without its caveats. It’s easy to construct examples of intuitively
unstable equilibria, e.g. the bank run game.
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box functions, but something that we can efficiently compute, and now
Boolean games tell us that we do not even need universal computation.
Propositional logic is enough.

5
VARIABLE - SUM GAMES
This question the Dodo could not answer without a great deal of
thought, and it sat for a long time with one finger pressed upon its
forehead, (the position in which you usually see Shakespeare, in the
pictures of him,) while the rest waited in silence. At last the Dodo
said, “Everybody has won, and all must have prizes.”
— Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland
In the last chapter we have punctured the piñata, and it is now that
the candy starts to spill. In Section 5.1 we demonstrate that six vari-
ants of the pseudo-problem ?Nash, non-trivial questions about Nash
equilibria, are NEXP-complete for existential properties and coNEXP-
complete for universal properties in two-player Boolean games. In Sec-
tion 5.2 we address rational and irrational equilibria. Finally in Sec-
tion 5.3 we consider the problem of determining whether a profile is in
equilibrium.
The cleaner proofs are by reduction from ∃GuaranteeNash or its
complement, while the less elegant involve replicating parts of the ear-
lier construction, and tweaking them to serve the present ends.
5.1 properties of equilibria in two-player games
Theorem 5.1.1. UniqueNash is coNEXP-complete for two-player
Boolean games .
Proof. We will reduce from the complement of ∃GuaranteeNash.
The idea is, given an instance (G,v) of ∃GuaranteeNash, the players
can either play in G or can unilaterally deviate to a game where they
get a utility of v[1] or v[2] in a unique equilibrium.1 The player who
does not deviate gets nothing, so there is no equilibrium where one
player chooses G and the other to switch. Hence if ∃GuaranteeNash
does not have an equilibrium guaranteeing the players at least v utility,
there will be a unique equilibrium where both players deviate.
Let G be a Boolean game and v ∈ [0, 1]2Q. Let u = v[1] and w =
1 − v[2]. Construct G(u) and G(w) over fresh variables. Recall, from
Lemma 3.2.1, that G(u) and G(w) each have a unique equilibrium.
Introduce new Play and Dummy variables for both players.
We claim that G′ with the following parameters has a unique Nash
equilibrium if and only if (G,v) /∈ ∃GuaranteeNash:
1 “Intuition” being the operative word. In the actual construction the payoffs will be
v[1](1− v[2]) and v[2](1− v[1]).
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Φ1 =var1(G) ∪ var1(G(u)) ∪ var1(G(w)) ∪ {Play1,Dummy1},
Φ2 =var2(G) ∪ var2(G(u)) ∪ var2(G(w)) ∪ {Play2,Dummy2},
γ1 =γ1(G(w)) ∧
(
(¬Play1 ∧ ¬Play2 ∧ γ1(G))
∨ (Play1 ∧ ¬Dummy1 ∧ (
∧
p∈var1(G)
¬p) ∧ γ1(G(u)))
)
,
γ2 =γ2(G(u)) ∧
(
(¬Play1 ∧ ¬Play2 ∧ γ2(G))
∨ (Play2 ∧ ¬Dummy2 ∧ (
∧
p∈var2(G)
¬p) ∧ γ2(G(w)))
)
.
First, suppose that (G,v) ∈ ∃GuaranteeNash, and σ is an equi-
librium that satisfies the payoff criterion. Consider the partial profile
σ′ in G′ where players play σ over the variables in G, set Play1,Play2
to false and play the unique equilibria of G(u),G(w). We claim that
any extension of σ′ to a full profile (that is, with any distribution over
Dummy1,Dummy2) yields an equilibrium of G′. As such, G′ does not
have a unique equilibrium.
First, observe that any extension of σ′ to a full strategy profile gives
Player One wv[1] utility (the probability of satisfying γ1(G(w)) times
the probability of satisfying γ1), and Player Two (1 − u)v[2]. We will
show that no deviation can give the players more than that.
Note that given the play of the opposing player, neither player can
hope to increase the probability of satisfying γ1(G(w)) or γ2(G(u)).
If there is to be a deviation, it will have to increase the probability
of satisfying one of the disjuncts on the right. Moreover, as given any
assignment to Φ1 Player One will have to choose whether to set Play1 to
true or false, from his point of view the disjuncts are mutually exclusive.Recall, from
Fact 2.1.10, that
we need only
consider pure
deviations. Any
pure strategy
involves picking
one disjunct.
We can thus restrict ourselves to considering the probability with which
Player One can satisfy the one or the other.
Should Player One choose to satisfy (¬Play1∧¬Play2∧γ1(G)), then
his payoff will be bounded by his ability to satisfy γ1(G). As we as-
sumed that σ′|G = σ is an equilibrium of G, Player One cannot
increase this unilaterally. If Player One chooses to satisfy (Play1 ∧
¬Dummy1 ∧ (∧p∈var1(G) ¬p) ∧ γ1(G(u))), then given Player Two’s play
over var2(G(u)), Player One can hope for no more than u.
Player One can thus choose between wv[1] utility or wu = wv[1]. He
is indifferent between any such deviation and σ′, and, mutatis mutandis,
so is Player Two. This establishes that every extension of σ′ is an
equilibrium.
Now suppose that (G,v) /∈ ∃GuaranteeNash. We claim that the
only equilibrium of G′ involves setting the variables in G as well as
Dummy1,Dummy2 to false, Play1,Play2 to true and playing the unique
equilibria of G(u) and G(w) over the remaining variables.
First note that this is indeed an equilibrium – any deviation to satisfy
the left disjunct yields a utility of 0 to the deviating player, and given
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the play of the opponent all deviations in the games G(v) and G(w)
yield the same payoff.
Now consider any other profile σ′. Note that if the profile realises
¬Play1∧¬Play2 with non-zero probability, then σ′|G must be an equi-
librium of G – were a deviation possible for Player One in G, he could
replicate that deviation on the variables var1(G(u)) in G′ without af-
fecting the rest of the game, which would increase the probability of
him satisfying his left disjunct. However this leads directly to a contra-
diction. Suppose, without loss of generality, that Player One obtains
less than v[1] utility in σ′|G. In this case Player One has a deviation
available to him: by setting Play1 to true, Dummy1 and all variables
in G to false he can transfer the weight he is currently assigning to
(¬Play1 ∧ ¬Play2 ∧ γ1(G)), which yields him less than v[1] utility, to
(Play1 ∧¬Dummy1 ∧ (∧p∈var1(G) ¬p)∧ γ1(G(u))), where he can guaran-
tee himself at least u = v[1] by playing the equilibrium play of G(u).
This does not affect the probability of him satisfying γ1(G(w)) and
hence increases the probability of satisfying γ1.
Next suppose that ¬Play1 ∧ ¬Play2 is realised with probability 0.
We can safely assume that the players set Play1,Play2 to true with
probability 1 and var1(G), var2(G),Dummy1,Dummy2 with probability
0. The remaining variables are var1(G(u)), var2(G(u)), var1(G(w)) and
var2(G(w)), and there is a unique way to play those in equilibrium. But
that would means σ′ is precisely the profile we started with initially,
and hence the equilibrium must be unique. q.e.d.
Corollary 5.1.2. SecondNash for two-player Boolean games is NEXP-
complete.
Proof. By Theorem 2.1.11, we know that every Boolean game G has
an equilibrium. If G /∈ UniqueNash, it follows that it has at least
two. q.e.d.
Theorem 5.1.3. ∃NashSat for two-player Boolean games is NEXP-
complete.
Proof. Consider the construction of Theorem 4.2.1. The reader will
note that in the equilibrium described in the proof, ϕ = γ1∨γ2 already
holds with probability 1, so we are halfway done. Unfortunately, in
the case where M does not accept w, there nevertheless can exist an
equilibrium where γ1 is true with probability 1, and hence ϕ – consider
the case where Player One plays a nonsense configuration that Player
Two cannot hope to match. Player Two faces 0 utility no matter what
she plays, so she has no incentive to guess the same entry as Player
One, which could allow Player One to win unchallenged.
The idea then is to alter the game so that Player Two always has an
incentive to guess the same entry as Player One, even if the rest of her
formula is unsatisfiable.
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With this in mind, let G be the game from Theorem 4.2.1 and con-
struct G(1/2). We construct a new game G′ with:
γ1 = γ1(G) ∧ γ1(G(1/2)),
γ2 = γ2(G) ∨ (¬γ1(G) ∧ γ2(G(1/2))).
The introduction of G(1/2) is to give Player Two a little utility for
guessing the same entry as Player One, even if she cannot satisfy γ2(G)
in its entirety. Player One has to satisfy both γ1(G) and γ1(G(1/2)) to
induce him to always play the equilibrium play in G(1/2).
First, observe that it is still the case that ϕ = γ1(G) ∨ γ2(G) holds
with probability 1 in some equilibrium if M accepts w – the profile
where both players describe an accepting run over the entire table and
play the unique equilibrium in G(1/2).
Now suppose that M does not accept w in K steps. Consider a
strategy profile σ where both players attach non-zero weight to all
entries of the table. As the computation history Player One describes
cannot be an accepting run, it must contain an inadmissible square
and therefore there exists a non-zero probability that both players will
choose that square, invalidating γ1(G), yet Player Two will be unable to
satisfy γ2(G), and therefore ϕ is not realised with probability 1. Hence
if there does exist an equilibrium where ϕ holds with probability 1,
it must be the case that one of the players does not attach non-zero
weight to every entry.
Next, consider the case where Player Two does not attach positive
weight to all entries. We claim that this profile is not an equilibrium. As
Lemma 4.2.3 establishes that there is a unique way to make every entry
equally dangerous for Player One, it follows that in this strategy profile
some entries are less dangerous than others. That is, we can assume
there exist entries (i, j) and (k, l), with Player Two assigning non-zero
probability to the square with upper left corner (i, j), such that the
expected utility of Player One playing (i, j) with probability 1 is less
than that of playing (k, l) with probability 1. As all strategies in the
support of Player One’s play must have equal expected utility, we can
assume that (i, j) is played with probability 0 and (k, l) with probability
p; we can further choose (k, l) in such a way that p is non-zero.
Now, the expected utility of Player Two playing the square with
upper left corner (i, j) is p1a1/4 + p2a2/4 + p3a3/4, where p1, p2, p3 are
the probabilities with which Player One plays (i + 1, j), (i, j + 1) and
(i+1, j+1), and a1, a2, a3 are 1 if the associated squares are admissible
and 1/2 otherwise. If all of p1a1, p2a2, p3a3 are zero, then Player Two
can transfer to (k, l) the mass she currently assigns to (i, j), which will
increase her payoff as the expected utility of (i, j) is 0 and (k, l) at least
p/2. If p1a1, p2a2, p3a3 are not all zero, without loss of generality suppose
that p1a1 is the largest of these. By transferring to (i+1, j) the mass she
currently assigns to (i, j) Player Two will be trading p1a1/4+p2a2/4+p3a3/4
utility for at least p1a1, which is clearly a profitable deviation.
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Finally, suppose Player Two does attach positive weight to all entries
but Player One does not. If any entry Player One describes cannot be
matched by an admissible square we are done – it is possible for γ1(G)
and γ2(G) to both fail to hold. If it is possible to tile the portion of the
table Player One describes with admissible squares, then we are not in
equilibrium as Player Two could deviate: if Player One attaches zero
weight to (i, j), Player Two yields p1a1/4+p2a2/4+p3a3/4 utility from that
entry, and she can replicate the deviation we described above. q.e.d.
Theorem 5.1.4. ∀NashSat for two-player Boolean games is coNEXP-
complete.
Proof. The idea is similar to Theorem 5.1.1. Again, we reduce from the
complement of ∃GuaranteeNash, having the players play G, with the
option to unilaterally deviate to another game where Player i is guar-
anteed a utility of at least v[i]. Thus if (G,v) /∈ ∃GuaranteeNash
some player will always deviate. The formula ϕ will track if a deviation
has occurred.
Let (G,v) be an ∃GuaranteeNash instance. Let u = v[1] and
w = 1− v[2].
Construct G′ as follows:
Φ1 =var1(G) ∪ var1(G(u)) ∪ var1(G(w)) ∪ {Play1},
Φ2 =var2(G) ∪ var2(G(u)) ∪ var2(G(w)) ∪ {Play2},
γ1 =(¬Play1 ∧ ¬Play2 ∧ γ1(G)) ∨ (Play1 ∧ γ1(G(u)))
∨ (Play2 ∧ γ1(G(w))),
γ2 =(¬Play1 ∧ ¬Play2 ∧ γ2(G)) ∨ (Play1 ∧ γ2(G(u)))
∨ (Play2 ∧ γ2(G(w))).
We claim that ϕ = Play1 ∨ Play2 is true in every equilibrium with
probability 1 if and only if (G,v) /∈ ∃GuaranteeNash.
First, suppose that (G,v) ∈ ∃GuaranteeNash, and let σ be an
equilibrium satisfying the payoff criterion. Extend σ to a profile of
G′ by having both players play the equilibrium strategies in G(u) and
G(w), and set Play1,Play2 to false. Observe that this is an equilibrium:
neither player has incentive to set Play1 or Play2 to true as that will As before, any
pure strategy can
satisfy at most one
disjunct.
yield them u or w utility respectively, which is no more than what
they are getting already. If both players set Play1,Play2 to false then
neither player has incentive to change their strategies in G(u),G(w) as
that has no effect on their payoff. Finally, no player has incentive to
change their distribution over var1(G), var2(G) as σ is an equilibrium
of G. Now note that this equilibrium satisfies ϕ with probability 0, so
(G′, ϕ) /∈ ∀NashSat.
Next, suppose (G,v) /∈ ∃GuaranteeNash. Assume, for contradic-
tion, that there exists an equilibrium σ of G′ where ϕ is satisfied with
probability less than 1. Note that this means that both players must
assign a non-zero weight to a truth assignment that assigns Play1 and
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Play2 to false. This implies that σ|G is an equilibrium of G: if it were
not, there would be a deviation for, say, Player One in G that would in-
crease his probability of satisfying γ1(G). Since this deviation only uses
the variables in var1(G), Player One could also perform such a devia-
tion in G′, as his distribution over var1(G) only affects the probability
of γ1(G) being satisfied, and not any other formula. Now, since the
event ¬Play1 ∧ ¬Play2 has a non-zero chance of occurring, this means
increasing the probability of γ1(G) being satisfied increases the proba-
bility of (¬Play1 ∧ ¬Play2) being satisfied, and hence the probability
of γ1.
Since (G,v) /∈ ∃GuaranteeNash, and σ|G is an equilibrium of G,
we can without loss of generality assume that in this equilibrium Player
One satisfies γ1(G) with probability v′ < v[1]. Suppose Player One de-
viates from σ by setting Play1 to true (with probability 1) and playing
the equilibrium strategy in G(u). Note that this does not affect the
probability of satisfying (Play2 ∧ γ1(G(w))) as we are keeping Player
One’s play in G(w) the same. On the other hand, it decreases the prob-
ability of satisfying (¬Play1∧¬Play2∧γ1) by at most pv′, where p is the
combined weight Player One previously attached to truth assignments
which set Play1 to false, and en revanche he increases the probability
of satisfying (Play1 ∧ γ1(G(u))) by pu. As pu > pv′ this is a profitable
deviation, so σ could not have been an equilibrium. q.e.d.
Theorem 5.1.5. ∀GuaranteeNash is coNEXP-complete for two-
player Boolean games.
Proof. Before we prove the theorem, we would like to point out just
how trivial it is to establish hardness for the multiplayer variant – de-
termining whether (G,ϕ) ∈ ∀NashSat is coNEXP-hard, so just add
another player with goal formula ϕ and test whether that player attains
1 utility in every equilibrium. The discerning reader will no doubt infer
that the presence of this aside suggests that the argument to follow is
somewhat less elegant, so we ask you to bear with us.
We reduce from the complement of NEXPTM. The construction
mirrors Theorem 4.2.1. This time, instead of supplying a legal square
Player Two attempts to supply an illegal square and, as Lemma 4.2.2
still holds, in the absence of an accepting run an illegal square must
exist, giving Player Two some guaranteed payoff that she would not
have were Player One to describe the history of an accepting run.
The players have the following goal formulae:
γ1 =AvoidC ∧ (Avoid ∨ γ1(G(3/4))),
γ2 =(¬AvoidC ∨ (¬Avoid ∧ γ2(G(3/4)))) ∧Agree ∧ Illegal.
With the exception of Illegal, the subformulae are as before. Illegal
asserts that Player Two plays a square, but that square violates some
requirement of Lemma 4.2.2.
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At this point we will digress to motivate what is to follow. Consider
a profile (not necessarily an equilibrium) where both players randomise
equally over all entries. If every square Player One describes is admis-
sible, then Player Two can achieve a utility of 122k +
2
22k+2 : no matter
what square she names, she can match three of those entries to Player
One’s and only modify the last to satisfy Illegal. In the case where an
accepting run exists, there exists an equilibrium of this kind, thus it
follows that our value for v[2] would have to be strictly greater than
1
22k +
2
22k+2 . If Player One describes at least one inadmissible square
in the table, as he must if no accepting run exists, then Player Two’s
utility in this case is at least v∗ = 122k +
2
22k+2 +
1
22k+222k . I.e., v
∗ is the
value we get if Player Two randomises equally over 1/22k− 1 admissible
squares and one inadmissible square. If the inadmissible square is re-
alised then Player Two is able to match all four entries to Player One’s
description, which accounts for the additional 122k+222k term.
A naïve approach would then be to let v[2] = v∗. This is problematic
as there is no guarantee that Player One will distribute over every
square equally in equilibrium. He may choose to attach less weight to
the inadmissible square, and thereby deny Player Two the additional
utility. However, a rising tide lifts all boats – the weight Player One
chooses to place everywhere will increase the probability of some other
square being realised, which will increase Player Two’s utility to some
v′. This v′ will be smaller than v∗, but nevertheless strictly greater than
1
22k +
2
22k+2 .
Now suppose (M,w,K) /∈ NEXPTM. If every 2 × 2 square in the
described table is inadmissible we are done – Player Two’s utility is at
least v∗, as that is what she can get by randomising equally throughout
the table. Suppose then there exists an admissible square, with upper
left corner (i, j), and an inadmissible square, with upper left corner
(k, l). Let pi,j be the probability with which Player One plays entry
(i, j). Note that the utility Player Two would get by playing (k, l) with
probability 1 is pk,l + pk+1,l/4 + pk,l+1/4 + pk+1,l+1/4, and for playing (i, j)
is pi,j + pi+1,j/4 + pi,j+1/4 (we are, without loss of generality, assuming
that pi+1,j , pi,j+1 ≥ pi+1,j+1. Player Two can pick whichever of the
two entries she wants to match, and it stands to reason that she will
pick those most likely to be realised). We furthermore assume that we
picked an (i, j) such that pi,j + pi+1,j/4 + pi,j+1/4 is maximal. These are
the lower bounds on Player Two’s utility in every equilibrium in which
Player One plays with probabilities p0,0, . . . , p2k−1,2k−1 (recall, every
pure strategy in the support of Player Two’s strategy must maximise
her utility).
If it is the case that pk,l + pk+1,l/4 + pk,l+1/4 + pk+1,l+1/4 ≥ v∗, there is
nothing more to be said. Suppose that this is not the case. This where
the rising tide comes in to play; if Player One does not attach enough
mass to the entries (k, l) through (k + 1, l + 1) to give Player Two v∗
utility, he must attach that excess mass somewhere else. The question
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we now answer is, how much mass do we have to remove from this sum
(relative to the equal distribution of 1/22k per entry) in order for it to
fall below v∗?
We assume this transfer is done adversarially, and hence the mass is
first removed from pk,l (if this is not the case, all it means is that the δ
we will arrive at will be larger, which will still establish the theorem).
This leads us to:The 3 is in the
numerator on the
left because we
remove mass from
pk,l before any
other weight.
pk,l +
3
22k+2 <
1
22k +
2
22k+2 +
1
22k+222k ,
pk,l <
1
22k −
1
22k+2 +
1
22k+222k .
So the total mass transfer is at least δ = 122k+2 − 122k+222k . Now observe
that this δ must be shared out in some way among the entries that are
not (k, l), (k, l+1), (k+1, l), (k+1, l+1). This raises the average weight
of those entries to 1/22k + δ/22k − 4. As we picked pi,j + pi+1,j/4 + pi,j+1/4
to be maximal, we can assume this sum to be at least:
1
22k +
δ
22k − 4 +
2
22k+2 +
2δ
22k+2 − 16 .
We now claim that (M,w,K) ∈ NEXPTM if and only if (G,v) /∈
∀GuaranteeNash, for the following v:
v[1] =0,
v[2] = 122k +
δ
22k − 4 +
2
22k+2 +
2δ
22k+2 − 16 .
One direction we have already done. It remains to see what happens
when (M,w,K) ∈ NEXPTM.
Consider the strategy profile where Player One randomises over all
squares equally, describing the accepting run, and Player Two ran-
domises equally over all entries in a manner where the upper left, upper
right and lower left entry of each square agrees with Player One and
the lower right disagrees in order to ensure the described square is not
admissible. The utilities derived by the players are:
u1 =1− 122k −
3
22k+2 ,
u2 =
1
22k +
2
22k+2 .
This is also the most they can hope to gain by deviating to any pure
strategy, so this is an equilibrium, and as u2 < v[2] we have (G,v) /∈
∀GuaranteeNash. q.e.d.
5.2 rational and irrational equilibria
The question of whether a game has a rational equilibrium is of a
fundamentally different nature to the questions studied so far: the two-
player variant can be solved in constant time by a machine that ignores
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the input and prints “YES”. We need at least three players to have any
chance of a hardness result. The proof below, in fact, uses four, as that
makes the argument more transparent; a three-player variant involves
absorbing the rôle of the fourth player by the first three players, and at
that point the logic of the construction becomes harder to follow. We
relegate that argument to the appendix.
Theorem 5.2.1. RationalNash for four-player Boolean games is
NEXP-hard.
Proof. Theorem 3 in Bilò and Mavronicolas [36] gives an example of a
three-player win-lose game, call it G′1, that has only irrational equilib-
ria. Players One and Two have two strategies each, but Player Three
has three, and as such the game as given does not have a Boolean rep-
resentation. However, the game has the positive utility property: for any
choice of strategies by two players, the third has a response that will
yield him strictly positive utility. We can thus extend G′1 into G1 that
has a fourth strategy for Player Three, which operates as follows:
1. Player Three’s payoff for choosing the fourth strategy is zero.
2. Player One and Two’s payoff from any profile where Player Three This is an
arbitrary choice to
ensure that payoffs
for One and Two
remain defined
even in “illegal”
play.
chooses the fourth strategy are the same as if Player Three chose
his first strategy instead.
Observe that in no equilibrium of G1 would Player Three attach posi-
tive weight to his fourth strategy – the positive utility property of the
game ensures that he can always do better than zero utility. Thus G1
does not introduce any new equilibria; they are the same as the equi-
libria of G′1, and ergo irrational. As every player now has either two or
four strategies, G1 has a Boolean representation.
We will reduce from ∃GuaranteeNash∗, from Corollary 4.2.4. Let
the pair (G2, v) be an instance of ∃GuaranteeNash∗ with three play-
ers.
The idea of the construction is to let the players choose to play in
G1 or G2 in such a way that every equilibrium involves all the players
choosing the same game to play in, and that there is an equilibrium
in which the players choose to play in G2 if and only if (G2, v) is a
positive instance of ∃GuaranteeNash∗. This will prove the theorem
– if (G2, v) ∈ ∃GuaranteeNash∗ then there is an equilibrium where
the players play in G2, and hence there is a rational-valued equilibrium
(namely, the equilibrium of G2 that guarantees Player One a payoff
of v). If (G2, v) /∈ ∃GuaranteeNash∗ then every equilibrium of the
game must be in G1, and those are irrational.
The fourth player, O, exists only to serve as an opponent in the
corresponding gadget games.
The game is defined as follows:
Φi≤3 = vari(G1) ∪ vari(G2) ∪ {Choicei } ∪ var1(Gi),
ΦO = var2(G1(v)) ∪ var2(G2(1/2)) ∪ var2(G3(1/2)),
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γ1 =
( ∧
i≤3
Choicei ∧ γ1(G2)
) ∨ ( ∧
i≤3
¬Choicei ∧ (γ1(G1) ∨ γ1(G(v)))
)
∨ (¬Choice1 ∧ (Choice2 ∨ Choice2) ∧ γ1(G1(v))),
γ2 =
( ∧
i≤3
Choicei ∧ (γ2(G2) ∨ γ1(G2(1/2)))
) ∨ ( ∧
i≤3
¬Choicei ∧ γ2(G1)
)
∨ (¬Choice2 ∧ (Choice1 ∨ Choice3) ∧ γ1(G2(1/2))),
γ3 =
( ∧
i≤3
Choicei ∧ (γ3(G2) ∨ γ1(G3(1/2)))
) ∨ ( ∧
i≤3
¬Choicei ∧ γ3(G1)
)
∨ (¬Choice3 ∧ (Choice1 ∨ Choice2) ∧ γ1(G3(1/2))),
γO = γ2(G1(v)) ∧ γ2(G2(1/2)) ∧ γ2(G3(1/2)).
Intuitively, what we are doing is separating the pure2 profiles into three
categories: the players coordinate on G1, G2, or a miscoordination oc-
curs. It should be clear how the Choicei variables implement this. TheDo note that only
the players opting
to play in G1 get
any utility from
miscoordination.
purpose of the gadget games is perhaps a bit more opaque at the mo-
ment, but observe that since winning G(v) is a disjunctive for Player
One in the case of G1 it acts as a floor on his utility in that state,
whereas being conjunctive in the case of miscoordination it acts as a
ceiling. For Players Two and Three, we likewise add a floor of 1/2 to G2,
and a ceiling of 1/2 to miscoordination.
Suppose (G2, v) ∈ ∃GuaranteeNash∗. We claim there is a rational-
valued equilibrium where Players One through Three set Choicei to
true, play the rational-valued equilibrium of G2 that satisfies the payoff
constraint over vari(G2), the equilibrium strategy over var1(Gi) and
every other variable to false. Player O plays the equilibrium strategy
in all his gadget games.
Player O has no incentive to deviate as he wins if and only if he
wins three independent games, and all those are currently in equilib-
rium. Player One has no incentive to deviate while Choice1 is true: he
is indifferent about what he does with var1(G1) and var1(G1(v)) as
those variables do not affect his ability to satisfy γ1(G2), and he has
no incentive to deviate over var1(G2) as G2 is in equilibrium. Should
he set Choice1 to false, then his utility will depend only on his ability
to satisfy γ1(G1(v)). The probability of that is v, the “ceiling” which
we have set earlier, and that is at most how much he is getting in the
current profile. Player Two (symmetrically, Three) has no incentive to
deviate over var1(G2(1/2)) or var2(G2) as those games are in equilib-
rium, and the variables in var2(G1) do not affect her current utility.
If she deviates by setting Choice2 to false, then she will be getting a
utility of 1/2; whereas in the current profile she is getting 1 − 1/2 · x,
where x is her probability of losing G2. As x is at most 1, 1/2 is indeed
the floor on her utility, and hence such a deviation could do no better.
Now suppose (G2, v) /∈ ∃GuaranteeNash∗. There are two cases to
consider. In the first, G2 does have equilibria for which u1(σ) ≥ v, but
all such equilibria are irrational. In the second, G2 has no equilibrium
2 Modulo equilibrium play in the gadget games.
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which affords Player One a utility of at least v. We will deal with
each as it arises, by considering an arbitrary equilibrium of G and
demonstrating that no matter what the case, the equilibrium cannot
be rational.
Consider an equilibrium of G where p, q and r are the probabilities
of players One, Two and Three respectively opting to play in G2, i.e.
the marginal probabilities of setting Choicei to true. We argue that
in every equilibrium all three must be zero or non-zero – the player
opting to play in G2 gets no utility from miscoordination, so if a play
in G2 has no hope of realising (because one of p, q, or r is 0), any pure
strategy that sets Choicei to true has a payoff of zero and hence can
only be included in an equilibrium if the player receives a payoff of
zero from every strategy available to him. From the point of view of
Two (mutatis mutandis, Three) this is impossible: she could expect 1/2
from miscoordination and something strictly positive in G1 were she
to change her strategy to one setting Choice2 to false. From the point
of One we could have a problem where v = 0, q = 0 and r = 1, as he
gets a utility of 0 no matter what he plays, but that situation cannot
arise as if q = 0 and r = 1 the profile cannot be in equilibrium – Three
would deviate by setting Choice3 to false. Hence, if q = 0 and r = 0,
then Player One also has a profitable deviation to whatever strictly
positive payoff he can get in G1. We need not consider the case where
p = q = r = 0, as the equilibrium is clearly irrational. Let us then
assume that they are not all 0.
This allows us to handle the case where G2 has no equilibrium that
affords Player One a utility of at least v – his current utility would be
pqr · y+ (1− p)(1− (1− q)(1− r)) · v+ (1− p)(1− q)(1− r) · x (payoff
from G2, from miscoordination, and from G1), with y being strictly less
than v and x being at least v. If he were to set p to 0, he would trade
pqry for a weighted basket of v and x, both which are at least as large
as y. Thus if (G2, v) /∈ ∃GuaranteeNash∗ and G2 has no equilibria
with u1(σ) ≥ v, then G has no rational equilibria.
Now suppose that G2 does have an irrational σ in which u1(σ) ≥ v.
Recall that Player One’s utility is pqr ·y+(1−p)(1− (1−q)(1−r)) ·v+
(1−p)(1−q)(1−r)·x. If y < v, then the same argument applies as before.
If y ≥ v, this can only be the case if the players are playing an irrational
equilibrium in G2, which establishes that the equilibrium of G under
consideration cannot be rational. This completes the proof. q.e.d.
Theorem 5.2.2. RationalNash for three-player Boolean games is
NEXP-hard.
Proof. See Appendix A.1. q.e.d.
IrrationalNash is thematically similar to RationalNash, but as
we shall show it is in fact no different from the problems studied in
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the previous section. While it is true that non-degenerate3 two-player
games have an odd number of rational equilibria, in which case Irra-
tionalNash would be trivial, restricting our study to non-degenerate
games only is hard to justify, given that determining which class a game
belongs to appears to be no easy task. Once we admit degenerate games
into consideration then we find that a two-player game can have any
number of equilibria and, critically, it has an irrational equilibrium if
and only if it has infinitely many of them.
Fact 5.2.3. A two-player game has an irrational equilibrium if and
only if it has an infinite number of equilibria.
Proof. Recall Lemma 3.3.3. If the support pair (X,Y ) has a unique
equilibrium, it must be rational. If it has an infinite number of equilibria,
it has a continuum of such, and hence an irrational equilibrium. q.e.d.
In other words: if we want to demonstrate that a game has an irra-
tional equilibria, we need to demonstrate that it has an infinite number
of them.
Theorem 5.2.4. IrrationalNash is NP-complete for two-player games
in normal form, and NEXP-complete for two-player Boolean games.
Proof. For membership, guess a support pair (X,Y ) and verify that it
induces infinitely many equilibria.
For hardness, we reduce from ∃GuaranteeNash∗. Let (G, v) be a
game and a payoff constraint. Without loss of generality, suppose G
has non-negative payoffs. For the normal form case, simply extend G
into a G′ in the following way:
1. Duplicate each of Player One’s strategies. That is, for every si ∈
S1 in G, G′ has si and s′i, with the property that uj(s−1(si)) =
uj(s−1(s′i)) for all s and j ∈ { 1, 2 }.
2. Give Player One a new strategy, a, that yields him a utility of v in
every profile. Give Player Two a new strategy b, with the property
that u2(a, b) = 1, u2(s Ó= a, b) = −1, and u2(a, s Ó= b) = −1.
If (G, v) ∈ ∃GuaranteeNash∗ then G′ has infinitely many equilibria
– any equilibrium σ of G satisfying the payoff constraint generates in-
finitely many equilibria in G′, as Player One can freely distribute strat-
egy weights between duplicate strategies. If (G, v) /∈ ∃GuaranteeNash∗
then G′ has a unique equilibrium: (a, b). Any profile that yields Player
One less than v utility cannot be an equilibrium as Player One can
3 The definition of degeneracy – the existence of more than k best pure responses to
a mixed strategy with support size k – is difficult to get an intuitive appreciation
for, and does not concern us in the present work. It suffices to say that whilst
statistically “almost all” games are non-degenerate, in practice the 0 probability
event of encountering a degenerate game happens too often to be dismissed out
of hand. On the other hand, if an approximate answer is sufficient, one need only
perturb a degenerate game’s payoffs by a random Ô and one is good to go.
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deviate to a, and any profile that gives him more cannot be an equi-
librium of G, and hence Player Two would have a profitable deviation.
By Fact 5.2.3, G′ has an irrational equilibrium if and only if G has an
equilibrium whence Player One derives a utility of at least v.
For the case of Boolean games, let (G, v) be a game and payoff con-
straint as before. Construct G(v), and let G′ be the following:
The asymmetry is
intentional: Player
One needs only
¬Choice1 in his
right disjunct,
Player Two needs
both.
Φ′1 =Φ1 ∪ {Dummy,Choice1 } ∪ var1(G(v)),
Φ′2 =Φ2 ∪ {Choice2 } ∪ var2(G(v)),
γ′1 =(γ1 ∧ Choice1 ∧ Choice2)
∨ (γ1(G(v)) ∧ ¬Choice1 ∧ ¬Dummy ∧
∧
p∈Φ1
¬p),
γ′2 =(γ2 ∧ Choice1 ∧ Choice2)
∨ (γ2(G(v)) ∧ ¬Choice1 ∧ ¬Choice2 ∧
∧
p∈Φ2
¬p).
If (G, v) ∈ ∃GuaranteeNash∗ then G′ has infinitely many equilib-
ria – the Dummy variable does not occur in γ1, and thus has the same
effect as duplicating each of Player One’s strategies did. If (G, v) /∈
∃GuaranteeNash∗ then the unique equilibrium involves the players
setting the variables in Φ1, Φ2, Dummy, Choice1 and Choice2 to false
and playing the equilibrium strategies in G(v). This is because any
equilibrium of G would yield Player One less than v utility, and he can
unilaterally deviate to G(v) where he can guarantee himself at least
v. Once in G(v) the equilibrium is guaranteed as neither player can
unilaterally deviate from G(v) to G – both Choice variables appear in
their left disjuncts.
G′ thus has infinitely many equilibria if and only if G has an equilib-
rium where Player One derives at least v utility. With Fact 5.2.3, this
proves the theorem. q.e.d.
As a side note, the zero-sum version can be solved by a call to Lin-
earProgramming.
Proposition 5.2.5. IrrationalNash is in P for two-player zero-
sum games in normal form, and EXP for two-player zero-sum Boolean
games.
Proof. See Appendix A.1. q.e.d.
5.3 testing for equilibrium
In this section we will consider the complexity of determining whether
a given mixed-strategy profile is an equilibrium. The difficulty of the
problem stems from the fact that the input assumes that only the non-
zero strategy weights are given (otherwise the input would be large
enough for us to expand the game to normal form in polynomial time),
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and that the number of players could be large (the problem is coNP-
complete for k-player games. See Corollary B.2.4 in the appendix).
Our hardness proof is based on Theorem 5.5 of Schoenebeck and Vad-
han [9], the main difference being that wherever the authors recourse to
universal computation, we must instead explicitly construct a formula
of propositional logic serving the same end.
The relevant complexity class is coNP#P, i.e. the complement of
those decision problems solved by a nondeterministic polynomial-time
machine with access to an oracle to #P. The relevant canonical problem
is the following:
NP#PTM
Input: A nondeterministic, polynomial-time machineM with an
oracle to #P, an input word w, and a computation bound
in unary k (i.e., the string 1k).
Output: YES if M accepts w in at most k steps, NO otherwise.
Fact 5.3.1. NP#PTM is complete for NP#P.
The proof of Schoenebeck and Vadhan [9] relies on a convenient char-
acterisation of NP#PTM in Lemma 5.7. We have need of a modified
version of the same:
Lemma 5.3.2. For every L ∈ NP#P, there is a nondeterministic
polynomial-time machine M that decides L, and that makes just a sin-
gle #Sat oracle query on any accepting computation. Moreover, the
formula in this query is of the form:Caveat lector: this
is the only section
of the thesis where
n does not denote
the number of
players. The Latin
alphabet has only
so many letters.
OneOf (p1, . . . , pn) ∧
∨
i≤n
(ϕi ∧ pi),
where each ϕi is a formula in 2CNF.
Proof. Let M be a nondeterministic machine with a #P oracle. Recall
that #2CNFSat is #P-complete (Valiant [94]), so we can assume that
M only submits formulae in 2CNF to the oracle.
Construct anM ′ that guesses an accepting computation history ofM
including any oracle queries made, which we denote ϕ1 through ϕn, and
the answers to those queries. Having done this, M ′ constructs a ϕ with
the property that given the number of satisfying truth assignments of
ϕ it is possible, in polynomial time, to derive the number of satisfying
truth assignments of each of the ϕi.M ′ will then submit ϕ to the oracle,
verify that its previous guesses for the oracle answers were correct, and
if so, accept. Clearly such an M ′ will accept w in a polynomial number
of steps if and only if M does. It remains to show how such a ϕ can be
constructed.
Let ki be the number of propositional variables in ϕi (we, of course,
assume that the variables used by different formulae are disjoint). Ex-
pand each ϕi to ϕ′i in the following manner:
ϕ′i = ϕi ∧
∧
j<k1+···+ki−1
(qj ∨ ¬qj), for fresh qj .
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Note that all these new variables are completely redundant – any assign-
ment to them will satisfy the clauses in which they appear. As a result,
if ϕi has mi satisfying truth assignments, then ϕ′i has 2k1+···+ki−1mi.
This means that the binary integer representing the number of satis-
fying truth assignments of ϕ′i will have 0s in the k1 + · · · + ki−1 least
significant positions, potentially non-zero entries in the next ki, and
nothing beyond that.
Given fresh variables pi, our desired formula is the following:
ϕ = OneOf (p1, . . . , pn) ∧
∨
i≤n
(ϕ′i ∧ pi).
Since one and only one of pi must be true, these variables do not in-
troduce any new satisfying truth assignments and thus the number of
assignments that satisfy ϕ is simply∑i≤n 2k1+···+ki−1mi. To extract mi
we need only to look at the bits between positions k1 + · · ·+ ki−1 and
k1 + · · ·+ ki−1 + ki. q.e.d.
Lemma 3.2.1 has served us well so far, as the subgames G(u) have
allowed us to pretend we were working in a setting with finer grained
preferences than Boolean games. The shortcoming of the construction,
however, is that by definition G(u) is completely modular and separate
from the rest of the game. This, of course, is working as intended –
when we come to evaluate the payoffs we want to know that the value
of G(u) is indeed u, regardless of what else has happened in the game.
The trouble is that G(u) is completely unresponsive to the passage of
play; we need to know, in advance, what utility values we need and
code them in explicitly. Should we want to associate a different utility
to every possible strategy we would need formulae of the form (p1 ∧
¬p2 ∧ · · · ∧ pk)→ γ1(G(ui)), which would not be feasible in polynomial
time.
To deal with this we introduce a different type of gadget game, the
value of which can be altered externally.
Definition 5.3.3. Fix a sequence un. Let G(un) denote a two-player,
zero-sum game with value JunK/2n, with Player One controlling the vari-
ables un. That is, the value of the game is determined after Player One
chooses an assignment to un.
Formally, G(un) looks as follows:
Φ1 ={p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qn, s1, . . . , sn, t1, . . . , tn, u1, . . . , un}
Φ2 ={r1, . . . , rn}
γ1 =
(
Sub(qn, pn, un) ∧LessEq(qn, p2n − 1q) ∧LessEq(rn, qn)
∧LessEq(pn, rn)
) ∨ (Add(sn, tn, un)) ∧ Sub(qn, p0q, sn)
∧ Sub(p2n − 1q, pn, tn) ∧
(
LessEq(rn, qn) ∨LessEq(pn, rn)
))
∨Less(p2n − 1q, rn).
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
Example 5.3.4. At first glance Definition 5.3.3 may appear a little
odd. We are essentially letting Player One rig the dice before he casts
them – what behaviour can we possibly expect except that of choosingJunK = 2n − 1 every single time? And if we do want a game of that
form, we have already seen how to construct G(2n−12n ) earlier.
The merit of this definition is that, unlike in Lemma 3.2.1, we do
not require that all the variables of G(un) are fresh. We use parameter
notation for un to indicate that these variables can occur elsewhere in
the construction. Suppose, for example, that Player One is trying to
satisfy a formula of the form:
γ1 = ϕ(vn) ∧Equal(vn, un) ∧ γ1(G(un)).
Now the choice of JunK will very much depend on what is going on in
ϕ(vn). 
Theorem 5.3.5. IsNash coNP#P-hard for Boolean games.
Proof. We follow the argument of Schoenebeck and Vadhan [9], but as
we work in a more restricted setting the coding will be more involved.
The idea is as follows: given a nondeterministic M with access to
a #Sat oracle, a w, and 1k we construct a game where Player One
will choose between specifying a computation history of the machine
(which will of course include the oracle query and answer received, if a
query is made), or to abstain from the game and earn some base level
of utility u. If Player One chooses to specify a computation history, the
payoffs of the game will be so structured as to give Player One more
than u utility if he specifies an accepting history with a valid oracle
response, or at most u if either the specified history is non-accepting
or the oracle response specified by Player One is incorrect.
If we manage, in polynomial time, to construct such a game and pro-
file then we will have proved the theorem – we map (M,w, 1k) to (G,σ)
where σ will involve Player One abstaining. Thereby, if (M,w, 1k) /∈
NP#PTM then Player One cannot deviate to any strategy that will
yield him more than u utility, so the profile will be in equilibrium and
thus (G,σ) ∈ IsNash. On the other hand, if (M,w, 1k) ∈ NP#PTM
then Player One will be able to deviate to an accepting computation
history with a valid oracle response, netting more than u utility and
establishing that (G,σ) /∈ IsNash.
In total G will have 4 + 6k players, although Player One is the only
one whose preferences will matter. Player Two will play a zero-sum
game of value u with Player One. The next 2k players will be dubbed
group A, of which k are called proposition-players and k clause-players.
Group B consists of the next 2k players with the same division into
proposition and clause-players. Groups A and B will serve to punish
Player One for playing an incorrect oracle response. The final 2k + 2
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players are group C, and their rôle is to enable the constructed profile
σ to be polynomial in size, as will be made clear at the end of the
proof.
To facilitate the reduction we will augment the machine with registers
that deal with the query to, and the response from, the oracle. The
output registers will be read-only, and the input registers write-once.
The output registers are simply k cells that will take a binary rep-
resentation of the oracle’s answer, with the least significant bit first,
concluding with an end-of-file character ⊥. As k is an upper bound on
the size of the formula submitted to the oracle, the formula can have
at most 2k satisfying assignments and as such k cells are sufficient to
store whatever output the oracle makes.
To understand the shape of the input registers, consider the form of
the formula in the statement of Lemma 5.3.2. Such a formula is uniquely
determined by the subformulae ϕi, and each ϕi is in 2CNF. As such,
each ϕi can be specified simply by listing the literals in the order in
which they appear. We will thus endow the machine with k2 + 1 input
register cells: k sets of registers, each consisting of k cells, and a header
register. The interpretation of the ith register is ϕi, and the jth entry
of the ith register specifies the jth literal of ϕi. The header register will
contain a special integer symbol corresponding to the amount of ϕi for-
mulae that are present. To facilitate the encoding of literals we assume
the machine alphabet contains the symbols { q1, . . . , qk,¬q1, . . . ,¬qk }
as well as the integer symbols { 1, . . . , k }.
The machine will write to an input register by placing the appropriate
symbol at the beginning of the tape, followed by the index of the register
to write to, and entering a special write state.
At this point it behoves us to summarise the assumptions we have
made to convince the reader that at no point have we assumed away
the issue at hand – namely, none of the restrictions we place on M
are substantial enough to prevent it from representing an arbitrary
polynomial-time machine.
1. We assume the machine issues at most one query to the oracle,
and the query is in a very specific format. This is justified by
Lemma 5.3.2.
2. We assume the machine is equipped with registers. As random
access memory would at most allow a polynomial speed up of the Obviously this
only applies to
classes in
PSPACE, which is
the case here.
machine, there is no generality lost in assuming that an arbitrary
polynomial-time machine has these.
3. We assume the machine has to write the query formula, symbol
by symbol, to the input registers, rather than just dumping it on
the tape. This is at worst a polynomial slow down, so the machine
is still polynomial time.
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4. We assume the machine has additional tape symbols. This will
allow at most a polynomial speed up over a machine working only
in binary.
We will introduce the variables Player One controls gradually through-
out the proof and give them together at the end. For now, we provide
him with the variable Abstain and the goal formula:
γ1 =
(
Abstain ∧ γ1(G(u))
) ∨ (¬Abstain ∧Machine ∧Oracle).
The subformula Machine asserts that Player One specifies a valid
computation history of M on w (with the possible exception of an
incorrect oracle response) that ends in an accepting state. Encoding a
polynomial-time machine is trivial so we relegate the construction to
the appendix.
Lemma 5.3.6. There exists a formula, Machine, such that:
1. ν  Machine if and only if ν represents an accepting run of M
on w in k steps that is correct with respect to everything except
possibly the oracle responses.
2. |Machine| is polynomial in the size of (M,w, 1k).
3. Machine has variables Qi,j,l and NQi,j,l representing that the ith
register has the symbol ql or ¬ql in cell j respectively. That is, the
jth literal of ϕi is ql or ¬ql.
4. Machine has variables Ri to denote the value of the ith most
significant bit of the oracle’s response.
5. Machine has variables {F1, . . . , Fk } to denote the value of the
header register.
Proof. See Appendix A.2. q.e.d.
While the details of the construction are unimportant, the reader
should pay attention to points 3, 4 and 5 as those variables will be
used in the sequel.
The subformula Oracle will be designed in a manner to ensure that
E[Oracle | σ′] > u if and only if the formula specified by Player One in
σ′ does in fact have the number of satisfying assignments that Player
One asserted. To do this we will implement the g function from Theo-
rem 5.5 of Schoenebeck and Vadhan [9], after transforming it to fit into
the [0, 1] range required by a Boolean game.
Of course, the difficulty here is that we do not know precisely how
many satisfying assignments ϕ has – Player One can submit whichever
formula he wants. This is where groups A and B come in. The strategies
chosen by the players in a group will define, uniformly at random, a
truth assignment to ϕ. Thus while we do not know m, the number
of satisfying assignments that ϕ has, we do know that the assignment
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chosen by group A or B has precisely a m/2k chance of satisfying ϕ.4
Some algebraic manipulation can then lead us to m.
To specify a truth assignment, we equip the ith proposition-player of
A with a single variable Ai. The truth value of this is to be interpreted
as the value assigned to qi. In σ, each of these players sets their variable The variable
names pi and qi,
as well as the
subformula names
ϕi, are used in the
same sense as in
Lemma 5.3.2.
to true with probability 1/2.
The clause-players in A are in charge of the pi variables. In the case
where ϕ has i subformulae, the ith clause-player chooses which pj is
true; the other clause-players are ignored. The ith clause-player in A
controls the variables CA1, . . . , CAi, and in σ he sets CAj to true and
every other variable to false with probability 1/i. Player One’s choice of
Fi will tell us which clause-player to listen to.
Group B is built identically to group A.
Recall that JRkK is the number of satisfying assignments that Player Rk as in
Lemma 5.3.6One claims that ϕ possesses. Let ϕ(A) be the truth value of ϕ if eval-
uated by the truth assignment specified by players A, and likewise for
ϕ(B). Consider the following g(JRkK, ϕ(A), ϕ(B)):
g(JRkK, true, true) =22k+1 − (JRkK2 − 2k+1JRkK + 22k)22k+2 ,
g(JRkK, true, false) =22k+1 − (−2kJRkK + JRkK2)22k+2 ,
=g(JRkK, false, true),
g(JRkK, false, false) =22k+1 − JRkK222k+2 .
Note that this is bounded above by 1 and below by 0, so it is within
the range of feasible payoffs for a Boolean game.
The expected value of g, in any σ′ where groups A and B choose an
assignment uniformly at random, is:
E[g | σ′] =(m2k )2g(JRkK, true, true) + 2(m2k )(1− m2k )g(JRkK, false, true)
+
(
1− m2k
)2
g(JRkK, false, false).
Which simplifies to:
22k+1 − (m− JRkK)2
22k+2 .
Clearly this function is maximised when JRkK = m. Player One controls
Rk, so it remains to figure out how to incentivise him to maximise g.
The first component in implementing g is a formula that tells us
whether the assignment played by players A does in fact satisfy ϕ. Our
4 We are tacitly assuming that ϕ contains all k possible variables. This is of course
impossible given the time constraints of the machine, but the assumption is harmless
if we treat the unlisted variables as dummies whose truth value does not matter.
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requirement that each ϕi is in 2CNF makes it easy to verify whether
ϕi is satisfied:
ASatPhii =∧
j≤k/2
∨
l≤k
∨
l′≤k
((
Qi,2j,l ∧Qi,2j+1,l′ ∧ (Al ∨Al′)
)
∨(Qi,2j,l ∧NQi,2j+1,l′ ∧ (Al ∨ ¬Al′))
∨(NQi,2j,l ∧Qi,2j+1,l′ ∧ (¬Al ∨Al′))
∨(NQi,2j,l ∧NQi,2j+1,l′ ∧ (¬Al ∨ ¬Al′))
∨(NoneOf(Qi,2j,1, . . . , Qi,2j,k, NQi,2j,1, . . . , NQi,2j,k)
∧NoneOf(Qi,2j+1,1, . . . , Qi,2j+1,k, NQi,2j+1,1, . . . , NQi,2j+1,k)
))
.
The outer conjunction iterates over the clauses in ϕi (a conjunction
because every clause in a CNF formula needs to be satisfied). The two
following disjunctions iterate over the l and l′ that identify which ql and
ql′ appear in the clause under consideration (is is the job of Machine
to ensure Player One places two and only two variables in each clause,
so these disjunctions will be satisfied in at most one case).
The first four disjuncts that follow treat with the non-degenerate
cases: if Player One said the jth clause contains ql and ¬ql′ (Qi,2j,l ∧
NQi,2j+1,l′), then we require that the players in A set ql to true or ql′
to false (Al ∨ ¬Al′). The last disjunct handles the case where ϕi does
not contain a jth clause.
Recall that in verity ϕ is definitely not going to contain all k variables.
If it actually has k′, then in our present formulation ϕ(A) will have 2k−k′
times more satisfying assignments than ϕ. To deal with this, we will
add a formula requiring that all unmentioned variables need to be false.
NoSpurious =
∧
i≤k
( ∧
j,l≤k
NoneOf(Qj,i,l, NQj,i,l)→ ¬Ai
)
.
Now, suppose for a moment that ϕ consists of j such subformulae, ϕi.
We could combine the formulae ASatPhii as follows:
ASatPhi[j] =
∧
i≤j
(CAji → ASatPhii).
That is, if the jth clause-player picks pi then we check whether ϕi is
satisfied.
Of course, we do not know how many terms ϕ is composed of. Which
is why it is kind of Player One to supply us with that information. The
final formula is:Fi as in
Lemma 5.3.6
ASatPhi = NoSpurious ∧
∧
i≤k
(Fi → ASatPhi[i]).
With the canaries sorted, the high level plan is to have something
that looks as follows:
Equal(xn; numerator of g(Rk,ASatPhi,BSatPhi)) ∧ γ1(G(xn)).
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That is, Player One is to select a number that must match the numer-
ator of g, and then play a game from Definition 5.3.3 with that value.
This will ensure that Player One’s payoff is precisely g. Now we just
need a logical formula telling us what the numerator is.
It is a lot easier to verify arithmetic than to do it, so we will ask
Player One to do the work for us. He will provide the values of the
various terms in g as well as of g itself, and we will pass those values
into logical formulae that are true if the numbers add up. To this end,
we want to define ξt,t(Rk, G12k+2) to be a formula that is true just ifJG12k+2K = 22k+2 · g(JRkK, true, true). That is, JG12k+2K is the numerator
of g(JRkK, true, true).
Recall that this numerator looks as follows:
22k+1 − (JRkK2 − 2k+1JRkK + 22k).
The main operation is subtraction, and we have already seen how to
define Sub. The minuend, 22k+1, is a constant that can be represented
by a Û followed by 2k+ 1 ⊥s. The trouble is with the subtrahend, but
we shall cross that bridge once we reach it. For now, we will ask Player
One to tell us what the subtrahend is via an assignment to sG12k+2, and
introduce a new formula, sξt,t, to verify that Player One is not lying.
This gives us ξt,t:
ξt,t(Rk, G12k+2) = Sub(p22k+1q; sG12k+2;G12k+2) ∧ sξt,t(Rk, sG12k+2).
Now we have to deal with the subtrahend, JRkK2−2k+1JRkK+22k. The
main operations are subtraction and addition, which we can do. The
rightmost term is a constant which we can deal with, and the middle
term is just Rk with k + 1 ⊥s after it. All we need to do now is to
square JRkK.
Recall the high-school multiplication algorithm: splitting up the mul-
tiplication of k-digit integers into k sums, of size up to 2k. Applied to
binary, computing JRkK · JRkK would involve computing these k sums,
the ith being either JRkK ·2i−1 or 0, depending on whether the ith most
significant bit of JRkK is 1 or 0. If we ask Player One to provide us the
summands (via s2k), the result of the partial sums
∑
j<iJsj2kK (via S2k)
and the squared value (via R22k), we can verify that the squared value
is correct with k Add statements.
Square(Rk;R22k; s12k; . . . ; sk2k;S12k; . . . ;S
k+1
2k ) =∧
j≤k
(
(Equal(sj2k;Rk · p2j−1q) ∧Rj) ∨ (Equal(sj2k; p0q) ∧ ¬Rj)
)
∧
∧
j≤k
(
Add(Sj2k; s
j
2k;S
j+1
2k )
) ∧Equal(S12k; p0q) ∧Equal(Sk+12k ;R22k).
Rk · p2j−1q is shorthand for a mixed proposition/constant sequence
with j− 1 ⊥s on the end of Rk, and k− j+ 1 ⊥s at the front to ensure
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the sequence is of length 2k. This is necessary as we have only defined
Equal on sequences of the same length.
This gives us what we need:
sξt,t(Rk, sG12k+2) =
Sub(R22k;Rk · p2k + 1q; aG12k+2) ∧Add(aG12k+2; p22kq; sG12k+2)
∧ Square(Rk;R22k; s12k; . . . ; sk2k;S12k; . . . ;Sk+12k ).
Armed with Square, the other cases succumb to us with ease.
ξt,f = ξf,t =Sub(p22k+1q; sG22k+2;G22k+2)
∧ Sub(R22k;Rk · p2kq; sG22k+2)
∧ Square(Rk;R22k; s12k; . . . ; sk2k;S12k; . . . ;Sk+12k ).
ξf,f =Sub(p22k+1q;R22k;G32k+2)
∧ Square(Rk;R22k; s12k; . . . ; sk2k;S12k; . . . ;Sk+12k ).
The sequences in the above are assumed to be padded with leading ⊥s
whenever necessary.
Now construct three games from Definition 5.3.3: G(G12k+2), G(G22k+2)
and G(G32k+2). Note that if Player One were to attempt to satisfy
ξt,t(Rk, G12k+2) ∧ G(G12k+2), he would have to set JG12k+2K to the nu-
merator of g(R, true, true), and hence his expected utility in G(G12k+2)
would be the numerator of g(R, true, true) over 22k+2, which is pre-
cisely g(R, true, true). And we have already seen that to maximise g,
Player One would want to set JRkK = m, the number of satisfying truth
assignments of ϕ.
This gives us a first guess for Player One’s goal. However, we warn
the reader that this is not our final formulation, which is why we mark
it with an apostrophe.
γ′1 =(Abstain ∧ γ1(G(u))) ∨ (¬Abstain ∧Machine ∧Oracle′),
Oracle′ =
(
ASatPhi ∧ BSatPhi ∧ ξt,t(Rk, G12k+2) ∧ γ1(G(G12k+2))
)
∨ (ASatPhi ∧ ¬BSatPhi ∧ ξt,f (Rk, G22k+2) ∧ γ1(G(G22k+2)))
∨ (¬ASatPhi ∧ BSatPhi ∧ ξf,t(Rk, G22k+2) ∧ γ1(G(G22k+2)))
∨ (¬ASatPhi ∧ ¬BSatPhi ∧ ξf,f (Rk, G32k+2) ∧ γ1(G(G32k+2))).
All that remains is the value of u.
Seeing how if M accepts any word whatsoever, then Player One
would be able to construe some machine history to satisfy Machine,
Player One’s choice comes down to taking u utility in the left disjunct
or E[Oracle′ | σ] = E[g | σ] = 22k+1−(m−JRkK)222k+2 utility in the right.
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Note that if m = JRkK, where the expectation is maximal, this is just
1/2. Since we want Player One to have a strict preference for the right
disjunct in the situation where such a choice of JRkK is possible (else
there would be no profitable deviation), u needs to be strictly smaller
than 1/2 but larger than any other possible value of E[g | σ]. The closest
E[g | σ] can get to 1/2 without actually reaching it is when the difference
between m and JRkK is unity, which gives us 22k+1−122k+2 .
Suppose we set u to 22k+1−0.522k+2 . We have then constructed a G and a
σ satisfying the requirement that σ is an equilibrium if and only if M
does not have an accepting computation in under k steps, and |G| is
polynomial in the size of (M,w, 1k). Are we done? Unfortunately not.
We must not forget the size of σ, and σ involves Player One playing
an equilibrium strategy in G(u) – this would require him to randomise
over 22k+1 − 1 possible strategies.
To address this, we could try and shift the extra 122k+2 term to the
other disjunct. I.e., Player One can abstain and get u = 1/2, and G(1/2)
would only require him to randomise over two strategies, or he can get
E[g | σ] + 122k+2 in trying to satisfy Oracle. But that does not solve the
problem: Player One may have a small strategy in G(u), but Player Two
would still have to play an equilibrium strategy in all the G games in
the Oracle subformula, which is also exponentially large. This is where
group C comes in.
We introduce a variant of game G:
Definition 5.3.7. Let G(un) be as in Definition 5.3.3. Define G′(un) to
be where in lieu of Player Two, we have Players Two through n+1, each
controlling just a single bit of what was earlier Player Two’s choice.
Formally, G′(un) looks as follows:
Φ1 ={p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qn, s1, . . . , sn, t1, . . . , tn, u1, . . . , un}
Φi>1 ={ri+1}
γ1 =
(
Sub(qi, pi, ui) ∧LessEq(qi, p2n − 1q)
∧LessEq(ri, qi) ∧LessEq(pi, ri)
)
∨
(
Add(si, ti, ui)) ∧ Sub(qi, p0q, si) ∧ Sub(p2n − 1q, pi, ti)
∧ (LessEq(ri, qi) ∨LessEq(pi, ri)))
∨Less(p2n − 1q, ri).
We are not defining the goal formulae of the other players as they are
of no importance to us at the present. 
If the ith player in C plays ri with probability 1/2, then every possible
integer is realised with probability 1/22k+2, as required.
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This allows us to state Oracle as follows:
Oracle =
(
ASatPhi ∧ BSatPhi ∧ ξt,t(Rk, G12k+2)
∧Add(G12k+2; p1q; fG12k+2) ∧ γ1(G′(fG12k+2))
)
∨(ASatPhi ∧ ¬BSatPhi ∧ ξt,f (Rk, G22k+2)
∧Add(G22k+2; p1q; fG22k+2) ∧ γ1(G′(fG22k+2))
)
∨(¬ASatPhi ∧ BSatPhi ∧ ξf,t(Rk, G22k+2)
∧Add(G22k+2; p1q; fG22k+2) ∧ γ1(G′(fG22k+2))
)
∨(¬ASatPhi ∧ ¬BSatPhi ∧ ξf,f (Rk, G32k+2)
∧Add(G32k+2; p1q; fG32k+2) ∧ γ1(G′(fG32k+2))
)
.
And the final goal formula:
γ1 = (Abstain ∧ γ1(G(1/2))) ∨ (¬Abstain ∧Machine ∧Oracle).
This formula is clearly polynomial in size. The goal formula of every
other player is simply:
γi = ⊥.
Their preferences do not matter, and so they can never be the cause of
a deviation from σ.
The final list of variables used is:
Φ1 =var(Machine) ∪ {Qk, NQk, Fk, Rk, G12k+2, sG12k+2, R22k,
s12k, . . . , s
k
2k, S
1
2k, . . . , S
k+1
2k , aG
1
2k+2}
∪ {G22k+2, sG22k+2, G32k+2, fG12k+2, fG22k+2, fG32k+2 }
∪ var1(G(fG12k+2)) ∪ var1(G(fG22k+2)) ∪ var1(G(fG32k+2))
∪ var1(G(1/2)),
Φ2 =var2(G(1/2)),
Φa ={Ai} or {CAi},
Φb ={Bi} or {CBi},
Φc ={ri}.
As there is a polynomial number of these, it remains to check the size
of σ.
Player One is playing Abstain, the equilibrium strategy in G(1/2), and
every other variable to false.5 Player Two is playing the equilibrium
strategy in G(1/2). The proposition-players in A and B randomise over
setting qi to true and false equally, giving each a total of two strategies
in their support. The clause-players have at most k strategies in the
support of each, and the players in C have two each. This completes
the proof. q.e.d.
5 Note that Player One does not have to play the equilibrium strategy in the G′ games
as he is playing Abstain, and hence his assignment to those variables does not matter.
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5.4 discussion
In this chapter we demonstrated the flexibility of propositional logic
and the proof techniques of the previous chapter. The reader will how-
ever note that the proofs presented here can be split into two cate-
gories: those that use more-or-less standard game theoretic reasoning
to obtain a reduction from a problem we have already shown to be
hard, such as UniqueNash or IrrationalNash, and those that re-
quire starting from scratch and encoding a Turing machine again such
as ∀GuaranteeNash and IsNash. The first are certainly more sat-
isfactory than the second: having done the hard work once, we would
like to put it aside for good. But this does demonstrate the difficulty
of finding natural reduction between concise problems when one does
not have recourse to universal computation. The reader is encouraged
to compare Theorem 5.3.5 to Theorem 5.5 of Schoenebeck and Vadhan
[9] to see just what a difference having a full-fledged circuit makes.
It is also worth mentioning that Theorem 5.3.5 is a hardness result;
the upper bound is still EXP. Theorem 5.5 of Schoenebeck and Vadhan
[9] is a completeness result, but that is because the authors consider
approximate solutions, where Evaluation can be done in FP#P. In
Appendix B we can only show a lower bound on exact Evaluation,
so a hardness result is all we have.
In terms of the practical significance of these results, all the caveats
we mentioned in the previous chapter still apply. However, it is worth
nothing that while the decision problems aside from IsNash have little
import to a player, they are very natural questions for a social plan-
ner to ask. The high complexity of these problems suggests that the
planner may have to take an approximate or indirect approach. At the
same time it is worth noting that these results are obtained under the
assumption that the players are computationally unbounded. For an
applied theory of Boolean games it would be beneficial to consider the
case where this is not so, and we briefly discuss this in Chapter 7.
IsNash, as we have said, differs in that it is a very natural question
for the players themselves to ask. After all, if a player does not know
that he is in equilibrium, who can blame him for trying a different strat-
egy to see if it might do better? However, unlike the other problems
studied, the hardness of IsNash depends crucially on the number of
players being unbounded. If it is fixed, the complexity drops to coNP
(Corollary B.2.4). While we would not normally consider coNP a par-
ticularly tractable class, compared to the rest of the problems we have
studied it is very much a walk in the park.

6
ZERO-SUM GAMES
Better to wrong the world than have it wrong me!
— Cao Cao, Romance of the Three Kingdoms
In this chapter we prove that determining whether the value of a two-
player zero-sum game exceeds a threshold is EXP-complete. The proof
is not original; it is a translation of Theorem 4.6 of Feigenbaum, Koller,
and Shor [84] into the setting of Boolean games using the coding ma-
chinery we have thus far developed.
6.1 the value of a game
Theorem 6.1.1. DValue for Boolean games is EXP-complete.
Proof. To see that the problem is in EXP, expand the Boolean game
into its normal form and run the linear programming algorithm.
For hardness, consider (M,K,w) where M is a deterministic Turing
machine, K a computation bound and w an input word. Feigenbaum,
Koller, and Shor [84] demonstrate how to construct, in polynomial time,
a game G(M,K,w) and a rational v such that the value of G(M,K,w) In the case of
Feigenbaum,
Koller, and Shor,
v = 0.
is at least v if and only if M accepts w in at most K steps. What we
will show is that we can construct a Boolean game with the same value
as G(M,K,w), the size of which is polynomial in |M |, |K| and |w|. This
will prove the theorem.
For the sake of self-containment, we will replicate the construction of
Feigenbaum, Koller, and Shor [84] below. The reader well acquainted
with the construction can skip straight to Lemma 6.1.2.
We wish to associate with M a set of Horn clauses S over a set of
propositional variables P such that M accepts w in at most K steps if
and only if there exists an assignment to the variables in P satisfying
every clause in S.
P contains propositions of the form p[t, l, a] and p[t, l, (s, a)]. The
intended interpretation of p[t, l, a] is that cell l contains symbol a at
computation step t. Without loss of generality, we are working with a
binary alphabet, so a is 0, 1, or the blank tape symbol . The intended
interpretation of p[t, l, (s, a)] is that, in addition to the above, the head
is over cell l and in state s.
S contains three types of clauses. The first type describe the ini-
tial configuration of the machine. These consist of p[0, 0, (q1, w[0])],
p[0, i, w[i]] for 1 ≤ i < |w|, p[0, i, ] for i ≥ |w|, and ¬p[0, x, y] for every
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x, y not conforming to the preceding types. The second type describe
the transition rules of the machine. These take the form:
(p[t, l − 1, ς1] ∧ p[t, l, ς2] ∧ p[t, l + 1, ς3])→ p[t+ 1, l, ς],
(p[t, l − 1, ς1] ∧ p[t, l, ς2] ∧ p[t, l + 1, ς3])→ ¬p[t+ 1, l, ς ′],
choosing appropriate values for ς1, ς2, ς3 and ς ′ Ó= ς. The last clause isAs in
Theorem 4.2.1, we
can without loss of
generality assume
that M will only
accept in the first
cell with 0 written
on the tape.
p[K − 1, 0, (qf , 0)], asserting that M accepts at time K.
For convenience, we will treat every negative clause as a clause with a
consequent of false. That is, instead of ¬p[0, x, y] and (p1∧p2∧p3)→ ¬q
we will have the clauses p[0, x, y]→ false and (p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p3 ∧ q)→ false.
This will mean a clause can have anywhere between 0 and 4 proposition
in the tail – a true initial condition, a false initial condition, a positive
boundary rule, a positive rule, a negative rule.
The game G(M,K,w) proceeds by letting Player One choose r ∈ P
and Player Two an element C ∈ S,C = ∧ pi → q. Letting R ⊆ P be
the set of variables made true in the unique run of M on w, the payoff
to One is as follows:
H(r, C) =

1 + α, r = q,
−1 + α, r = pi,
α, otherwise.
In the above, α = j−1|R| , where 0 ≤ j ≤ 4 is the number of literals in
the antecedent of C. To simplify matters we assume that |R| = 22k, i.e.
we consider the first 2k computation steps and 2k tape cells. This can
be done by endowing the machine with a “do nothing” transition as
before.
Lemma 6.1.2 (Feigenbaum, Koller, and Shor [84]). M accepts w in
at most K steps if and only if the value of G(M,K,w) is at least 0.
This is where we seek to hijack the rest of their proof. If we can
demonstrate that we can build a Boolean game with the same value as
G(M,K,w) in polynomial time, we are done. The first hurdle we face
is that we clearly cannot – the payoffs of a Boolean game are restricted
to { 0, 1 }, so we cannot implement H. As such we adjust the payoffs
as follows:
H ′(r, C) =

3/4 + α/4, r = q,
1/4 + α/4, r = pi,
1/2 + α/4, otherwise.
H ′ is obtained via the affine transformation x Ô→ x/4+1/2, so applying
Theorem 2.1.22 to Lemma 6.1.2 we can conclude that a game with these
payoffs has a value of at least v = 1/2 if and only if M accepts w in at
most K steps.
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Note that now the payoffs are within [14 − 14·22k , 34 + 34·22k ], and thus
for k ≥ 1 they are contained in [0, 1], the range of feasible expected
utilities in a Boolean game.
Now, suppose we can find sets of variables Φ′1 and Φ′2, and fifteen
(polynomial size) formulae ϕjr=q, ϕjr=pi , ϕ
j
Ó=, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, with the
following properties:
• Every truth assignment to Φ′1 corresponds to a choice of r ∈ P .
• Every truth assignment to Φ′2 corresponds to a choice of C ∈ S.
• ϕjr=q is true if and only if C has j elements in the tail and r is
equal to the head of C. Mutatis mutandis, for the other ϕ.
We claim that at that point we are done, and the following is the game
we desire:
Φ1 =Φ′1 ∪ var1(G(3/4 + α/4)) ∪ var1(G(1/4 + α/4)) ∪ var1(G(1/2 + α/4)),
Φ2 =Φ′2 ∪ var2(G(3/4 + α/4)) ∪ var2(G(1/4 + α/4)) ∪ var2(G(1/2 + α/4)),
γ1 =
∨
j≤4
(
ϕjr=q ∧ γ1(G(3/4 + α/4))
) ∨ ∨
j≤4
(
ϕjr=pi ∧ γ1(G(1/4 + α/4))
)
∨
∨
j≤4
(
ϕjÓ= ∧ γ1(G(1/2 + α/4))
)
.
By Lemma 3.2.1, the subgames can be constructed in polynomial
time. As such, all that remains is to provide Φ′1, Φ′2, and ϕjr=q, ϕjr=pi ,
ϕjÓ=, for j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}.
We start with Player One: As before, k is the
bit length of K.
We do not use q
for |Q| to avoid
confusion with the
head propositions.
Φ′1 ={Zero1,One1} ∪ {Time1k} ∪ {Tape1k} ∪ {State1|Q|}.
We map a truth assignment to Φ′1 to r ∈ P in the following way:
• If both Zero1 and One1 are true, or more than one of {State1|Q|}
is true, then the assignment is treated as p[0, 0, 0].1
• If State1m and, without loss of generality, Zero1 is true then the
assignment is treated as p[JTime1kK, JTape1kK, (qm, 0)].
• If all the state variables are false and, say, Zero1 is true, then the
assignment is treated as p[JTime1kK, JTape1kK, 0].
For Player Two we have a larger set of variables:
Φ′2 ={pZero2, pOne2,Zero2,One2, sZero2, sOne2,nZero2,nOne2}
∪ {Time2k} ∪ {Tapek2} ∪ {nState2|Q|} ∪ {pState2|Q|} ∪ {State2|Q|}
∪ {sState2|Q|} ∪ {Negative,Accept}.
We map a truth assignment to Φ′2 to C ∈ S in the following way:
1 In the previous section we punished a player for making an illegal move by having
them lose the game. However, we cannot do this here as if both players play illegally
the game would fail to be zero-sum. Instead, we pick an arbitrary legal move for
them, in this case p[0, 0, 0].
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• An illegal configuration is mapped to p[K − 1, 0, (qf , 0)].
• The Time2k, Tape2k variables refer to the step/cell specified by the
consequent – this uniquely defines the step/cell values of the tail
propositions. Thus, if JTime2kK = 0, then the clause is treated as
an initial configuration clause, p[0, JTape2kK, w[i]]. If JTape2kK is 0
or 2k − 1, then the clause is a boundary case and hence has only
two propositions in the tail. If Negative is set to true, then the
assignment is mapped to a negative clause. With this in mind,
the contents of ∧ pi → q are derived from the assignment in
the natural way: recall, nOne2 refers to the contents of the next
computation step, or the head of the clause. sOne2 and pOne2
are the successor and predecessor of the central literal in the tail,
and hence refer to the right and left cell.
• Accept is a special variable used to mark the fact that Player
Two is playing the accepting clause, p[K − 1, 0, (qf , 0)]. If Accept
is set to true, and Player Two plays JTime2kK = K− 1, JTape2kK =
0, nZero2 and nState2accept , the assignment is treated as p[K −
1, 0, (qf , 0)]. 2
At this point the reader should convince themselves that the mapping
defined above does, in fact, allow Player One to specify every proposi-
tion in P and Player Two every clause in S.
Let us now turn to ϕjr=q. We will deal with j = 0 and j = 3. The
case of j = 2 is obtained from j = 3 by changing the appropriate cell
index and j = 1, 4 is simply false, as these are negative clauses and
Player One is incapable of guessing the consequent in that instance.
For j = 0 there are three possibilities to consider. Player Two may
have correctly specified a positive initial condition, the accepting clause,
or played an illegal configuration. Recall that a negative initial condi-
tion clause is treated as q → false, and thus falls under j = 1. We
also need not consider Player One playing an illegal configuration, as
p[0, 0, 0] cannot appear in the head of any clause, and hence cannot
satisfy ϕjr=q.
ϕ0r=q = Init ∨ Final ∨ Illegali.
Init requires that Time2k encodes 0; the state variables are false unless
Tape2k encodes 0, in which case only State21 is true; and if Tape2k encodesThe initial state is
q1. j then the nZero2,nOne2 variables are played in accordance with w[j].
Negative and Accept are both false. Player One plays his time, tape
variables such that they encode the same numbers as Player Two’s,
and likewise the players agree on the state and content variables.
2 This is technically redundant: Player Two could specify the accepting clause by
playing any illegal assignment, but for the purposes of transparency we do not wish
to make illegal play a necessary aspect of the game.
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Init can be broken down into a correctness and a matching require-
ment.
Init = Initc ∧MatchHead.
Line by line, the formula below reads: if the chosen cell is not 0, the
head is not over the cell. If the chosen cell is 0, the head is over the
cell and in state q0. If the chosen cell is i < |w|, then Player Two sets
w[i] ∈ {nZero2 ∧¬nOne2,nOne2 ∧¬nZero2} to true, depending on the
bit of w. If the chosen cell is i ≥ |w|, then the cell is blank. As the
clause is neither accepting nor negative, both those variables are set to
false.
Initc =
(¬Equal(p0q;Tape2k)→NoneOf(nState2|Q|))
∧
(
Equal(p0q;Tape2k)→
(
nState21 ∧OneOf(nState2|Q|)
))
∧
∧
0≤i<|w|
(
Equal(piq;Tape2k)→ w[i]
)
∧ (¬Less(Tape2k; p|w|q)→ (¬nZero2 ∧ ¬nOne2))
∧ ¬Accept ∧ ¬Negative.
Note that the third line expands into |w| conjuncts, so the formula is
of polynomial size.
MatchHead states that Player One specifies the same proposition as
is in the head of Player Two’s clause. That is, the cell is the same, the
computation step is the same, the tape contents are the same and the
machine state is the same. This is a general term that we will reuse in
other subformulae.
MatchHead =Equal(Tape1k;Tape2k) ∧Equal(Time1k;Time2k)
∧ (Zero1 ↔ nZero2) ∧ (One1 ↔ nOne2)
∧
∧
1≤i≤|Q|
(State1i ↔ nState2i ).
Final likewise has a correctness and a matching requirement. The
correctness requirement asks that Player Two set Accept to true and
specify p[K−1, 0, (qf , 0)]. The matching requirement we can reuse from
the preceding case.
Final =Finalc ∧MatchHead,
Finalc =Accept ∧ ¬Negative ∧ nState2accept ∧OneOf(nState2|Q|)
∧Equal(pK − 1q;Time2k) ∧Equal(p0q;Tape2k)
∧ nZero2 ∧ ¬nOne2.
Illegali says that Player Two names an illegal configuration and
Player One names p[K − 1, 0, (qf , 0)].
Illegali = TwoIllegal ∧OneFinal.
Let us list everything that could constitute an illegal assignment for
Player Two:
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1. The presence of both 1 and 0 in any specified cell.
2. The presence of more than one state in any cell.
3. The presence of the head in more than one cell in the tail.The absence of the
head is covered by
6. 4. Player Two names computation step 0, but supplies an incorrect
initial configuration of the machine.
5. Player Two plays Accept and does not correctly describe p[K −
1, 0, (qf , 0)].
6. Player Two names computation step ≥ 1 and supplies a clause
inconsistent with the transition rules of the machine.
We will introduce a formula for each item. TwoIllegal will be the dis-
junction of these formulae.
1 =(pZero2 ∧ pOne2) ∨ (Zero2 ∧One2) ∨ (sZero2 ∧ sOne2)
∨ (nZero2 ∧ nOne2).
2 =
(¬OneOf(nState2|Q|) ∧ ¬NoneOf(nState2|Q|))
∨ (¬OneOf(pState2|Q|) ∧ ¬NoneOf(pState2|Q|))
∨ (¬OneOf(State2|Q|) ∧ ¬NoneOf(State2|Q|))
∨ (¬OneOf(pState2|Q|) ∧ ¬NoneOf(sState2|Q|)).
3 =
(¬NoneOf(pState2|Q|) ∧ ¬NoneOf(State2|Q|))
∨ (¬NoneOf(pState2|Q|) ∧ ¬NoneOf(sState2|Q|))
∨ (¬NoneOf(State2|Q|) ∧ ¬NoneOf(sState2|Q|)).
4 =Equal(p0q;Time2k)
∧
((
¬Negative ∧ ( ∨
0≤i<|w|
(Equal(piq;Tape2k) ∧ ¬w[i])
∨ (¬Less(Tape2k; p|w|q) ∧ (nZero2 ∨ nOne2))
))
∨
(
Negative ∧ ( ∨
0≤i<|w|
(Equal(piq;Tape2k) ∧ w[i])
∨ (¬Less(Tape2k; p|w|q) ∧ (¬nZero2 ∧ ¬nOne2))
)))
.
5 = Accept
∧ (¬Equal(pK − 1q;Time2k) ∨ ¬Equal(p0q;Tape2k)
∨ ¬nState2accept ∨ ¬nZero2
)
.
The last formula we will not provide in its entirety. Its general form is
a disjunction:
6 = ¬
∨
Rule∈M
Rule.
That is, we check whether some rule is inconsistent with the clause. A
difficulty arises because a rule of the form (qi, ς)→ (qj , D, ς ′) manifests
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itself in as many as 24 different Horn clauses – boundary cases and
locations of the head. Of course 24 is a constant, so as far as our proof
goes there is no problem in introducing that many terms into the dis-
junction for every rule of the machine, but doing so could well double
the size of the present document. Instead we will give a concrete exam-
ple of one specific case: the rule (q3, 0) → (q4, R, 1) where the head is
initially in the middle cell and the middle is neither 0 nor 2k − 1:
NoneOf(nState2|Q|) ∧ State23 ∧ ¬Equal(p0q;Tape2k)
∧ ¬Equal(p2k − 1q;Tape2k) ∧ ¬Equal(p0q;Time2k) ∧ Zero2 ∧ nOne2.
We will also need to introduce “negative rules” to correspond to what
the machine does not do. These will be treated in a similar way, all that
needs to be mentioned is that for each (qi, ς)→ (qj , D, ς ′) there will be
only polynomially (of order O(|Q| · 2 · |Σ|)) many (qi, ς)→ ¬(q′j , D′, τ).
So much for j = 0. Let us turn to j = 3.
This turns out to be a lot easier as we have already done much of
the grunt work. All we need is for Player Two to name a step ≥ 1, a
cell ≥ 1 and < 2k − 1, a correct configuration, and for Player One to
guess the head.
ϕ3r=q =¬Equal(p0q;Time2k) ∧ ¬Equal(p0q;Tape2k)
∧ ¬Equal(p2k − 1q;Tape2k) ∧ ¬TwoIllegal ∧MatchHead.
Next up is ϕjr=pi . We will deal with j = 4. There is no case for j = 0,
and j = 1, j = 2, j = 3 can be easily obtained from j = 4.
Let us start by introducing the formulae checking for Player One
guessing the tail. We have already seen MatchHead, which is applicable
in the case of j = 4 because we treat negative clauses as (∧ pi ∧ q) →
false. The others are built similarly.
MatchLeft =Succ(Tape2k;Tape1k) ∧ Succ(Time1k;Time2k)
∧ (Zero1 ↔ pZero2) ∧ (One1 ↔ pOne2)
∧
∧
1≤i≤|Q|
(State1i ↔ pState2i ).
MatchCentre =Equal(Tape1k;Tape2k) ∧ Succ(Time1k;Time2k)
∧ (Zero1 ↔ Zero2) ∧ (One1 ↔ One2)
∧
∧
1≤i≤|Q|
(State1i ↔ State2i ).
MatchRight =Succ(Tape1k;Tape2k) ∧ Succ(Time1k;Time2k)
∧ (Zero1 ↔ sZero2) ∧ (One1 ↔ sOne2)
∧
∧
1≤i≤|Q|
(State1i ↔ sState2i ).
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Note that this is all we need to capture the case where Player One plays
legally:
ϕ4r=pi =Illegalr=pi ∨
(
¬Equal(p0q;Time2k) ∧ ¬Equal(p0q;Tape2k)
∧ ¬Equal(p2k − 1q;Tape2k) ∧ ¬TwoIllegal ∧Negative
∧ (MatchHead ∨MatchLeft ∨MatchCentre ∨MatchRight)
)
.
Illegalr=pi is also relatively simple. Player One must make a violation,
and Player Two needs to play a legal clause with p[0, 0, 0] in the tail.
Illegalr=pi =OneIllegal ∧ ¬TwoIllegal
∧
((
pZero2 ∧NoneOf(pState2|Q|)
∧Equal(p1q;Time2k) ∧Equal(p1q;Tape2k)
)
∨ (Zero2 ∧NoneOf(State2|Q|)
∧Equal(p1q;Time2k) ∧Equal(p0q;Tape2k)
))
.
Player One does not have a lot of creativity in how to play incorrectly:
OneIllegal =(One1 ∧ Zero1)
∨ (¬OneOf(State1k) ∧ ¬NoneOf(State1k)).
Finally we come to ϕjÓ=, where we look at j = 3.
There are four cases: both players play correctly and differ in the
step/cell specified. Player One plays incorrectly and Player Two plays a
correct clause not covering step/cell (0, 0). Player Two plays incorrectly
and Player One plays a correct proposition not covering the step/cell
(K − 1, 0), and of course both players could play incorrectly, in which
case p[0, 0, 0] does not cover p[K − 1, 0, (qf , 0)].
ϕ3Ó= =¬Negative ∧ ¬Accept ∧ ¬Equal(p0q;Time2k)
∧ ¬Equal(p0q;Tape2k) ∧ ¬Equal(p2k − 1q;Tape2k)
∧ (BothCorrect ∨ TwoCorrect ∨OneCorrect ∨NoneCorrect).
We already have all the tools we need.
BothCorrect = ¬OneIllegal ∧ ¬TwoIllegal
∧ ¬(MatchHead ∨MatchLeft ∨MatchCentre ∨MatchRight).
TwoCorrect = OneIllegal ∧ ¬TwoIllegal
∧ ¬(Equal(p1q;Time2k) ∧Equal(p0q;Tape2k) ∧ Zero2)
∧ ¬(Equal(p1q;Time2k) ∧Equal(p1q;Tape2k) ∧ pZero2).
6.2 discussion 115
OneCorrect = ¬OneIllegal ∧ TwoIllegal
∧ ¬(Equal(pK − 1q;Time1k) ∧Equal(p0q;Tape1k)
∧ Zero1 ∧ State1accept
)
.
NoneCorrect = OneIllegal ∧ TwoIllegal.
Let us recap: we have shown that we can interpret truth assignment to
Φ′1 and Φ′2 as choices of a clause and proposition, and that we can define
polynomial-size formulae that are true just if the named proposition
correctly matches the head of the clause. Using these formulae we can
construct a game where Player One finds himself playingG(v) whenever
H ′(r, C) = v. To see that the resulting Boolean game has the same
value as the game with payoffs defined by H ′, one need only consider
the equilibrium where Player One and Two play an equilibrium of the
Feigenbaum, Koller, and Shor game on the Φ′1 unionmulti Φ′2 variables, and the
equilibria of the G(v) games on the rest. q.e.d.
6.2 discussion
Apart from yet another demonstration of our coding techniques, a take-
home message of this section is the necessity of interpreting complexity
results in context. Value is often cited as an example of an easy prob-
lem in game theory – after all, it is only polynomial. Well, once we
remember that this is a function of the input, and the input is the
normal form, the picture changes somewhat. After all, chess is a two-
player zero-sum game, yet a thousand years down the line we have yet
to determine its value.
It is also worth stressing that the fact that we have looked atDValue
rather than Value is significant. Within polynomial space, we tend to
switch between a function problem and its decision variant without
much thought, but we cannot do so once we go beyond that. In Ap-
pendix B.1 we discuss some of the conceptual problems that arise when
dealing with this issue, and hence why we deal only with DValue in
the above.

7
CONCLUS ION
A strange game. The only winning move is not to play.
— WOPR, WarGames
The technical contributions of this thesis are summarised in Table 7.1,
alongside with known complexity results for the normal form. The gen-
eral pattern is that an exponential jump of complexity occurs when
we switch between the two representations; as the normal form repre-
sentation of a game is at most exponential in the size of the smallest
Boolean representation of the same game, this can be read as stating
that Boolean games are “as hard as possible” – one can always solve
a problem concerning a Boolean game by expanding it into its normal
form first and, as far as asymptotic worst-case complexity is concerned,
one can do no better. A more optimistic reading is that Boolean games
offer a high level of succinctness – were it the case that in all non-trivial
cases the normal form was not exponential in the size of the Boolean,
then the expand-it-into-normal-form algorithm would contradict the
hardness results demonstrated here.
Within mathematics the proof is at least as important as the theo-
rem, so the techniques used to derive these results deserve a mention. In
Theorem 4.2.1 we have demonstrated how we can use mixed strategies
to describe the computation history of a machine. This is a powerful
technique as in a concise game a mixed strategy could carry an expo-
nential amount of information and thereby describe exponentially large
objects, and variations of this approach could be fruitful in any setting
where pure strategies have a significantly smaller representation size
than mixed strategies.
The gadget games of Section 3.4, and the variation of Definition 5.3.3,
can be used to simplify proofs in Boolean games by allowing us, within
limits, to simulate richer payoffs than { 0, 1 }. These are unlikely to be of
use outside of the Boolean games framework as they benefit only repre-
sentations that are both succinct and with binary preferences – circuit
games have no need of fictional preferences as they can already repre-
sent any rational-valued game, while win-lose games in normal form
cannot benefit from these gadgets because while G(v) has a Boolean
form polynomial in |v|, the normal form is nevertheless of order v, or
2|v|. This means that even though we have shown that Irrational-
Nash is coNEXP-hard for Boolean games, this is unlikely to help us in
proving that the problem is coNP-hard for win-lose normal-form games.
Faced with this pattern of an exponential jump, however, a reader ac-
quainted with complexity theory may ask, is this not obvious? Boolean
games, after all, are a succinct representation of games in normal form.
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Problem Normal form Boolean games
∃GuaranteeNash NP-complete NEXP-complete
∀GuaranteeNash coNP-complete coNEXP-complete
UniqueNash coNP-complete coNEXP-complete
∃NashSat N/A NEXP-complete
∀NashSat N/A coNEXP-complete
RationalNash† NP-hard NEXP-hard
IrrationalNash NP-complete NEXP-complete
IsNash† P coNP#P-hard
DValue P-complete EXP-complete
Table 7.1: Comparison of the complexity of problems studied between the
normal form and Boolean representations. Problems are for the
two-player case unless marked by dagger.
Should there not be a general result, in the vein of Papadimitriou and
Yannakakis [97], that defines a general class of problems for which
NP-hardness in the normal form implies NEXP-hardness for Boolean
games? The author had such thoughts before, during, and after obtain-
ing the results of this thesis; the question was also raised at the 3rd
International Workshop on Strategic Reasoning by a member of the au-
dience; and a close reading of Mavronicolas, Monien, and Wagner [69]1
suggests that the authors may have had a similar construction in mind.
All I can say on this note is that if such a result exists, then I have not
been able to find it. The standard arguments tend to rely on universal
computation, and hence not applicable in the case of Boolean games
as propositional logic is (possibly)2 less concise than Boolean circuits.
7.1 playing boolean games
The approach taken in this thesis was to study Boolean games strictly
as a concise representation of win-lose games, and to address standard
problems of algorithmic game-theory in this setting. This was done to
firmly establish the place of Boolean games among the many models of
strategic behaviour that exist out there, and their relationship to other
representations.
1 “It is nevertheless possible to transform a boolean circuit into a polynomial size set
of clauses; [...] Hence, there is a polynomial time transformation of a circuit game
into a boolean formula game”. If I understand the authors correctly, then such a
construction would run into difficulties in the presence of mixed strategies.
2 In particular, a polynomial translation of an arbitrary Boolean circuit to a formula
would imply that the NC hierarchy collapses to the first level. I.e., polylogarithmic
time is equal to logarithmic time on a parallel machine.
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A shortcoming of this approach is that it fails to capture some of the
essence of the framework that makes it so appealing to the multiagent
community. People do not view a Boolean game as a representation,
but as something of itself, that has more to do with logic than classical
game theory. This is demonstrated by the fact that perfectly natural
extensions of the framework, such as CP-Boolean games, are very diffi-
cult to interpret from the perspective of finite strategic games, and the
concept of play in mixed strategies is a lot harder to make sense of.
However, I maintain that mixed strategies are important. Randomi-
sation is a necessary response to uncertainty and games without un-
certainty, attractive as they may be to a social planner, are in some
sense trivial: children quickly grow bored of tic-tac-toe, but rock-paper-
scissors has international tournaments. The only thing saving chess
from a similar fate is its colossal size.3
All the standard questions of Boolean games, such as implementing
desirable equilibria and determining tractable fragments, can and ought
to be asked in the setting of mixed strategies. However, if one is to stay
relevant to Boolean games as a model of strategic interaction, it pays
to consider some computationally friendly restrictions.
To play a pure strategy in a Boolean game, a player need only flick
some bits in his set of propositional letters. A mixed strategy involves
randomising over exponentially many assignments. Exponential space
is a much graver handicap than exponential time. Agents might be
willing to wait, or to use approximate reasoning, but if they cannot even
store their final plan of action then they cannot possibly be expected
to play the game.
In this work we have already seen one way of dealing with: drop the
zero weights. One could approach the problem by positing that agents
can store a maximum of k strategies in their support and see what
comes of it. This is worth considering, but there is also much that is
unsatisfactory with this approach. If I have the power to randomise
over k plays, surely if I really wanted I could go for k + 1?
Computational restrictions are perhaps more natural. We could, for
instance, assume the agents possess a computational device that on
input si returns the weight of si in their strategy. This would allow us
to study a hierarchy of computationally bounded agents, with black-box
agents at the top being equivalent to the unbounded players considered
in this thesis, down to agents with a very modest circuit in their device,
that only allows for limited randomisation.
It has also been brought to my attention that at present there are
scholars considering randomised play in Boolean games that operates
not by randomising over all possible assignments, but rather setting the
probability with which pi is set to true. These are dubbed behavioural
strategies given their similarity with their namesake in extensive games.
I had briefly considered this concept at the start of my doctorate, but
3 Checkers, of course, is no longer worth playing.
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in the end found them unsuitable to the goals of this work. The trouble
is that behavioural strategies can only capture a subset of all possible
mixed strategies, and Nash’s theorem does not apply to this subset.
Consider, for example, the following game:
Φ1 = { p1, p2 },
Φ2 = { q },
γ1 = (p1 ↔ q) ∧ (p2 ↔ q),
γ2 = ¬γ1.
This is essentially Matching Pennies, except Player One has two vari-
ables in his disposal. He loses if they are assigned different values, so
the only equilibrium play would involve him setting both p1 and p2 to
true with probability 1/2, and both to false otherwise.
Still, in the context of modelling strategic behaviour of computa-
tionally bounded agents such behavioural strategies are an interesting
approach. It is also worth noting that, even though probability is a
very different concept from vagueness, such a strategy has a superficial
resemblance to fuzzy logic. It would be interesting to see whether some
connection with Łukasiewicz games can be drawn.
7.2 open problems of complexity
The most obvious lacuna in the current presentation is the complete
absence of any function problems, even though Value, FindNash and
Evaluation are some of the most natural questions one could ask
about a game. These problems could prove to be both technically and
conceptually difficult, for reasons discussed in Appendix B.1.
The work has also focused on the complexity of exact solutions rather
than approximation schemes, in contrast to the focus in the circuit
games literature. Given the high complexity of the problems involved,
approximate reasoning could well be the only way to deal with Boolean
games; it would be interesting to study the complexity of such problems.
A more abstract, though I would argue much more significant issue
is the length and complexity of the proofs involved. The problem, of
course, pertains not only to the current work but to a great deal of mod-
ern mathematics. Man today is much the same as he was two millennia
ago, yet a single conference’s proceedings could hold more technical
content than all the beaches of Attica. Diagrams and explanations to
bolster the reader’s intuition only go so far, and if the reader must rely
on faith alone to carry them through a twenty page argument then the
author has failed; the minute a proof stops being self-evident it stops
being a proof.
There has been much interest in automatic proof verification in recent
years, and perhaps this is the way to go. Though a mixed-strategy
space is ostensibly continuous, the proofs throughout this session were
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essentially combinatorial in nature; it could be the case that they lend
themselves well to at least partial automation. However, it is my belief
that there is still room for elegance in mathematics, and that writing
a readable proof involves nothing more than writing a readable proof.
Atrocities like Theorem 5.1.5 could be avoided with the aid of ink,
paper, and a great deal of thought.

Part III
APPENDIX

A
OMITTED PROOFS
The beautiful is good,
And if a thing’s not beautiful it isn’t good.
— Theognis, Elegies
a.1 from section 5.2
Theorem 5.2.2. RationalNash for three-player Boolean games is
NEXP-hard.
Proof. Let G1 be a game with only irrational equilibria and the positive
utility property. Let (G2, v) be an instance of ∃GuaranteeNash∗. The
desired G′ is:
Φ1 = var1(G1) ∪ var1(G2) ∪ {Choice1 } ∪ var1(G1(v)),
Φ2 = var2(G1) ∪ var2(G2) ∪ {Choice2 } ∪ var1(G2(1/2)) ∪ var2(G3(1/2)),
Φ3 = var3(G1) ∪ var3(G2) ∪ {Choice3 } ∪ var1(G3(1/2)) ∪ var2(G1(v))
∪ var2(G2(1/2)),
γ′1 =
( ∧
i≤3
Choicei ∧ γ1(G2)
) ∨ ( ∧
i≤3
¬Choicei ∧ (γ1(G1) ∨ γ1(G(v)))
)
∨ (¬Choice1 ∧ (Choice2 ∨ Choice2) ∧ γ1(G1(v))),
γ′2 =
(( ∧
i≤3
Choicei ∧ (γ2(G2) ∨ γ1(G2(1/2)))
) ∨ ( ∧
i≤3
¬Choicei ∧ γ2(G1)
)
∨ (¬Choice2 ∧ (Choice1 ∨ Choice3) ∧ γ1(G2(1/2)))) ∧ γ2(G3(1/2)),
γ′3 =
(( ∧
i≤3
Choicei ∧ (γ3(G2) ∨ γ1(G3(1/2)))
) ∨ ( ∧
i≤3
¬Choicei ∧ γ3(G1)
)
∨ (¬Choice3 ∧ (Choice1 ∨ Choice2) ∧ γ1(G3(1/2)))) ∧ γ2(G2(1/2))
∧ γ2(G1(v)).
Should the reader still have the proof of Theorem 5.2.1 fresh in their
minds, what we have done is the following:
γ′2 =γ2 ∧ γ2(G3(1/2)),
γ′3 =γ3 ∧ γ2(G2(1/2)) ∧ γ2(G1(v)).
Suppose (G2, v) ∈ ∃GuaranteeNash∗. Consider the profile where
the players play a rational equilibrium satisfying the payoff constraint
over the variables in G, equilibrium play over the gadget games, and
setting the Choice variables to true. This is clearly an equilibrium, and
all the strategy weights are rational.
125
126 omitted proofs
Now suppose (G2, v) /∈ ∃GuaranteeNash∗. As before, let p, q and
r be the probabilities of the players opting to play in G2. If players
Two and Three are playing equilibrium play over the gadget games,
then the argument of Theorem 5.2.1 applies. Let us then consider the
case where they are not.
Because Player Two’s goal is conjunctive, the only reason she would
play suboptimally in γ2(G3(1/2)) is if her probability of satisfying γ2 is
0, and hence it does not matter what she does elsewhere. However, by
observing her goal formula one will see that her probability of satisfying
γ2 is at least 1/2pqr+1/2(1−q)(1−(1−p)(1−r))+(1−p)(1−q)(1−r)x, for
a strictly positive x. The only way this could be 0 is if q = 1 and either
p = 0 or r = 0, but that is not an equilibrium profile as Player Two
could deviate to q = 0. Mutatis mutandis, for Player Three. q.e.d.
Fact A.1.1. A two-player zero-sum game has either one or a contin-
uum of equilibria.
Proof. We have seen in Section 3.3 the connection between the equilib-
ria of a zero-sum game and the solutions1 to a linear program. A solu-
tion to a linear program is found where the hyperplane of the objectiveArbitrary linear
programs may not
have solutions, but
games do due to
Theorem 2.1.12.
function is tangent to the convex region determined by the constraints.
The hyperplane will either be tangent on a corner, in which case the
solution is unique, or on at least one edge, in which case we have a
continuum.
For the reader averse to linear programming, a direct argument is
possible. Let σ = (σ1, σ2) and τ = (τ1, τ2) be two equilibria. Choose
an α ∈ (0, 1) and consider the profile ρ = (ασ1 + (1 − α)τ1, σ2).
Observe that u1(ρ) = αu1(σ) + (1 − α)u1(τ1, σ2) = u1(σ). It can
be no higher, as σ is an equilibrium, and the only way it could be
lower is if u1(τ1, σ2) < u1(σ). The latter is impossible as, by Theo-
rem 2.1.12, u1(σ) = u1(τ ), and since τ is an equilibrium we know that
u2(τ ) ≥ u2(τ1, σ2), hence u1(τ ) ≤ u1(τ1, σ2). It follows that Player
One has no profitable deviation from ρ. Player Two, by deviating to
δ2, would expect a utility of αu2(σ1, δ2) + (1− α)u2(τ1, δ2). u2(σ1, δ2)
is bounded above by u2(σ), and u2(τ1, δ2) by u2(τ ) = u2(σ). Thus
Player Two derives a utility of at most u2(σ), which is what she is
already getting. q.e.d.
Lemma A.1.2 (Appa [99]). Determining whether a linear program has
a unique solution is in P.
Proposition 5.2.5. IrrationalNash is in P for two-player zero-
sum games in normal form, and EXP for two-player zero-sum Boolean
games.
Proof. If the equilibrium is unique, then it is rational due to the linear
programming characterisation. Hence the only way multiple equilibria
can exist if there is a continuum. q.e.d.
1 In the language of linear programming, we would say the optimal feasible solutions.
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a.2 from section 5.3
Lemma 5.3.6. There exists a formula, Machine, such that:
1. ν  Machine if and only if ν represents an accepting run of M
on w in k steps that is correct with respect to everything except
possibly the oracle responses.
2. |Machine| is polynomial in the size of (M,w, 1k).
3. Machine has variables Qi,j,l and NQi,j,l representing that the ith
register has the symbol ql or ¬ql in cell j respectively. That is, the
jth literal of ϕi is ql or ¬ql.
4. Machine has variables Ri to denote the value of the ith most
significant bit of the oracle’s response.
5. Machine has variables {F1, . . . , Fk } to denote the value of the
header register.
Proof. The proof is essentially Cook’s Theorem with some register ma-
nipulation.
Observe that the computation bound, k, is given in unary. As a
consequence the k× k table representing the history of the machine (à
la Figure 4.1) is polynomial in the size of the input. As such we have
no need to mess around with cell indices, but instead can ask Player
One to describe the entire table directly.
We equip Player One with k2 l[i, j] variables for every l ∈ Σ, denoting
that the (i, j)-entry of the computation history is l. We also provide
k2 state variables for every q ∈ Q, q[i, j], denoting at once the location
of the head and the state that it is in. This allows us to formulate the
initial configuration of the machine: w[j][0, j] is to be
interpreted as
l[0, j], l ∈ Σ being
the jth entry of w.
Initial = q0[0, 0]∧
( ∧
j<|w|
w[j][0, j]
)∧( ∧
j≥|w|
NoneOf({ l[0, j] : l ∈ Σ })).
Now all we need is a Rules term which is nothing but a giant or-
statement, checking that every square in the history follows from the
preceding computation step via the application of an admissible rule,
to establish that the machine history is correct. We shall not consider
the standard transition rules and instead focus on the ones unique to
the machine at hand.
Let Write[t, i, j, l] be the rule that states that the machine at time t
writes symbol ql to the jth entry of the ith clause of ϕ. We can express
it as follows:
Write[t, i, j, l] =
(
(qw[t, 0] ∧ pl[t, 0] ∧ i[t, 1] ∧ j[t, 2])
∧ (Qi,j,l ∧ q′[t+ 1, 0])
) ∧ SameTape[t].
Recall that we have included the integers { 1, . . . , k } (of which there
is a polynomial number) as primitives so there is no need to mess
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around with encoding numbers – we simply demand that the symbol i
be written on the tape to write to the ith clause. The state is qw, theIn Lemma 5.3.2
the proposition
variable would be
called ql, but we
use pl here to
avoid confusion
with state
special write state, and pl[t, 0] is a propositional symbol, which is also
included as a primitive. The next state, q′, can be chosen arbitrarily:
the machine is nondeterministic and we can assume it jumps from q′
to wherever it needs to go to resume computation.
SameTape[t] asserts that the tape contents are unchanged between
steps t and t + 1, and that the head does not move. This is expressed
in the obvious way:
SameTape[t] =
∧
i<k,l∈Σ
(
(l[t, i]↔ l[t+ 1, i])
∧ (NoneOf({ q[t, i] : q ∈ Q })↔NoneOf({ q[t, i] : q ∈ Q }))).
There are no more than k4 such rules, and we analogously include
the rules for writing a negative literal.
Next is the oracle query. We assume this is made from state qo, giving
us the following formula:
Oracle[t, i] = qo[t, i] ∧ q′[t+ 1, i] ∧ SameTape.
There are k2 possible cases depending on where and when the query is
made.
Finally, the machine needs to be able to access the oracle results
somehow. There are several ways we could handle this, a simple one is
to allow the machine to request that the ith bit be written to the start
of the tape by writing i at the start of the tape and entering state qr.
Read[t, i] =
(
qr[t, 0] ∧ i[t, 0]
)∧(
q′[t+ 1, 0] ∧ (Ri → 1[t+ 1, 0]) ∧ (¬Ri → 0[t+ 1, 0])
)
∧ SameTapeExceptCellZero[t].
SameTapeExceptCellZero[t] is exactly what it says.
We add the usual consistency constraints such as every cell can only
contain one symbol, the machine can only be in one state, and so on.
We do not need to worry about what happens if the machine writes
an ill-configured formula into the registers, or tries to read the oracle’s
response before it makes the query – we can assume the machine itself
would enter an abort state in such an instance. All that remains to do
is verify that Player One behaves sensibly with the variables we use
later in the construction.
So far we have guaranteed that if Write[t, i, j, l] is issued, then Qi,j,l
is true. At present nothing prevents Player One from setting to Qi,j,l to
true regardless, so we have constraints of the following form for every
j, l:
(
∧
t,i<k
¬Write[t, i, j, l])→ ¬Qi,j,l.
Analogously for the negative literals.
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We also need Player One to tell us how many clauses ϕ has. As
the internal rules of the machine guarantee that there are no gaps in
between the clauses, we only need to spot the highest index of an issued
write command.∨
i≤k
∧
k≥m>i
(¬(∨
t,j,l
Write[t,m, j, l]) ∧ (
∨
t,j,l
Write[t, i, j, l]) ∧ Fi
)
∧OneOf(Fi).
The outer or ranges over candidates for the highest i for which ϕi is
defined. For this to be true it must be the case that for all m > i the
write command was never issued, but that it was issued at i. In this
case, Fi ought to be true.
Putting these together, the lemma is proven. q.e.d.

B
TRIV IAL OBSERVATIONS
I’m afraid that some times you’ll play lonely games too.
Games you can’t win ‘cause you’ll play against you.
— Dr. Seuss, Oh, the Places You’ll Go!
b.1 comparing functions
Function, or search problems, have been oft neglected in favour of their
decision-version cousins. The extent of this neglect is such that, when
the author set down in an (unsuccessful) attempt to prove a hardness
result about Value, he was faced with the fact that he did not even
know what the appropriate reducibility notion is. The purpose of this
section is to discuss various functional reducibilities he had come upon
in the literature, as well as why their use is problematic for function
problems with potentially exponentially long output, such as the natu-
ral game theoretic problems applied to concise representations.
The term “function” is potentially misleading, as search problems
are more correctly relational in nature; a typical definition of a search
problem, in works that bother to define the concept, is by means of
a computable predicate, R. On input x the problem is to find some
y for which Rxy holds, and there could be many, or perhaps none, y
satisfying that rôle – consider the task of finding a clique of size k in a
graph. We shall, however, assume these problems are functional in the
discussion that follows. This will simplify presentation, and restating
the arguments in terms of more general search problems would not be
a difficult task.
We denote functional complexity classes by appending F to the name
of the appropriate class of decision problems, or sets; thus FP and
FEXP are the classes of functions computable in deterministic poly-
nomial or exponential time respectively. Less obvious classes, such as
FΣp2, will not interest us in the sequel.
Functions are characterised not only by the computational complex-
ity of producing their result, but also by the representational complex-
ity of displaying that result once it is computed. A natural class of
functions is where this result is commensurate with the input.
Definition B.1.1. A class of functions C is said to be polynomially-
balanced if for every f ∈ C there exists a polynomial p such that p(|x|) ≥
|f(x)|. I.e., the size of the output is polynomial in the size of the input.

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Example B.1.2. Every class in FPSPACE is polynomially-balanced.
FEXP is not. 
We now turn to reducibility between functions. As a starting point,
it is reassuring to note that the Turing reduction survives the transition
seemingly intact.
Definition B.1.3. A polynomial-time Turing reduction, or a Cook re-
duction, from function f to g is a polynomial-time oracle machine Mg
such that for all x:
Mg(x) = f(x).
We write f ≤PT g to indicate that there exists a polynomial-time Turing
reduction from f to g. 
Turing reductions are defined identically for both decision and func-
tion problems; they are thus the only notion of reducibility that allows
us to compare the difficulty of decision to search. Thus, for example,
the claim that Value is EXP-hard for circuit games (Schoenebeck and
Vadhan [20]) can only be interpreted in the context of ≤PT .
As convenient as this property may be, Turing reductions are not
what we want. It would be unsatisfactory to use ≤PT for functions when
we use the much stricter ≤Pm for sets, moreover since polynomially-
balanced functions trivialise away under ≤PT – a polynomially-balanced
f is FPSPACE-hard if and only if it is PSPACE-hard, given bireducibil-
ity between f and the decision problem “Is the ith bit of f(x) 1?”.
What we are after is a stricter notion of reducibility. We start with
one of Simon [101]:1
Definition B.1.4 (page 83 in Simon [101]). A polynomial-time parsi-
monious reduction from function f to g is a function Ô ∈ FP such thatÔ is chosen as a
mnemonic for
“encoding”.
Likewise, δ will
stand for
“decoding”.
for all x:
f(x) = g ◦ Ô(x).
We write f ≤Ppar g to indicate that there exists a polynomial-time
parsimonious reduction from f to g. 
There is, however, a shortcoming to the parsimonious reduction: it
is perhaps too strong. The following fact trivially follows:
Fact B.1.5. f ≤Ppar g only if range(f) ⊆ range(g).
As a consequence of this ≤Ppar is sensitive to the way we choose to
encode mathematical objects and present our output – the function that
takes as input the index of an exponential time machine e and an input
word w and outputsMe(w) is clearly FEXP-hard, but the function that
1 It is, of course, difficult to determine the origin of concepts that to by now appear
self-evident. To my knowledge, Simon was the first to introduce such a reduction in
western literature, but in the Eastern Bloc it appears earlier, e.g. in Ershov’s theory
of numerations (Ершов [102])
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on input (e, w) prints “The eth machine on input w outputs: . . . ” is
not.
Parsimonious reductions seem more appropriate to “classical” algo-
rithmic problems where the output of the function is meant to be taken
at face value – an integer representing the size of the largest clique, for
example. But this too is not without its problems. Depending on the
biases of our background, we may define a function as f : N → N
or f : { 0, 1 }∗ → { 0, 1 }∗, i.e. as a recursive function on integers or
as the output of a computational process that manipulates strings.
Ideally such a choice should be inconsequential on later theory, but
clearly there are problems that would be complete with the definition
f : N→ N and not f : { 0, 1 }∗ → { 0, 1 }∗, unless we use a non-standard
encoding of integers that makes use of leading zeroes.
As our interest is on the complexity of computing a function rather
than our particular method of encoding mathematical objects as bit
strings, it is natural to simply allow a decoding step to the reduction.
This leads to the following definition:
Definition B.1.6 (Zankó [103]). A polynomial-time Zankó reduction2
from function f to g is a pair of functions Ô, δ ∈ FP such that for all x:
f(x) = δ ◦ g ◦ Ô(x).
We write f ≤PZ g to indicate that there exists a polynomial-time metric
reduction from f to g. 
This is the notion that seems to be favoured by authors in the algo-
rithmic game theory literature, e.g. Chen and Deng [31].
Levin used a similar, but not identical, notion in his 1973 paper:
Definition B.1.7 (Левин [106]). A polynomial-time Levin reduction
from function f to g is three functions Ô, δ, τ ∈ FP such that for all x:
1. g ◦ Ô(x) = τ ◦ f(x).
2. f(x) = δ ◦ g ◦ Ô(x).
We write f ≤PL g to indicate that there exists a polynomial-time Levin
reduction from f to g. 
It may be difficult to get an intuition for the concept from the defini-
tion alone, and Levin does not offer any motivation himself, but one can
view a Levin reduction simply as a strengthening of a Zankó reduction:
2 The author calls this a many-one reduction, on the grounds of similarity to the
reducibility notion ≤Pm between sets. However, Vollmer [104] labelled what we here
term a parsimonious reduction as a many-one reduction, on the basis of it being
similar to ≤Pm. Likewise, Krentel [105] felt that metric reductions were the “obvious”
counterpart of many-one reducibility between sets. In my undergraduate years my
lecturer told me that the obvious has no place in mathematics, hence I avoid the
usage.
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Fact B.1.8. The functions Ô, δ, τ ∈ FP constitute a Levin reduction
from f to g if and only if:
1. Ô and δ constitute a Zankó reduction from f to g.
2. τ is the pseudo-inverse of δ on the range of f .
Proof. Recall the definition of a Levin reduction:
1. g ◦ Ô(x) = τ ◦ f(x).
2. f(x) = δ ◦ g ◦ Ô(x).
Condition 2 is precisely that f ≤PZ g via δ and Ô.
Recall that for τ to be a pseudo-inverse, τ(y) must be a pre-image
of y with respect to δ. That is, δ ◦ τ(y) = y. Observe:
g ◦ Ô(x) = τ ◦ f(x),
δ ◦ g ◦ Ô(x) = δ ◦ τ ◦ f(x),
f(x) = δ ◦ τ ◦ f(x).
As we are only concerned with the behaviour of τ on the range of f ,
this proves the claim. q.e.d.
Definition B.1.7 is Levin’s own, but there is an alternative definitionStrictly speaking,
Levin worked in
the more general
case of relational
rather than purely
functional
problems.
of a “Levin reduction” that comes up perhaps more often the original.3
This is a weaker notion, so we give it an appropriately creative name:
Definition B.1.9. A polynomial-time weak Levin reduction from func-
tion f to g is three functions Ô, δ, τ ∈ FP such that for all x:
1. g ◦ Ô(x) = τ(x, f(x)).
2. f(x) = δ(x, g ◦ Ô(x)).
We write f ≤PwL g to indicate that there exists a polynomial-time weak
Levin reduction from f to g. 
Faliszewski and Ogihara [107] gives an identical definition to the one
above, but they label it a polynomial-time metric reversible reduction.
This is in reference to the metric reduction, another known reducibility
metric. The relationship of a weak Levin reduction to a metric reduction
parallels that of a Levin reduction to a Zankó reduction.
Definition B.1.10 (Krentel [105]). A polynomial-time metric reduc-
tion from function f to g is a pair of functions Ô, δ ∈ FP such that for
all x:
f(x) = δ(x, g ◦ Ô(x)).
We write f ≤Pmet g to indicate that there exists a polynomial-time
metric reduction from f to g. 
3 I have been unable to trace the origins of this notion, but it is rampant in many
courses on complexity theory. See, for instance, www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/ lyuu/complex-
ity/2008b/20081028.pdf.
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An alternative name for the metric reduction is the 1-Turing reduc-
tion, as f ≤Pmet g could be equally defined as the existence of an Mg(x) This equivalence
only holds in
polynomially-
balanced
classes
computing f(x) with at most one call to the oracle to g – Ô is the
computation of the machine before the oracle query and δ is the post-
computation, which has a dependency on x because the machine would
have already read the input by then.
We present a summary of the relationship between these notions
below, which is largely based on the observations of Faliszewski and
Ogihara [107]:
Fact B.1.11 (after Faliszewski and Ogihara [107]). The following
diagram depicts the inclusion relations between degree structures of
polynomially-balanced classes under various reducibility notions. The
arrows point to the stronger4 notion. Solid arrows are strict, dotted
arrows weak.
≤PZ
≤PT ≤Pmet ≤PL ≤Ppar
≤PwL
Proof. Weak inclusions all follow from definition.
To see that f ≤PZ g does not imply f ≤Ppar g, consider f : x Ô→ x and
g : x Ô→ 2x. We have f ≤PZ g via Ô : x Ô→ x and δ : x Ô→ x/2, but f Ppar g
because the range of g is only the even integers.
To see that ≤PwL does not imply ≤PL or ≤Pmet does not imply ≤PZ ,
consider f : x Ô→ x and g : x Ô→ 0. We have both f ≤PwL g and f ≤Pmet g,
with the decoding δ : (x, y) Ô→ x, but f PwL g and f Pmet g because a
univariate decoding function is not much use with a constant g.
To see that f ≤PT g does not imply f ≤Pmet g, recall that Ladner,
Lynch, and Selman [108] demonstrate the existence of sets A and B
for which A ≤PT B but A Ptt B (hence, A P1−T B). It is clear that
this implies that χA ≤PT χB but χA Pmet χB (as metric reductions χA is the
characteristic
function of A
are identical to 1-Turing reductions in a polynomially balanced class).
q.e.d.
Furthermore, it turns out that if P Ó= NP, then ≤PwL and ≤PZ are in
fact incomparable.
4 The terminology used in the literature on this point is unfortunately confusing.
Some authors call ≤Ppar “stronger” because it is a stronger notion – f ≤Ppar g implies
f ≤PT g. Others call ≤PT “stronger” because it is a stronger reduction – there exist
f, g which f ≤PT g but about which ≤Ppar does not seem to say anything. Others still
use “stronger” in both senses in the same paper, because they view their readers
with contempt.
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Proposition B.1.12 (Faliszewski and Ogihara [107]). The following
relations hold:
1. ≤PwL does not imply ≤PZ .
2. If P Ó= NP, ≤PZ does not imply ≤PwL.
The world looks a little different, however, if the class is not polyno-
mially balanced:
Fact B.1.13. The following diagram depicts the inclusion relations be-
tween degree structures of classes of functions that are not polynomially-
balanced:
≤PZ
≤Pmet ≤PL ≤Ppar
≤PwL
Proof. To see that f ≤PZ g does not imply f ≤PL g nor f ≤Pmet g imply
f ≤PwL g, consider f : x Ô→ x and g : x Ô→ 1x. There is both a Zankó
and a metric reduction from f to g – Ô is identity and δ takes 1x to
x. However, while δ is polynomial-time computable it cannot have a
polynomial-time pseudo-inverse as the size of the input is exponential
in the size of the output.5
Note that this also establishes that ≤PZ and ≤PwL are incomparable,
even if P = NP. q.e.d.
Note that we did not even include ≤PT on the diagram. In the context
of functions whose output could be exponentially long, the very notion
of Turing reducibility becomes questionable as it is highly sensitive to
the model of computation used. For instance, where does the oracle
dump its response? If it is on a special oracle tape, then the machine
will simply not have the time to copy it to the working tape; if it is on
to the working tape then it is critical to know whether it will overwrite
the existing contents or be appended to the end, as the machine will
not have the time to shift it. Likewise, it is critical to know whether or
not the machine is capable of random access, as otherwise it will only
be capable of reading and modifying an initial segment of the oracle
response. One would also have to specify whether the tape is one-way
or two-way infinite – in the latter case, the machine would be able to
append some characters to the left of the oracle response, while in the
former it would have to leave it as it is.
5 One could avoid this with a different definition of reducibility, for example where
the decoding function is not required to give the entire output but only the ith bit.
This will do nothing to address the other issues discussed, however.
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As such, we argue that Turing reducibility is not particularly mean-
ingful in this context – after all, we use Turing machines not because
they are a reasonable model of computation, but because in the context
of universal computation it does not matter what model we use. If we
find ourselves in a setting where small alterations of the model can lead
to significant differences in behaviour, perhaps we ought not to use a
Turing machine at all.
The other reducibility notions remain well defined, but the standard
intuition behind ≤PL and everything below is no longer applicable – the
statement “f is reducible to g” is typically interpreted as “give me an
efficient algorithm for g, and I will give you an efficient algorithm for
f”. Not so, if the functions in question have exponential output – I can
give you a polynomial-time Ô and δ, but if |g(Ô(x))| is exponential in
the size of the input, then δ(g(Ô(x))) will still run for a number of steps
exponential in |x|. And if you have to wait that long anyway, why not
just compute f(x) directly? Parsimonious reductions, of course, avoid
both problems, but they do not become any easier to work with.
Perhaps the trouble is that we have approached the problem from
the wrong angle. Rather than asking how one should compare functions
that are not polynomially-balanced, we should ask whether we really
care about such objects. What profits it a man to study the complexity
of f if |f(x)| is astronomical? Perhaps what we are really interested are
classes such as the following:
Definition B.1.14. The class of polynomially-balanced exponential-
time functions, FEXPPB, is the class of functions f : {0, 1}∗ → { 0, 1 }∗,
such that:
1. f is computable in deterministic exponential time.
2. There exists a polynomial p such that, for all x, p(|x|) ≥ |f(x)|.

This is a syntactic class – it is categorised by exponential time machines
with bounded output tapes – and as such it has complete problems.
It is also a very natural class, as one could imagine many problems
that take a long time to compute but do not present any difficulties
with the representation of the output. However this is all moot, as the
author does not have any FEXPPB-completeness results to share with
the reader, under any notion of reducibility stronger than ≤PT .
b.2 bounds and observations
Proposition B.2.1. Evaluation for Boolean games is #P-hard (in
the number of players) under Levin reductions.
Proof. We will reduce from #Sat.
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Let ϕ be a formula with n propositional variables. Consider a Boolean
game G with n players, every γi = ϕ and every Φi = { pi }, i.e. a single-
ton set. Let σ be a profile where every player plays pi with probability
1/2. Note that both G and σ can be constructed in time polynomial in
|ϕ|.
Clearly, σ realises every truth assignment with probability 1/2n, hence
ui(σ) = k/2n, where k is the number of satisfying assignments of ϕ.
The encoding function of the reduction takes ϕ to (G,σ), and the
decoding function takes x to x · 2n. The decoding function is efficiently
invertible by the function that takes y to y/2n, so this is a Levin reduc-
tion. q.e.d.
Corollary B.2.2. Evaluation for Boolean games is FP#P-hard (in
the number of players) under Turing reductions.
Proof. Evaluation is #P-hard, so one can simply trace the execution
of M ∈ FP#P, and every time M makes an oracle call replace it with
the appropriate call to Evaluation. q.e.d.
Fact B.2.3. Evaluation for k-player Boolean games is in FP.
Proof. Let pi denote the number of pure strategies in Player i’s support,
and mij the representation size of the weight Player i attaches to the
jth strategy in his support. The representation size of σ is thus the
sum of all such mij . If we use mi to represent the mean size of the
strategy weights chosen by Player i, the size of σ can be expressed with
greater perspicuity as ∑ pimi. We can thus see that the total number
of strategy profiles that could be realised by σ, ∏i≤k pi, is O(pk) for
p = maxi pi, and hence polynomial in the size of σ.
The naïve algorithm to compute ui(σ) will consider each of these∏
i∈N pi profiles in turn. For every such pure profile, ν, the algorithm
will compute the probability of ν eventuating, P (ν | σ), and if ν  γi
then the algorithm will add P (ν | σ) to the running total of ui(σ).
To compute P (ν | σ), we need to multiply k rationals. The rationals
are given as input so their size is trivially polynomial in the size of the
input, and k is constant, so this operation can be done in polynomial
time. Deciding whether ν  γi is polynomial in (|ν|, |γi|), the latter of
the two being part of the input and the former being proportional to
|Φ|. Finally, we add a polynomial number (one for each profile) of such
weights (which are polynomial in the size of the input, because they
are the output of a polynomial-time multiplication algorithm), which
is in FP. q.e.d.
Corollary B.2.4. IsNash for k-player Boolean games is coNP-complete.
Proof. For membership, given (G,σ) we can guess a pure strategy de-
viation for Player i and compare ui(σ−i(si)) in nondeterministic poly-
nomial time. If no such deviation exists, we must be at equilibrium.
B.2 bounds and observations 139
For completeness we reduce from Tautology: given ϕ, construct a
game with γ1 = ¬p ∧ ¬ϕ for a fresh p, and Φ1 the entire variable set.
Choose any strategy profile that sets p to true. If this is at equilibrium,
then it must mean that Player One has no deviation to satisfy ¬ϕ,
which can only be the case if ϕ is a tautology. q.e.d.
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